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The decision To compile This collecTion of essays on The urban 
political presence of the Latino community was based on a critically 
important question that is generally taken for granted when analyzing 
Latino politics. This question has to do with the definition of Latino poli-
tics in a changing political landscape in America. Is there, or can there be, 
a generic, overarching definition/identity of Latinos in the United States? 
The premise in approaching this question, and our resulting decision to 
compile these essays, is that the Latino community is one of the most 
diverse communities that can be defined ethnically. 
More importantly, as diversity within the Latino community intensified 
toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the question 
of how Latino communities would relate to the larger changing political 
system,1 in what many political pundits called a post-racial era, became one 
of the most important questions facing both activists and scholars in the 
twenty-first century. An important factor to consider in this post-racial era 
is the emergence of particular political and electoral relationships between 
Latinos and the larger political community. 
We argue that before we can address the future of urban politics and the 
resulting public policy in a changing twenty-first century, we must begin 
with an analysis of how Latinos came to terms with the political reality 
in their communities and how they then addressed the “system” of gover-
nance where they found themselves at the close of the twentieth century. 
As evidenced by the chapters in this volume, which focus on the decade 
closing the twentieth century, Latinos learned not to depend on the federal, 
Introduction:
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state, and local governments for needed resources, and they have strongly 
emphasized their multiple forms and strategies of urban agency in their 
quest to influence the various public policy outcomes in their communities. 
In fact, the various forms and strategies of agency are contextual and stem 
from a historically consistent marginalization. In this context, Latino urban 
agency has taken many forms and strategies such as mobilization, networks, 
lobbies, legal challenges, coalitions, appointments, and representation. 
These articles take on greater importance if we are correct that to under-
stand where we are, we must start with community politics as it expressed 
itself before 9/11 and the explosion of politics that intensified an anti-immi-
grant, anti-Latino discourse that radically changed the context of commu-
nity empowerment and the promise of political inclusion. This collection 
of urban essays then represents the diverse ways that urban Latinos sought 
empowerment in an era that seemed to promise greater inclusion, that is, 
until 9/11. 
 In this context, various political scientists have focused on the polit-
ical struggle of the Latino community for social, economic, and political 
advancement in their respective urban communities. In their pioneering 
study Protest is Not Enough, Browning et al. attempt to document the 
resulting urban change through a theory of political incorporation and 
policy responsiveness. The major premise in their analysis is that the domi-
nant coalitions in these cities have diverse orientations toward minorities 
and their interests. As a consequence, they attempt a balanced approach 
using the characteristics of minority coalition to inform their analysis.2 
Their work is especially significant because they attempt to move beyond 
minority mobilization to develop a theory of incorporation, which for them 
means achieving something more than getting elected. Minorities must 
become an integral part of a coalition. That is to say, the coalition must be 
dominant if the interests of minority groups are to influence policy. 
On the Ground and Running
Our approach presents a picture of the community in all its diversity by 
focusing on the five major cities where the greatest demographic impact has 
occurred: San Antonio, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and Miami. In 
order to make sense of the seemingly chaotic diaspora that Latino growth 
in the United States represents today, this analysis goes where the Latino 
community can be seen exercising their political power. While there is a 
5
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multitude of community studies focusing on the Latino community across 
the urban landscape in the United States, this volume presents several 
studies that assess the diverse ways that these Latinos have exercised urban 
agency in the major cities that we have selected. The point is not to measure 
success or failure, but the process itself as these communities first identified 
the major issues in the context of their on-the-ground reality and second 
mobilized to address these issues. Hence, this book discusses the efforts 
of Latinos to address the diverse political realities that faced each of these 
communities at the approach of the twenty-first century. 
These essays will add to an understanding of Latino politics as a complex 
and diverse force in the broader, national political context. Ultimately, this 
volume in total adds to the epistemological discourse on how Latinos seek 
to exercise their agency to transform politics. Each case study offers us 
a different view of political incorporation. That is to say, what connects 
Latino communities in their efforts to shape their surroundings to their 
needs is their politics of inclusion into the local system that determines 
their lives. Our chapters frame, in their particular studies, that the power 
of the Latino community lies in its ability to exploit available political 
opportunity structures. Together these chapters offer us a glimpse of what 
national politics would reflect. 
Thus, a second premise in this volume is that the political future of the 
Latino community in the United States in the twenty-first century will 
be largely determined by the various roles they have played in the major 
urban centers across this nation. How this urban agency unfolded from San 
Antonio to Los Angeles to San Francisco, and from Chicago to Miami will 
go a long way to collectively shape the national political presence organiza-
tionally, legislatively, and electorally in the United States. Moreover, it will 
provide for a more nuanced and detailed understanding of Latino political 
incorporation nationally. 
Thus, the collective attempt in this volume is to understand not only 
how the Latino movement for political power unfolded in some of the 
largest and most important American cities, but also the possibilities 
(and limitations) of the present and future—the adequacy of political 
incorporation of this previously excluded group, the extent to which 
they pursue the broader goals of the movement, what they might not 
do in pursuit of those goals, and the obstacles they encounter. Given 
the diversity between the various “Latino” communities in this era, the 
shape and content of their urban political presence will be an impor-
tant factor in their ability to build coalitions within the more populous 
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urban regions and beyond their urban boundaries into the national 
arena of politics. 
To further bring the regional character of Latinos out in relief, one needs 
only to contrast it with how black politics gained its greatest momentum 
in the twentieth century. Through national politics that have covered 
everything from civil rights to the war on poverty, even their regional 
and local politics have, to a large extent, thrived from the national image 
that came from both their national political agenda as well as from the 
historic experience in a black and white America. While their overall 
experience is diverse from north to south, urban to rural, even state-to-
state, the galvanizing effects of a national civil rights agenda has firmly 
established African American politics in a national context. And while no 
one can, by any means, characterize the black community as one mono-
lithic community, they do have a common agenda by which they debate, 
disagree, and mobilize. 
On the other hand, the Latino community’s experience has been one 
of invisibility and/or exclusion from national politics. Hence, historically, 
the Latino community has had to resort to regional and local politics to 
address their political realities. Even in national politics, they have been 
approached regionally. The “Viva Kennedy” clubs in the 1960 presidential 
election are an early example of this regional approach to their communi-
ties.3 In 1959, the Kennedy campaign approached Juan McCormick, a long-
time Latino political activist in Arizona, to organize “Viva Kennedy” polit-
ical clubs throughout the Southwest to mobilize the Mexican American 
vote. The approach had to be further broken down into states. In Texas, 
Albert Peña, Jr. and others successfully worked this strategy beyond anyone’s 
wildest expectations, enabling Kennedy to carry Texas.4
Even in the midst of the Latino diaspora that the United States began 
to experience in the 1990s, Latino politics were still essentially a regional 
and/or urban phenomenon. The issues that defined Latinos were cast in a 
regional character; even immigration and bilingual education were cast in a 
regional context. One very specific issue, for example, that confronted only 
those who lived in the Los Angeles area, was the almost complete disenfran-
chisement of an entire community in East Los Angeles from urban gover-
nance. This issue, plus the history of rapid and intense capitalist corporate 
development in Southern California, placed the Latino community in this 
region in a very different situation than in most other regions or urban 
areas. Thus, as Latino communities emerged in all of the major urban 
centers in the United States, with no over-arching historical identity—such 
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as is found in the black/white experience that produced a national civil 
rights agenda—they were still anchored in a regional cast. 
Arising from this reality is the observation that from region to region, 
city to city, Latinos exhibit different cultural manifestations that speak 
to different origins as well as to different social, political, economic, and 
historical conditions. This leads to a third premise that across the urban 
political landscape, the Latino community has experienced different polit-
ical formations, strategies, and ultimately different political outcomes in 
their different urban settings. If this premise is correct, then we must assess 
the conditions of Latino urban agency (i.e., the potential or non-potential 
of that agency) from city to city, in order to be able to gauge the role Latinos 
will play at the national level. 
The Nature of Political Discourse
To move from disenfranchisement to political inclusion, Latinos have used 
a variety of methods. To explain the process of achieving and retaining polit-
ical power, political incorporation theory needs to be part of the discourse 
in this introduction. The theory of political incorporation is a central idea 
in the study of politics: when a group is politically incorporated, it has 
opportunities to influence public policy.5 According to Browning et al., 
political incorporation explains local “movements demanding the power 
of political equality and their ability to achieve it.”6 Political incorporation 
is a widely used term to measure the extent to which group interests are 
effectively represented in policymaking in government.7 At the lowest level, 
a group is not represented at all, that is, there are no elected officials from 
the group, and the group does not participate in the governing coalition 
that controls the political decision-making through its use of resources. At 
the next level, racial minorities have formal representation in a governing 
body, but the government body is dominated by a coalition resistant to 
minority group interests. The highest form of incorporation is when racial 
minorities have an equal or a leading role in a dominant coalition that is 
strongly committed to minority group interests. 
For Latinos, the achievement of political incorporation has been uneven. 
There is wide divergence in the levels of incorporation at the local, state, 
and national levels. Because this unevenness has unfolded differently in 
state and local contexts, the forms and strategies to achieve incorpora-
tion have evolved differently. In some contexts, Latinos were, until recently, 
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completely excluded from access to government. In other situations, they 
were partially included in a governing coalition as junior partners in polit-
ical party- or business-centered states. Under certain circumstances, they 
achieve an equally dominant role without the use of a biracial coalition 
(e.g., the Cubans in Miami). 
Manuel Castells, in his study of cities across the western part of the globe 
from Europe to Latin America to the United States, gives a more grass-
roots approach. His basic argument is that cities are in the end a product 
of conflict between elites who want to shape the city to their economic, 
social, and political needs, and communities who struggle to shape their 
urban experience to their particular community reality.8 This theory is not 
about incorporation strictly speaking. It is about how communities mobi-
lize to stop the advance of the broader economic and social intrusions that 
tend to not only disrupt their community but in reality undermine and 
destroy community. So in that sense, Castells was describing incorpora-
tion in his theoretical discussions of communities and how they maintain 
their identity. 
However stated, the four distinct pathways to political incorpora-
tion do not negate Castells theory of the city. One incorporation theory 
is political, and the other is sociological and historical. These pathways 
include 1) demand/protest,9 2) non-confrontational political evolution, 
3) legal challenges to structural barriers,10 and 4) coalition politics.11 The 
first pathway,12 demand/protest, includes violent and nonviolent protest 
(e.g., sit-ins, demonstrations, boycotts) and also includes more traditional 
tactics such as mass mobilization at city meetings and exchanges with city 
officials. Michelson’s chapter on Chicago addresses this angle of political 
incorporation. The second pathway is more gradual political evolution, 
without demand and protest. Instead, individuals in the Latino community 
are cultivated by political elites to run for office, usually as pro-business 
candidates and alternatives to more grassroots candidates. The chapters by 
DeLeon, Monforti et al., and Manzano and Vega exemplify this perspective 
of political incorporation. A third pathway is the use of legal challenges (i.e., 
voting-rights lawsuits that challenge redistricting and reapportionment 
plans) that lead to restructuring the electoral system. The fourth pathway is 
the use of coalition politics. Ambruster-Sandoval’s chapter on Latinos in Los 
Angeles speaks to this aspect of incorporation. Insights derived from these 
case studies might then serve as harbingers for other large metropolitan 
areas affected by the “internationalization” of their populations, economies, 




Around the turn of the twenty-first century, the racial and ethnic composi-
tion of the US population has changed markedly. Minorities are increasing 
their presence in the United States and will continue to do so for the fore-
seeable future. The Latino population is driving these transformations. 
While currently one of every six residents of the United States is Latino, it 
is projected that Latinos could account for one of every five residents by 
2035, one of every four by 2055, and one of every three by 2100.13 We begin 
the twenty-first century with the Latino population concentrated in five of 
the most populated states of the United States. According to the 2010 US 
Census, states with the largest share of Latino population are California 
(37.6%), Texas (37.6%), Florida (22.4%), New York (17.6%), and Illinois 
(15.8%). From these states, we picked the cities with the largest population 
of Latinos as indicated by the 2010 US Census: Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Miami, San Antonio, and Chicago.14 We included San Francisco because 
of its recent political battles and its comparable size in the Latino popu-
lation.15 The authors employ both qualitative and quantitative analysis in 
their approach to studying Latino agency. The authors discuss the different 
ways such progress can manifest itself in disparate cities. 
Chapter Organization
We begin with Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval’s chapter “Latino Political 
Agency in Los Angeles Past & Present.” The author carefully examines 
Latino political agency in Los Angeles, notably in relation to a past history 
of multi-racial coalitions of the left—a tradition that has continued into 
the ’90s and beyond against a brutal context of inter-racial (i.e., black-
brown) gang violence. They point out that Latino political agency can be 
both constrained and facilitated by where Latinos stand in reference to 
others. The authors add the helpful suggestion that pop culture, and music 
especially, has helped both to express and to accelerate multi-racial politics 
in the city. 
“The Rebirth of Latino Urban Agency in San Francisco: From the MCO 
to the MAC, 1967–2002,” written by Richard Edward DeLeon links specific 
place-based political, economic, and cultural features of San Francisco 
to the dynamics of insurgent Latino politics as well as to wider circles of 
progressive politics in the city. With battles over land used as his dynamic 
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context, DeLeon analyzes the changing tides of urban resistance, the ebb 
and flow of victory, defeat, and re-emergence, including the importance of 
the introduction of district elections as a main institutional change. This 
reform favored a politics in which Latino working-class interests exploited 
electoral strategies that emphasized communal, place, and ideological 
considerations above identity politics. The chapter allows us to see how 
the Latino community really does construct their “political agency” in the 
process of engaging a city with a specific history of progressive politics and 
a changing political design. 
Melissa R. Michelson’s “The Fight for School Equity in Chicago’s Latino 
Neighborhoods” focuses on the long and embattled minority in Chicago, 
causing a historic alliance between Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. 
She details the emerging patterns of Latino political action. Michelson 
points to a grassroots level of Latino political agency and organization that 
drew inspiration from, but was not reliant on, the growth in the Latino 
population in the United States as well as the growth in the number of 
elected political representation by Latinos. 
Monforti, Flores, and Moreno’s chapter on Miami is about how one 
leader, in this case the mayor, became the agent of change. Similar to 
Stone’s analysis of Atlanta’s black leadership,16 Diaz’s populist persona and 
minority developers transformed the city’s image from one of corruption 
to one of renaissance. Monforti et al. detail the ascension of Diaz as mayor 
and the way in which his leadership (and growth machine strategies) led to 
unprecedented growth in the city’s real estate market, changing its skyline 
and creating a population shift. 
Manzano and Vega’s “‘I Don’t See Color, I Just Vote For the Best 
Candidate’: The Persistence of Ethnic Polarized Voting” examines ethnic 
polarization in urban elections. Using the 1991 and 2005 San Antonio 
mayoral races, the authors consider the role of ethnicity from the perspec-
tive of both the voters and candidates. They provide a statistically sophis-
ticated analysis of the most orthodox form of American political agency: 
voting. The authors find that ethnic voting is a fact of political life in San 
Antonio. 
The last chapter, titled “Latino Urban Agency in the twenty-first Century,” 
highlights the growing political power of Latinos in cities, or more specifi-
cally, their political agency. This volume encompasses everything from 
a diversity of cities, to the heterogeneity of the Latino population in the 
United States, to the conventional and unconventional forms of political 
agency. The political incorporation of Latinos in these five major urban 
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areas suggest that Latinos are in fact gaining access to the same political 
institutions that worked so hard to marginalize them. These case studies 
will allow us to project what national politics look like when Latinos exer-
cise their agency. 
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aT The Time of california sTaTehood in 1850, The firsT los angeles 
City Council included eight members: seven were of Mexican origin and 
only one was Anglo American. In the decades that followed, however, the 
political power and influence of the old Mexican Californio elite—who 
became downwardly mobile Mexican Americans after 1848—began to 
wane.1 So dramatic was the ensuing loss of political representation that 
followed, that after 1881 no Latino sat on the Los Angeles City Council for 
sixty-nine years, until 1949 when Edward R. Roybal won the Ninth District 
Council seat by a two-thirds margin. Roybal’s victory came after two years 
of organizing in the Mexican American community by the Community 
Service Organization (CSO), a civil rights organization that Roybal founded 
in 1947 with the support of Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation. The 
aim of CSO was to address the many problems suffered by Latinos in Los 
Angeles and to provide those Latinos with the meaningful political repre-
sentation that they had lacked since the late nineteenth century. In 1948 
alone, the multi-racial, but Latino-led CSO registered over fifteen thou-
sand new voters in Los Angeles, with the help of unions, Catholic parishes, 
and “members of other ethnic groups throughout the city.”2
Roybal’s grassroots activism and his eventual election to the Los Angeles 
City Council in the context of systematic marginalization of Latinos can be 
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Diverse Conflicts, Diverse Coalitions, 
and Fates that Intertwine
Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval
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seen as emblematic of the shape of Latino political agency in Los Angeles. 
Specifically Roybal’s political actions exemplify the long-term significance 
of four elements that continue to characterize Latino political agency in the 
city to this day. These four dimensions are 1) the intermittent emergence 
of community leaders and new community organizations in response 
to systematic forms of Latino subordination; 2) a praxis in Los Angeles 
Latino politics that defines Latino politics broadly to include not only elec-
toral politics, but also grassroots politics/social movement organizing and 
cultural production; 3) the intersection of labor organizing (and some-
times religious networks) with Latino politics; and 4) the significance in 
Latino politics in Los Angeles of building coalitions with members of other 
racial and ethnic groups. 
This fourth dimension is sometimes overlooked, or denied, as part 
of Latino politics.3 Yet in California, the interconnection between the 
political voices of Latinos and other minority groups began even before 
California was a state. At the 1848 California Constitutional Convention, 
some white delegates sought to exclude non-whites from the franchise. It 
fell to the eight Mexican-origin delegates present to object. They argued 
that Mexican citizenship—while undeniably practiced through a social 
class system that had subordinated indigenous peoples—had abolished 
slavery in the Mexican Republic and extended voting rights regardless of 
race. The Mexican delegates contended therefore that under the conditions 
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on territorial sale and transfer, former 
Mexican citizens including non-whites (i.e. mestizos, Native Americans, and 
blacks)—thus could not be legally denied the franchise as new American 
citizens.4 The implications of the debate were clear however: Mexican 
Americans were not considered white, and their voting rights and political 
influence were conferred by revocable exception. The eventual demise of 
Latino representation on the Los Angeles City Council demonstrates that 
disenfranchisement of Latinos did take place. Yet these historical events 
indicate that from the outset, Latino political agency in California and Los 
Angeles has traditionally been bound up with the political voices of other 
marginalized groups. 
Speaking philosophically, if agency is the capacity to make choices, then 
the exercise of political agency by Latinos in urban settings is conditioned 
by the circumstances under which political choices are made and acted 
upon.5 As the historical examples just described indicate, political agency 
for Latinos in Los Angeles historically has been both constrained and facil-
itated by the relationships in which Latinos have stood with reference to 
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other racial and ethnic groups in the city and in the region. As those rela-
tions have shifted over time, so too has the latitude open to Latinos for 
specific acts of political agency in Los Angeles. In this chapter, I present 
and analyze various examples that illustrate all four of the character-
istics I consider to be defining of Latino political agency in Los Angeles. 
I also situate the description of these four dimensions in the context of 
contemporary Latino politics in Los Angeles including important demo-
graphic shifts, economic relations, and interracial conflict and coopera-
tion, focusing in particular on the perceptible rise in interracial violence 
between blacks and Latinos that occurred in the middle and late 2000s. 
This growth in violent interracial conflict is considered by some to be 
reshaping the political landscape upon which Latinos are able to act politi-
cally in Los Angeles. Many see it as a major stumbling block to political 
progress for both blacks and Latinos in the city. In addition to consid-
ering the characteristic dimensions of Latino politics in Los Angeles, I also 
broadly consider, therefore, whether the history of Latino coalition poli-
tics in Los Angeles offers useful resources with which to understand and 
address current conflicts between blacks and Latinos in the city. 
Political, Economic, and Social Context of 
Contemporary Latino Politics in Los Angeles. 
The Spanish-speaking population had become a minority in California—
roughly 13% of the population—by 1848, but the proportion of Latinos 
in California and in Los Angeles have rebounded over time.6 In 2005, the 
US Census Bureau estimated that Latinos constituted 35.2% of California’s 
36 million residents. In Los Angeles County however, Latinos represented 
a full 46.8% of the population, thereby exceeding the number of non-
Latino whites (who are 29.5% of the population) by 17%. Latinos also 
exceed in large numbers other “minority” groups in Los Angeles County, 
which include, by percentage, Asians (13.1%), African Americans (9.7%) 
and Native Americans (1.1%).7 In addition, recent immigrants continue 
to comprise large proportions of Latinos in Los Angeles even as immigrant 
destinations in the United States continue to diversify. In 2000, for example, 
California had become home to 35.4% of all recent Mexican immigrants.8 
Moreover in recent decades, Latino immigrant streams have come to Los 
Angeles not only from Mexico, but also from countries throughout Central 
and South America, particularly Guatemala and El Salvador.9 Given Los 
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Angeles’ current racial/ethnic profile, its history, and its continuing status 
as a destination for immigrants from Mexico, Central and Latin America, 
South Asia, and the Pacific Rim, the demographic trends that have made 
Los Angeles a “minority-majority” city are likely to continue. At the turn 
of the twenty-first century, the number of foreign-born residents in Los 
Angeles was 36.2%, and over half (54.1%) of the children in Los Angeles 
over age five spoke a language other than English at home.10
As the Latino population in Los Angeles has expanded and civil rights 
activity continued, electoral representation of Latinos in the city has also 
continued to grow albeit somewhat unevenly. Following Edward Roybal’s 
election to the District 9 City Council seat in 1949, he served on the council 
until 1962. Afterward, however, no Latino served on the City Council until 
Richard Alatorre won the District 14 seat in 1985. Since that year, at least 
one, and recently up to four, Latinos have served on the council each term. 
Richard Alatorre held the District 14 seat until 1998 and was followed in 
it by three other Latinos, Nick Pacheco (1999–2002), Antonio Villaraigosa 
(2003–2004), and most recently by José Huizar (2005–present). Likewise, 
the District 1 council seat has been held by Latinos since Gloria Molina 
assumed the seat between 1987 and 1991. Mike Hernández won the 
District 1 seat after Molina (1992–2000) and he, in turn, has been followed 
in it by Ed Reyes who currently remains on the council (2001–present). 
More recently Latinos have gained new council representation in District 
7 (Richard Alarcon 1994–1998 and Alex Padilla 2001–2005), and in 2003, 
Tony Cardenas became the first Latino to be elected in District 3.11 In addi-
tion to representation on the Los Angeles City Council, Latinos have been 
represented on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and the Los 
Angeles School Board.12 Most importantly, Antonio Villaraigosa was elected 
as the first Latino mayor of Los Angeles in 2005. Villaraigosa took office 
with broad electoral support not only from Latinos, but also from blacks 
and whites in the city.13
In terms of social economic stratification, Latinos and blacks in Los 
Angeles—consistent with conditions nationwide—are over-represented 
among the city’s poor. Yet studies show that despite their relative poverty, 
Latinos in California as a whole, including Los Angeles, have consistently 
had the highest rates of labor market participation of any ethnic or racial 
group in the state including non-Latino whites, Asian/Pacific Islanders and 
African Americans. Since 1940, of all these groups, California Latinos—
including immigrant and native-born Latinos—have had “the longest work 
week, the greatest involvement in the wealth-generating private sector, the 
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lowest use of public assistances, and the greatest propensity to form intact 
families.”14 In recent years, some segments of the Los Angeles economy in 
which occupation segmentation has been racialized have shifted: segments 
that were once dominated by blacks (such as janitorial services in the 1980s) 
have slowly become dominated by Latinos, including many unauthorized 
Latino residents.15 Such patterns of economic succession have potentially 
fed perceptions that there is strong competition for jobs between blacks 
and Latinos in Los Angeles—and that Latinos are prevailing in this compe-
tition on the basis of immigration. 
Some political analysts contend that labor competition—or at least the 
perception of competition—is the primary source of increasing conflict 
between blacks and Latinos, and as such as a key context for Latino poli-
tics. At the same time, however, some studies have shown that Latino 
immigrants have not significantly displaced African Americans in the 
Los Angeles economy.16 Nevertheless, perceptions—even ill-founded 
ones—can spur conflict under conditions of general duress. Without 
doubt, among the increasing numbers of Latinos in Los Angeles, there is 
both visible upward mobility and continued poverty to be seen. In 2002, 
for example, Latinos owned 20.9% of businesses in Los Angeles County, 
while blacks owned only 5.8%. While this percentage of black business 
ownership is significant given that blacks represent less than 10% of the 
population (compared to Latinos as nearly 47%), the fact that blacks are 
proportionately more likely to own businesses than Latinos is unlikely to 
be perceived against the sheer numbers of Latinos and the visible economic 
success of some upwardly mobile Latinos vis-à-vis poor blacks in the city. 
Racial tensions around employment and immigration are thus an impor-
tant current context of contemporary Latino political agency in Los Angeles. 
Those tensions may be one reason why relatively few African Americans 
participated in the immigrant rights rallies held across the country in 
2006.17 At the same time, low participation among African Americans in 
the immigrant rights movement may not be indicative of widespread anti-
immigrant sentiment among blacks in Los Angeles. Despite their concen-
trated efforts vigilante groups such as the Minutemen (who have ties with 
white supremacist groups) have been largely unsuccessful in their efforts to 
recruit African Americans to nativist efforts in Los Angeles.18
What is undeniable, however, is that cultural and historical factors 
such as white supremacy, slavery, and colorism in the Americas, especially 
in Mexico, have carved the divides that clearly do exist between blacks 
and Latinos in contemporary Los Angeles.19 There can be no doubt, for 
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example, that anti-black racism persists in Mexico, and among many 
US-born Latinos, and that anti-black racism is sometimes articulated in 
transnational as well as domestic political discourse. Former President 
Vicente Fox illustrated this brand of persistent racism when he defended a 
Mexican government-backed postage stamp that reinforced stereotypes of 
blacks.20 Fox further mimicked racial stereotypes and potentially inflamed 
brown-Latino tensions in Los Angeles when he stated that Mexican immi-
grants “filled with dignity, willingness, and ability to work, are doing jobs 
that not even blacks want to do there in the United States.”21 Moreover, race 
riots in public high schools in Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Bernardino 
Counties in the middle and late 2000s demonstrate that racial and ethnic 
group conflicts between blacks and Latinos do persist and fall across 
numerous generational lines.22
It is against this backdrop of Latino immigration, shifting ethnic/racial 
labor patterns, persistent poverty among many blacks and Latinos, and 
increased political influence among Latinos, that an increase in violence 
between black and Latino Angelinos took place in middle and late 2007. 
Some called the conflict between the two groups a “race war” or “ethnic 
cleansing,” terms that sparked controversy and opposition.23 In particular, 
the tragic and senseless killing of Cheryl Green in the Harbor Gateway 
region of Los Angeles sparked renewed interest in the troubled and some-
times toxic relationship between Latinos (“browns”) and African Americans 
(“blacks”). Green, a fourteen-year-old African American young woman, 
was standing on a sidewalk in the middle of the day with friends when 
two men walked up and shot her, apparently for no other reason than the 
color of her skin.24 The assailants were members of the 204th Street gang, 
a Latino organization that has been involved with numerous crimes and 
murders that have targeted African Americans in the racially mixed area 
known as the “Strip” that connects South-Central Los Angeles to the Ports 
of Long Beach and Los Angeles.25
Green’s death generated widespread attention across the city. The Los 
Angeles Times covered the story almost daily for over a month, and its 
coverage gave the impression that a sectarian civil war, not unlike the one 
being fought between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, had broken out between 
brown and black Angelinos. Harbor Gateway residents responded to this 
divisive rhetoric with a series of interracial peace rallies.26 Unfortunately 
tensions persisted. The Green case, along with mounting concern about 
rising gang violence throughout the city, prompted Mayor Antonio 
Villaraigosa, LAPD Chief William Bratton, and FBI Director Robert 
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Mueller to announce that they would “strategically dismantle” the 204th 
Street gang through legal measures and expanded patrols.27 Several days 
after the crackdown or “surge” went into effect however, a Latino shot a 
thirty-four-year-old African American man as he picked up his daughters 
from a sleepover at a friend’s house.28 This second shooting, combined with 
the killing of a Latino male shot by an African American male two weeks 
before Green was killed, left many people in the affected neighborhoods 
shaken and afraid to leave their homes.29 The 204th Street gang called for 
a truce, but local and federal agents have not relented and so the “war” or 
“counter-insurgency” against violent street gangs continues.30
Unfortunately, Cheryl Green’s death can and should be seen as one of 
the most recent killings in a history of similar inter-racial violence. In 1996 
for example, Mark Hammonds, a black high school star football player, 
was shot and killed by a Latino gang member in Hawaiian Gardens, a tiny 
community located near Cerritos and Long Beach.31 In the mid-1990s, the 
Avenue 43s, a Latino gang started targeting African Americans in Highland 
Park, located in downtown Los Angeles.32 Avenue 43 members shot and 
killed Anthony Prudhomme, Christopher Bowser, and Kenneth Wilson in 
1999 and 2000. Before shooting Wilson, one gang member reportedly stated, 
“Hey, wanna kill a nigger?”33 In 2006, African American gang members 
killed three Latinos (Larry Marcial, David Marcial, and Luis Cervantes) in 
South Los Angeles.34 That same year, a three-year-old Latina girl named 
Kaitlyn Avila was murdered by an African American affiliated with the 
Black P-Stones, a gang that is active in the Baldwin Village neighborhood 
known as the “jungle.”35
As mentioned earlier, these deaths were framed by a variety of sources 
(including mainstream newspapers like the Los Angeles Times and LA 
Opinion, along with internet bloggers, social advocacy organizations, 
and flat-out racist groups) as “ethnic cleansing,” sometimes drawing on 
sensationalist claims that brown-on-black violence is the secret work of 
the Mexican Mafia.36 Conflict between the Mexican Mafia and the Black 
Guerrilla Army (two prison gangs) purportedly spilled into Los Angeles 
streets because La Eme’s leaders supposedly “green-lighted” all African 
Americans for attack.37 It is as yet unclear whether this so-called “fatwa” 
explains why brown-on-black violence has increased over the past fifteen 
years, or why black-on-brown violence continues. Whether or not orders 
to kill are being issued by the Black Guerrilla Army or some other shadowy 
force, however, prison gang and street gang rivalries, are unlikely to fully 
explain rising conflict between Los Angeles’ brown and black communities 
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and/or associated reluctance to resist violent outcomes collectively. In any 
case, the current opportunities and future prospects for Latino political 
agency in Los Angeles are very much shaped by how black vs. brown 
violence is interpreted and addressed not only by Los Angeles Mayor 
Antonio Villaraigosa, but also by community organizations and those who 
might build coalitions to respond to this and related problems affecting 
Latinos in the city. 
While tensions between black and Latino communities are still undeni-
able, “brown-on-black” violence has waned over the past few years. This 
does not mean that conflicts that once existed have since mysteriously 
vanished because they most certainly have not, and yet the near-hysteria 
around the so-called “race war” has quieted down, making it possible to 
recognize there has been a long and largely-overlooked history of brown-
black cooperation and coalition building in Los Angeles that forms a signif-
icant part of Latino agency. It is this history, as well as present, that some 
analysts, who seem quick to reject what has been called a mystical or politi-
cally naïve “presumed alliance” between blacks and browns, seemingly and 
stunningly ignore or dismiss as irrelevant.38
It may be that such an erasure of black-Latino cooperation in Los Angeles’ 
political history is itself an aspect of Los Angeles political culture. In his 
book, The History of Forgetting, Norman Klein argues that Los Angeles is 
generally constructed and understood as a city without a past.39 Thus while 
Native peoples, Chicanos, Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, 
women, workers, and queer people have always been in Los Angeles, their 
histories have not often appeared in scholarly literature until quite recently. 
New works by scholars and writers are correcting this chronic forgetful-
ness and are bringing back to academic and mainstream urban political 
memory the kinds of political histories that have remained obscured to 
many Angelinos as well as to those interested in understanding Latino 
political agency in Los Angeles’ past, present, and future.40
As a contribution to this recovery, I hope not only to identify and 
describe main characteristics of Latino political agency in Los Angeles, but 
to do so in a way that casts light on how that political agency has included 
significant cases in which Latinos came together with blacks and others to 
respond to various forms of crisis and/or to systematic forms of subordina-
tion in Los Angeles. I contend that historical and contemporary organiza-
tions such as the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee and the Bus Riders 
Union demonstrate that black and brown coalitions are significant part 
of Los Angeles political history for Latinos.41 That history in turn links 
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Latino political practice to the histories and practices of other groups in 
Los Angeles in ways that can bring about—and in some instances already 
has brought about—meaningful change. I also argue that brown and black 
coalitions can be seen in the broader popular culture—in the production 
of musical groups such as Ozomatli and Rage Against the Machine and in 
comic strips like La Cucaracha. By describing Latino political agency in Los 
Angeles in terms of these examples it is possible not only to see the primary 
characteristics of Latino politics in the city (that is new community organi-
zations and leaders, broadly conceived political forms, labor and religious 
elements in political efforts, multiracial/multiethnic coalitions) but also to 
counter the apocalyptic “racial war” narrative that currently threatens to 
narrow or complicate the political agency of Latinos by constructing more 
rigid racial divides in the city. 
From Resistance to Subordination to New Grassroots 
Leaders and Community Organizations: 
The Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee
The literature on the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee (SLDC) and 
the Zoot Suit Riots is relatively extensive.42 The SLDC was a small and 
short-lived, multiracial committee that included Euro Americans, 
Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Japanese Americans.43 Carey 
McWilliams, the well-known writer, attorney, and human and labor 
rights activist, was its chairperson.44 He nominated a politically inexperi-
enced Jewish woman named Alice Greenfield McGrath to be the SLDC’s 
executive secretary after four Chicano men were wrongly convicted of 
killing José Diaz on August 1, 1942 at a location called the Sleepy Lagoon. 
Greenfield McGrath had previously organized for the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) and had done some political work around 
the Spanish Civil War. Most crucially, she joined the Communist Party 
in the late 1930s. While recovering from an illness, one of the defendants’ 
attorneys, George Shibley, visited her, asking that she read the court tran-
script, identify contradictions and inconsistencies, and prepare notes for a 
possible appeal. Greenfield McGrath later visited the defendants (male as 
well as female) in prison and wrote and edited a newsletter that kept them, 
their families, and supporters apprised of the appeal and contemporary 
political events. Seeing her hard work and commitment, McWilliams 
asked her to be SLDC executive secretary, to which she replied, “I have 
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never done that before,” to which he politely, but firmly said, “And now 
you will.”45
Greenfield McGrath took the position and played a central role in the 
committee. Yet she did not win the defendants’ release single-handedly as 
is sometimes suggested in retellings of the story.46 Moreover, while many 
Chicano authors and activists have rightly argued that the role of Chicanos 
in the committee has been overlooked, that outlook has also tended to 
ignore how involved African Americans and Japanese Americans were with 
the committee.47 Euro American men and women were also deeply involved 
with the SLDC, a fact that some Chicanos may have downplayed given the 
generally nationalist orientation of the Chicano Movement and the racial 
myopia of the white feminist movement.48
The committee’s main functions were to spread publicity about the 
case and to raise funds for the appeal.49 Alice Greenfield McGrath recalls 
that the “Jewish, labor, communist, left, Spanish-language, and black press” 
all covered and wrote about the case. In the case of the “black press,” the 
California Eagle ran numerous articles about the Sleepy Lagoon case and 
later, the so-called “zoot suit” riots that took place in Los Angeles in June 
1943.50 The Eagle’s publisher was Charlotta Bass who ran the paper for nearly 
forty years between the 1910s and 1950s. During that time period, she was 
a tireless advocate for racial equality and worked on many social justice 
campaigns, including the one that eventually helped abolish racial cove-
nants and residential segregation.51 Bass’ positions often mirrored those of 
the Communist Party and she was regularly branded a “red” for her politics. 
Despite those attacks, she remained one of the SLDC’s key supporters and 
she stayed very active in leftist circles, running as the Progressive Party’s 
vice-presidential candidate in 1952. 
We should mention here too that outside the Black Press, some black 
writers like Chester Himes also explored the Zoot Suit Riots. While Himes 
has been rightly critiqued for partially defining the riots in sexual terms, he 
wrote articles in the California Eagle clearly stating, “The zoot suit riots are 
race riots.”52 It should be remembered that the Zoot Suit Riots took place the 
same year that race riots involving mostly African Americans took place in 
Detroit and Harlem.53 Himes’ classic Los Angeles-based novel, If He Hollers 
Let Him Go, concludes with an intriguing passage about brown/black soli-
darity in which two zoot-suiters who “wore bagged drapes” and “talked in 
melodious Mexican lilt” are conscripted into the Army, along with a black 
man who had been falsely accused of rape, during World War II.54 Himes 
therefore positions brown and black men on the frontlines, fighting for 
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“freedom” overseas, while they (along with women of color, whom he over-
looks) were still not free back home. 
Thus contrary to some scholarly interpretation, and in contrast to 
the idea of an inevitable racial divide between Latinos and blacks, the 
SLDC is an example of cooperation not only among Latinos and Anglos 
(Bert Corona and Josefina Fierro de Bright were the most active from the 
Latino community, aside from the defendants and their families), but also 
some African Americans. All three communities—whites, browns, and 
blacks—all helped raise funds, most of which came from CIO-affiliated 
labor unions (the Communist Party also provided resources).55 In 
addition—and quite strikingly—some Japanese American internees in 
Manzanar internment camp located in the Owens Valley, 250 miles north 
of Los Angeles, raised funds for the Sleepy Lagoon defendants. Internees 
did this by walking the grounds of the internment camp that they had 
been relocated to during World War II. Many internees had actually 
lived in Boyle Heights, a multiracial community that included African 
Americans, Mexicans, Eastern Europeans, Russians, and Jews until the 
late 1940s, before being shipped to Manzanar.56 These shared experi-
ences created a bond between the Japanese American internees and the 
Mexican American defendants. The fundraising effort in Manzanar, given 
the harsh conditions that existed there, was admittedly quite small, but 
the War Worker, a progressive World War II-era paper, reported several 
teenagers gathered ten dollars picking up coins around the internment 
campgrounds. Those funds were eventually delivered to the SLDC.57
Evidence of interethnic connection are not restricted to Japanese 
American interest in the plight of Mexican Americans. In one case, a bira-
cial (Mexican/Irish) teenager named Ralph Loza also extended himself in 
a quite selfless way on behalf of the Japanese Americans who had become 
important friends to him. Loza also lived in Boyle Heights and when the 
internment order came down, he said, “If they (his Japanese American 
friends) go, I will go too.” Consequently, Loza came to be held in the 
Manzanar internment camp, ironically without his neighborhood friends 
who were sent to Heart Mountain, Wyoming. Until fairly recently Loza’s 
name was relatively unknown; however, a documentary film released in 
2004 made his story more recognizable.58
The SLDC is one of the better-known cases that illustrates how effective 
multi-racial coalitions can be. Alice Greenfield McGrath made this point 
clear when she held up, during a class presentation, a picture of a group 
of workers who were holding signs and demanding an eight-hour day in 
24
The Roots of Latino Urban Agency
the early 1900s. The signs were in the workers’ native languages (English, 
Spanish, Yiddish, Russian, German, etc.), but despite this fact, they all 
worked together and succeeded. They bridged their multiple identities and 
passed the bill, showing the power of “coalition, coalition, coalition,” as 
McGrath memorably put it. It is true that the SLDC didn’t last very long 
after the defendants were released.59 The committee was established for one 
clear purpose—to win the release of the defendants. This goal was achieved 
through a unique coalition that included white, brown, black, and yellow 
peoples, as well as women, workers, prisoners, and internees. Seen from the 
perspective of Latino political agency, the “least of these,”—that is, a variety 
of marginalized and powerless people—made history.
Social Movement Politics and Interracial Coalitions:
The Bus Riders Union
The racial composition of the Bus Riders Union (BRU) mirrors the Sleepy 
Lagoon Defense Committee. The BRU is a multiracial organization that 
includes Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Euro Americans. 
The BRU emerged from the Labor Community Strategy Center, a self-defined 
“act tank” that was established on the heels of the campaign to stop General 
Motors from shutting down its Van Nuys-based plant in the late 1980s.60 
That was a time period when Los Angeles, like other urban centers across 
the United States, experienced “deindustrialization” that devastated union-
ized workers, especially black workers in South-Central Los Angeles who 
lost thousands of jobs. The Strategy Center fought those plant shut-downs 
and it battled environmental racism along the Harbor Gateway strip—the 
same area that was plagued with gang violence in the mid-2000s. 
The BRU was established in the early 1990s to “confront and defeat 
transit racism”—meaning the organization emphasized the fact that the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) was spending tremendous 
resources on a rail system that very few middle- and upper-class white 
riders were using and hardly any on an overcrowded, pollution-spewing 
bus system that mostly lower-income, working-class people of color were 
riding. The BRU filed a lawsuit against the MTA to create a transportation 
system that would serve all its riders in a fair, just, and environmentally 
sustainable manner. These issues, along with its very name (which symbol-
ized its roots in the labor and civil rights movements and implied that it 
might sign a collective bargaining agreement), allowed the BRU to create a 
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unique local “movement of movements” that focused on labor, anti-racist, 
feminist, environmental, and global issues.61
The BRU’s lawsuit against the MTA was not the only “weapon of the weak” 
that the organization relied on.62 During the lengthy, four-year campaign 
(1992–1996), BRU activists held boisterous rallies and demonstrations, 
testified before public hearings, and organized “guerrilla” (improvisational) 
street theater actions. The organization also conducted its meetings in three 
different languages (Spanish, English, and Chinese), published trilingual 
flyers, and a bilingual newsletter. The BRU also linked up with the NAACP’s 
Constance (“Connie”) Rice to claim that the MTA had violated the civil 
rights of its riders of color through spending disproportionate resources 
on a rail system that mostly benefited white riders.63 This innovative legal 
strategy enabled the BRU to tie itself to the historic Montgomery bus 
boycott that helped launch the Civil Rights movement in the mid-1950s.64
The creative, militant, and multiracial social movement that the BRU 
helped create eventually succeeded in a variety of ways. In 1996, the MTA 
signed a $1 billion consent decree with the BRU to improve the city’s bus 
service. The ten-year decree obligated the MTA to purchase over three 
hundred new “green” (environmentally-friendly) buses and to cut spending 
on the rail system. This outcome was a significant victory that gave the BRU 
“collective bargaining rights” for over four hundred thousand bus riders in 
Los Angeles County. The MTA slowly bought more buses and conditions 
improved, but it continued to challenge the consent decree, appealing it all 
the way to the US Supreme Court in 2002. The court refused to hear the 
case, but a federal judge ruled that the MTA “substantially complied” with 
the decree, lifting and thereby ending federal oversight of the agency.65 
The BRU immediately denounced this decision, emphasizing significant 
problems still exist for bus riders—including low-wage workers, students, 
poor people, and the homeless—throughout the county. That movement 
campaign for transportation, environmental, and racial justice in Los 
Angeles thus continues. 
Latina/o Political Participation & Latina Labor Leadership: 
Justice for Janitors, HERE Local 11, and 
the 1933 Dressmaker’s Strike 
In Los Angeles, labor organizing has also become an important locus for 
political agency among Latinos. One widely recognized and important 
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example is known as “Justice for Janitors”—a labor organizing effort that 
took place in the 1990s organizing janitors, many Latino and many unau-
thorized, for better working conditions.66 It was among the first labor orga-
nizing efforts to focus on organizing unauthorized Latino workers in Los 
Angeles. The significance of this movement lies not only in its emphasis 
on unauthorized immigrants but also its diversity of membership under 
circumstances of racial and ethnic tension. English filmmaker Ken Loach 
captures the dynamics of these tensions in his 2001 film Bread and Roses, 
a fictionalized account of the Justice for Janitors campaign. The film’s two 
main characters are Maya, a recent immigrant woman from Mexico, and 
Sam, a white male, Jewish, college-educated union organizer. Maya is a 
tough and self-sufficient, as well as sometimes impulsive character who is 
willing to fight those who would subordinate her. In the film’s initial scenes 
Maya extricates herself from nearly being raped by a coyote who brought 
her over the border. She later challenges several men who verbally insult 
and grab her in a bar. 
Despite being an unauthorized resident, Maya eventually helps lead the 
campaign for better working conditions for janitors in Los Angeles. Before 
she takes that position, the viewer first sees her wildly pushing around a 
vacuum cleaner until Ella, a black co-worker, comes to her assistance. Ella, 
a seasoned worker, calmly shows Maya how to properly use it. This scene 
illustrates two things—first before the 1980s, most janitors in Los Angeles 
were African American.67 The rise in immigration in the 1980s and 1990s 
from Mexico and Central America changed the industry’s racial and ethnic 
composition and generated tensions between blacks and Latinos, especially 
in South-Central Los Angeles where concentrations of Latinos made them 
a numerical majority by the end of the 1990s. Despite these changes and 
resulting tensions however, black, brown, and white janitors worked—and 
this is my second point—together and successfully challenged some of the 
most powerful economic interests in the city. These workers negotiated 
contracts that improved wages and working conditions and gave them a 
sense of dignity and respect. Here again Justice for Janitors, like SLDC and 
the Bus Riders Union, serves to bring together browns, blacks, whites and 
others in a multiracial coalition working for social justice. 
Currently, Latino labor organizing in Los Angeles can be seen as an 
avenue of political agency for Latinos for several reasons. First, the effort to 
secure the rights and dignity of working unauthorized Latino residents is 
politically important in that Latinos are politically marginalized in part as a 
function of how unauthorized Latino immigrants are sought as exploitable 
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labor on one hand and used as scapegoats for the economic practices that 
impoverish Latinos and other minority groups on the other. This political 
double bind, and its dire social and economic effects on Latinos, is one of 
the most difficult problems now facing Latino communities. Thus, for some 
Latinos that wish to work to increase political voice for Latinos, gaining 
recognition, fair compensation and treatment, and dignity for working, 
poor Latinos who labor in this country is a crucial step is to securing that 
voice. In turn, labor organizing is regarded as an important means by which 
to achieve that recognition, and in turn, to improve the circumstances in 
Latino communities and the prospects for Latino political empowerment 
and effective voice. 
Second, Los Angeles labor movements, including the Justice for Janitors 
movement, have become a place for significant participation by Latinas, 
who in some cases have assumed highly visible leadership roles. In Los 
Angeles, Maria Elena Durazo, who is currently the Executive Secretary-
Treasurer of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor and served as 
President of HERE (Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union) 
Local 11, has been a particularly visible and influential labor leader who 
has spearheaded efforts to shift Los Angeles union activity toward orga-
nizing unauthorized immigrants. The participation of Latinas in labor 
leadership is particularly important because it can significantly affect the 
kind of labor (or political) organizing that is prioritized and accomplished. 
Studies in Latina political participation show that in exercising political 
agency Latinas frequently prioritize cultivating networks of people who 
can effectively communicate and cooperate and then tapping those 
networks to work toward specific collective goals. In other words, Latinas 
in leadership roles thus often (though not always) approach leadership in a 
gendered manner, using empathic sensibilities and other common female 
social skills to cultivate working relationships that can sustain collective 
mobilization. The result is non-traditional forms of leadership that priori-
tize group cohesion formation and intra-group communication over the 
creation of hierarchically ordered kinds of leadership.68
In a labor organizing context, such gendered variation in leadership 
styles can, and in Los Angeles commonly has, facilitated modes of orga-
nizing that enhance the civic knowledge and inclination to participate 
in electoral and other politics among Latinos, independent of their citi-
zenship status. In her leadership of HERE Local 11 for example, Maria 
Elena Durazo sought to increase the low levels of participation by rank 
and file Latinos in the working efforts of the union by producing union 
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materials in Spanish and holding bilingual meetings. While union 
membership had been 75% Spanish-speakers, its previous male union 
leaders had not taken these simple measures to facilitate communication 
among members and between members and union staff and “leaders.” 
As Durazo cultivated effective group communication, she observed that 
Latino union members significantly increased their levels of participation 
and felt less trepidation in participation in collective action initiatives, 
and in confrontational encounters with employers.69 She also witnessed 
improved leadership skills both among union representatives and among 
union members in general. 
These new skills and levels of comfort with participatory and dissenting 
activities had direct applicability and relevance to fostering political partic-
ipation. In the case of HERE Local 11, Durazo’s fostering of direct participa-
tion among immigrant Latinos has led to greater political awareness among 
immigrant Latinos of importance to electoral politics to their needs. This 
awareness, in combination with increased confidence in participation, has 
led to increasing numbers of Latinos participating in electoral campaigns 
and get-out-the-vote efforts regardless of their legal status. During Antonio 
Villaraigosa’s 2005 campaign for Mayor of Los Angeles, for example, Durazo 
noted that roughly one hundred members of her local, many of whom 
were not citizens, took leaves of absence from their jobs in order to engage 
full-time in efforts to get out the Latino vote for Villaraigosa. 
In Los Angeles, however, the circumstance of having female-led labor 
organizing becoming a vehicle for the politicization of Mexicanas and 
Mexican Americans is not entirely new. In October 1933, for example, 
Local 96 of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) 
engaged in a major union building effort and registered one thousand new 
members in just three weeks in preparation for a strike of garment workers 
in Los Angeles sweatshops. Local 96, which was comprised overwhelmingly 
of Mexican American women with some Anglo, Italian, and Jewish workers, 
was eventually snubbed by the white male garment workers union which 
secretly negotiated its own contract. The women’s local however proceeded 
with the planned strike, and were led by Rose Pesotta, a Russian-Jewish 
dressmaker, immigrant, and anarchist who rejected the prevailing view 
among white male labor leaders that Mexican American women workers 
could not be organized. Not unlike Durazo, some fifty plus years later, 
Pesotta used bilingual appeals in both in print and on the radio to register 
hundreds of Chicana laborers. Soon those Chicanas were contributing to 
union strategy; for example, union members suggested turning to radio 
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stations in Tijuana when the option to use radio stations in Los Angeles 
was compromised.70
As the bilingual abilities of union members became an asset for the 
union, Pesotta herself had already begun to learn Mexican American 
culture. She recognized and integrated the family lives of the union’s 
Chicanas into the union’s activities in ways that male leaders had not done. 
She engaged Mexican American women as equals and connected with 
them through her multiple identifications with them as a fellow dress-
maker, an immigrant, and woman.71 In that connection some members 
of the union confided to Pesotta that they wished to participate more in 
American culture, including political life. As George Sánchez has put it, 
union activity in IGLWU Local 96 became a means for political incorpora-
tion and provided “an outlet for Mexican women to lean English, regularly 
interact with non-Mexicans, and voice political protest” all in connection 
with family life.72 As such, Sánchez contends “these new Chicana workers 
were among the first members of their communities to express a civil 
rights agenda as American citizens, largely through their participation in 
the labor movement of the 1930s and 1940s.”73 The work of Durazo and 
other Latino labor leaders in Los Angeles can thus be seen as part of the 
fabric of Latino political agency in the city and an important tradition by 
which Latinos have come to greater political participation.  
Popular Culture and Interethnic/Interracial Relations: 
Calling Coalition 
Given the violent conflict between blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles in the 
mid-2000s and the historical and contemporary examples of multiethnic, 
multiracial political (or politically-relevant) activism in Los Angeles, there 
is clearly a balance to be struck in describing the current character and 
prospects of Latino political agency in Los Angeles. Stark racial and class 
divisions are hallmarks of the city. But at the same time Latino politics in 
Los Angeles is replete with examples of multiracial and multiethnic coop-
eration—cooperation that has been a key ingredient in some of the most 
important successes in Latino politics in Los Angeles. 
From a theoretical perspective, Chicana feminist thinkers such as Gloria 
Anzaldúa and Elizabeth Martínez have argued for several decades of the 
need to shift our understanding of Chicano/Latino politics from one based 
on a presumed need for unity based on ethnic and/or racial homogeneity, 
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to one built on the ongoing construction of solidarity among diverse 
peoples in common causes that resist all forms of subordination.74 Such 
an approach to Latino political agency, however, would require privi-
leging modes of interracial and interethnic cooperation in Latino politics 
without losing sight of the genuine conflicts that also exist and can become 
manifest. Bringing a solidarity-based vision of Chicano/Latino politics to 
fruition, however, requires socially constructing a widely held view that 
diverse peoples can work together for political ends that benefit Latinos 
and others. 
To this end, cultural products such as films, popular literature, music, 
and even academic literature such as this chapter, can serve to keep 
Latino Angelinos aware of group conflict and at the same time continu-
ally familiar with the idea that diverse coalitions have produced effective 
results in the past and may do so again at any time Latinos choose to work 
with others toward common cause. Cultural production may thus serve 
as important political intervention in that it can acclimatize Latinos and 
others to the ambivalence and ambiguities of political action in diverse 
contexts. For example, from one perspective, Bread and Roses might look 
like a contemporary version of Salt of the Earth (1954), the classic black-
listed McCarthy-era film, complete with a Mexican American woman 
activist (Esperanza Quintero) and a white male union organizer (Frank 
Barnes). Some Chicana activists and scholars have criticized the prominent 
portrayal of white men in both films, implying that the films would better 
serve Latino cultural, political, and aesthetic interests had they focused 
solely on Latina efforts. 
Yet, such criticism is factually unjustified to the extent that white men 
and women actually were present and had influential roles in these strug-
gles. The portrayal of white allies in these cases then is not mere fiction. 
Moreover, the impulse to erase white and/or black support in largely Latino 
political/economic struggles is arguably counterproductive, in that it at once 
obscures the historical success of diverse coalitions in Latino causes, and 
it fails to build confidence in the ever-present possibility of building new 
diverse coalitions that can take up the needs of Latinos as part of common 
political cause. In this sense it is a potentially important contribution for 
filmmakers such as Herbert Biberman (Salt of the Earth), Ken Loach, and 
Luis Valdez to portray white men and women as active in labor and political 
struggles that benefit people of color. At the same time, there is always a risk 
of portraying Anglo contributors such as Barnes, Sam, and Alice Greenfield 
McGrath as “white knights in shining armor” if it is not specified that while 
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white activists were crucial, they were not the only ones who contributed 
to political success. Each of the examples of Latino political agency in Los 
Angeles discussed so far can claim successes in part because they included 
participants from various racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
If forms of cultural production that depend on narrative run the risk 
obscuring the co-presence of racial/ethnic conflict and racial/ethnic coop-
eration, then cultural forms that evoke feelings and imagery may better 
perform such a balance. Poetry and song are effective modes for holding 
contradictory ideas or tendencies together in brevity of expression—con-
tradictions can mar cultural forms that conventionally require narrative 
cohesion. Consequently, popular music may be considered an impor-
tant potential and de facto contributor to the political landscape in Los 
Angeles to the extent that particular musicians have effectively portrayed 
“Los Angeles” as a place of both interracial conflict and interracial hope. 
Ozomatli, Rage Against the Machine, the Disposable Heroes of Hiphoprisy, 
and Tupac Shakur for example have all sung about the reality of racial 
conflict and class divides in the “City of Angels.”
Tupac Shakur’s 1996 song “To Live and Die in L.A.,” for example, 
contains one of the most memorable lines about coalition politics and the 
common condition of people of color in Los Angeles. He wrote, “Cause 
what would L.A. be without Mexicans, black love, brown pride and the sets 
again. Pete Wilson trying to see us all broke.”75 Former California Governor 
and nativist Pete Wilson was also mentioned in the Disposable Heroes of 
Hiphoprisy’s classic remake of the Dead Kennedys’ iconic song, “California 
Uber Alles.”76 The Disposable Heroes were a short-lived, multi-racial rock 
band that included African Americans and Asian Americans. In the orig-
inal version of the punk anthem, Dead Kennedys’ lead singer Jello Biafra 
lambasts then and current (remarkably enough) California Governor Jerry 
Brown.77 In the cover, Disposable’s front man, Michael Franti (who now 
leads Spearhead, a politically conscious hip-hop band) criticized Wilson for 
cutting social programs for poor people and attacking immigrants. In this 
and other pieces, the band blended hip-hop and punk and discussed as well 
as embodied interracial unity. The band’s lyrics, its multiracial membership, 
and its hybridization of musical genres therefore suggested that people of 
color were allies, not enemies, and that the “real” adversaries they faced were 
political and economic leaders who perpetuated racial and class system that 
sought to “divide and conquer” diverse racial and ethnic groups. 
The Los Angeles-based hip-hop, metal, funk, and punk rock band 
Rage Against the Machine (whom the Disposable Heroes of Hiphoprisy 
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sometimes toured with in the early 1990s) also released a well-known song 
about the same racially divisive and racially subordinating “enemy.” On the 
band’s self-titled debut album, Rage’s Chicano lead singer Zack de la Rocha 
defiantly proclaims, “Yes, I know my enemies. They’re the teachers who 
taught me to fight me. Compromise, conformity, assimilation, submis-
sion, ignorance, hypocrisy, brutality, the elite, all of which are American 
dreams.”78 Rage Against the Machine is an extremely popular, politicized, 
and controversial band that made headlines throughout the 1990s. Band 
members like multiracial (black/white) lead guitarist Tom Morello and de 
la Rocha were deeply involved in the anti-sweatshop, indigenous, prisoners’ 
rights, and global justice movements. The band’s “preferential option for 
poor” led it to support Leonard Peltier, Mumia Abu-Jamal, the Zapatistas, 
and garment workers toiling in downtown Los Angeles sweatshops. Rage’s 
name and political activities implied that people of color, as well as sympa-
thetic white people, should unite and “rage against the machine,” rather 
than each other. The word “machine” harkens back Mario Savio’s famous 
speech during the UC Berkeley Free Speech Movement where he urged 
those assembled to “lay your bodies upon the wheels and levers of the 
machine.”79
At times, Rage has chosen performance venues that also express its 
political agency, and its choices have sometimes placed it in the middle 
of dissenting protest and ground level political conflict in Los Angeles. In 
2000, Rage Against the Machine played outside the Democratic National 
Convention at the Staples Center. Their performance at a protest rally 
served as the endpoint of a protest march and daylong “counter-Conven-
tion” that was heavily monitored by police. Rage played the counter-Con-
vention with another ethnically and racially mixed progressive band called 
Ozomatli—an equally politicized hip-hop cumbia, ranchera-oriented band. 
Rage’s four-song set ended without incident, but when Ozomatli took the 
stage, alleged crowd disturbances caused the LAPD to move in with force, 
cutting short their appearance. 
While these musical groups have worked to emphasize the common-
ality of racial and ethnic subordination and potential for common cause, 
their musical production—if seen as political intervention—must still 
confront misinterpretation though the lens of prevailing racial stereo-
types. For example, Ozomatli—a group that formed in 1995, taking its 
name from the Aztec god of dance—received its major commercial break-
through when it appeared in the film Never Been Kissed, a Hollywood 
production that starred Drew Barrymore.80 That film stereotypically 
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portrayed black musicians from another band eating marijuana-laced 
brownies with Barrymore. The next scene shows her “high” and dancing 
energetically on stage with Ozomatli. This unfortunate sequence in the 
film rearticulates the essentialist notion that white people are sober, 
strait-laced rhythm-impaired individuals who gain from interaction 
with Blacks and Latinos only to the extent that these “others” are their 
polar opposites. 
By playing upon discredited, but still present stereotypical images, Never 
Been Kissed depoliticizes Ozomatli. This may be interpreted as unconscious 
stereotyping, or as the conscious rearticulation of colonial discourses 
which—as Arturo Aldama and others have argued—have historically 
portrayed Native Americans, Chicanos, and Mexican immigrants as 
“savage.”81 As Aldama contends, however, hybrid cultural forms can still 
present receptive audiences with the politics and complex identifications of 
subordinated groups even if those cultural products are misinterpreted in 
the cultural mainstream. In any case, Ozomatli’s multiracial members have 
been heavily involved in local, state, national, and global social movements 
for numerous years. Bassist Wil-Dog Abers, for example, was active in the 
failed battle to save the Peace and Justice Center in downtown Los Angeles, 
an alternative, political “free safe space” for artists, activists, and musicians 
in the mid-1990s.82 The band’s website lists links to organizations that 
oppose police brutality, the Iraq war, and the School of the Americas. The 
band’s lyrics routinely explore political issues. Its 2007 album, Don’t Mess 
with the Dragon, included a song called “City of Angels”that some predicted 
would replace Randy Newman’s well-known, but possibly outdated anthem, 
“I Love L.A.” as the city’s signature jam.83
Finally, while cartoonists are not usually seen as activists, there are some 
like Paul Conrad, formerly with the Los Angeles Times, and Gary Trudeau 
(Doonesbury) whose work has focused on socio-political issues and raising 
political consciousness. Aaron McGruder and Lalo Alcaraz also belong to 
this list and their work underscores the possibility for racial and ethnic 
cooperation in the context of ongoing conflict. McGruder’s Boondocks 
gained tremendous publicity shortly after it first appeared in 1996 because 
it included African-American characters (Huey, Riley, and their grandfa-
ther) who candidly discussed controversial issues like racism and the war 
on terrorism from a progressive perspective. The Boondocks eventually 
became the nation’s first nationally syndicated black comic strip. McGruder 
eventually sold the television rights to the strip to the Cartoon Network, 
and it has been on the air since 2006. 
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During this time period, Lalo Alcaraz—whose comic strip La Cucaracha 
is the first Latino-written strip ever to be nationally syndicated—began 
a comic series sardonically titled, the Beandocks. Characters from La 
Cucaracha and the Boondocks appeared in these “bi-racial” stories, 
discussing brown and black issues and stressing the need for solidarity 
and coalition. Alcaraz ran these pieces as an homage to McGruder and 
to extend some of his earlier work that called for brown and black coali-
tions. The Beandocks is one more example from the wider popular culture 
that shows how the similar socio-economic circumstances of blacks and 
Latinos can engender multiracial alliances. 
Conclusion
Fifteen years ago, Derrick Bell wrote that black faces were the ones at the 
“bottom of the well.”84 A 2007 report titled, “The State of Black California” 
shows that this is still the case, but that in nearly ever category (e.g. income 
and home ownership rates) Latinos share the “bottom of the well” with 
their black counterparts.85 These socioeconomic facts are not surprising. 
Even a casual look at the composition of urban life in nearly every major 
US city indicates that black and Latino faces are to be found in dispro-
portionate numbers at the lowest levels of socioeconomic advantage and 
at the highest levels of suffering. While Latino and African American 
middle and upper-middle classes do exist in American cities, the overall 
statistics indicating growing poverty and related deprivations suggest 
that the futures are not promising for poor members of black and Latino 
communities.86
To remedy the systematic and persistent subordination of African 
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, many people have called for a 
politics (as stated by Alice Greenfield McGrath) rooted in “coalition, coali-
tion, coalition.”  Yet despite the emphasis in this chapter, relatively few efforts 
to generate racially and ethnically diverse coalitions have been established 
in recent times. Activists can cite the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee, 
the Civil Rights Congress in the 1950s, the Bus Riders Union, AGENDA 
(Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Alternatives), 
the Watts Century/Latino Organization, and spaces such as the Southern 
California Library for Social Studies and Research as efforts that inten-
tionally sought to include black and Latino Angelinos. Diverse electoral 
coalitions such as that which helped Antonio Villaraigosa win election as 
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Los Angeles mayor have emerged, but by their nature, such coalitions are 
temporary. 
Nonetheless, the larger point here is that the history of Latino political 
agency in Los Angeles provides some powerful examples which illustrate 
in the famous words of the United Farm Workers’, sí se puede—it can be 
done. Diverse coalitions have worked in the past as acts of Latino political 
agency and they could do so again. The question that remains, however, 
is that given the history of coalition-based politics in Los Angeles, is 
whether or not Latino activists, academics, and concerned citizens will 
employ their political agency to join with others to work politically across 
various racial, ethnic, gender and sexual lines to create lasting change in 
Los Angeles. 
This question is not merely academic, of course. In contemporary Los 
Angeles, it is quite literally a life-and-death question as the deaths of Cheryl 
Green, Kaitlyn Avila, and sadly too many others remind us. For more than 
a decade, the motto “another world is possible” has inspired activists all 
over the world. Given the problems of intergroup violence involving Blacks 
and Latinos that currently exist in Los Angeles, it might seem idealistic to 
claim that “another” Los Angeles—one relatively free of violence, poverty, 
racism, inequality, and violence—is possible. There is strength in numbers 
(remember Shelley’s aphorism here “we are many and they are few”); the 
“faces at the bottom of the well” far out-number those looking down from 
the rim at the top. If Latinos seeking to exercise their agency took responsi-
bility for stopping violence and attempted to work together with a diversity 
of others in solidarity to transform the City of Angels there is no telling 
what might happen at the powerful hands of diverse well-formed, sustain-
able, and progressive coalitions.  
If Latinos chose in future to initiate projects of solidarity and coalition 
building as acts of political agency, Latino elected officials could facili-
tate that process “from above,” yet substantive change would also need to 
come “from below” from the networks built—often by Latinas and other 
women—within current labor movements, community organizations, 
and/or progressive faith communities. Producers of popular culture and 
music might contribute by creating hybridized cultural forms that help 
draw together black and Latino cultures and communities. As the zoot 
suit, swing, and jitterbug scenes of the 1930s and 1940s were to ethnic and 
racially divided communities at that time, so are hip-hop, reggae, rock en 
español, and other musical genres of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s to Los 
Angeles black and Latino communities today. 
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While musicians, writers, and filmmakers cannot set labor laws or immi-
gration policy, much less bring back those who have lost their lives, they can 
plant seeds that educate Latino and black youth about their shared histo-
ries in the city. Latino academics might collaborate with black academics to 
write and introduce a “people’s history” of Los Angeles into the curriculum 
in the city’s public school system. In short, in addition to understanding the 
past and present of Latino political agency in Los Angeles, one can reason-
ably hope that many different potential acts of Latino political agency 
could help reverse the existing currents of conflict, prevent other tragic 
deaths, and give energy to the creative forces that may indeed help build 
“another” Los Angeles in which Angelinos of all kinds may feel in their city 
a sense of home. 
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This is an analyTical case sTudy of The fall and rise of laTino urban 
agency in San Francisco, with a sharp focus on the city’s predominately 
Latino Mission District over the period 1967–2006. The argument to be 
made here, based on the case study, is that San Francisco’s Latino commu-
nity is at once politically empowered and economically threatened by the 
special conditions that define the city’s local political economy. That is 
to say, Latino agency in San Francisco is defined by the very conditions 
that threaten its existence. On the one hand, San Francisco’s liberal polit-
ical culture, celebration of diversity, and assertion of local autonomy has 
provided the ideal conditions for the development of Latino urban agency. 
On the other hand, the wide appeal of the city’s spectacular physical setting 
and its status as one of the nation’s top “creative cities” in the emerging new 
economy have frequently combined to attract business interests and capital 
investment on a scale that has threatened massive displacement of all low-
income working-class residents, especially in the Mission.1 Indeed, the most 
impressive testimony to the power of Latino urban agency in San Francisco 
is the fact that the Mission District neighborhood, where many of the city’s 
Latinos live, has defended itself well over the last forty years against repeated 
waves of proposed economic development that have threatened the very 
existence of the Latino community in the Mission District. 
San Francisco officially became a majority-minority city in 1990 when the 
US Census reported that the Anglo population had dropped below 47%. In 
2 
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2000, the city’s Anglo population dropped to 43.6% with the Latino popula-
tion growing to 14.1%, the Asian/Pacific Islander population at 30.7%, while 
the city’s African American population dwindled from 10.7% to 7.6%.2 
Cross-cutting the city’s racial and ethnic diversity is a large and politically 
active gay and lesbian community that represents 10 –15% of the city’s adult 
population and 15–20% of its active electorate. Thus, combined with other 
forms of cultural difference and class stratification, San Francisco’s racial 
and ethnic diversity greatly complicates any attempt to mobilize solidarity 
along only one dimension. What Bailey calls “identity-multiplexing”—the 
“layering and ranking by individuals of their different identities in different 
arenas”—has increasingly become an essential political skill. Similarly, lead-
ership skills in building multiracial and multicultural coalitions are increas-
ingly vital for achieving electoral success and political incorporation.3
The Rise and Fall of the Mission Coalition Organization
The roots of the MCO were struck in late 1966 with the formation of the 
Mission Council on Redevelopment (MCOR). The MCOR was a coalition 
of churches, Latino service agencies, and radical Latino nationalist groups 
(including the Brown Berets) that stopped a major urban renewal project 
threatening demolition and displacement in the Mission. The MCOR 
disbanded after the threats had passed, but its brief life and political success 
laid the groundwork for the creation of the MCO in early 1968, when the 
city’s newly elected mayor, Joseph Alioto, applied for a federally funded 
Model Cities program targeting poverty and blight in the Mission and in 
the predominately African American Hunter’s Point neighborhood. Seeing 
an opportunity to move beyond the mainly defensive stance of the MCOR 
and toward a more comprehensive community development agenda funded 
by new federal money, 600 delegates representing 66 neighborhood-based 
organizations held a convention in October 1968 and gave birth to the 
MCO.4 The assembly elected Ben Martinez as MCO’s first president, hired 
Mike Miller (an Alinsky-trained community organizer) to direct a small 
staff, and outlined key neighborhood priorities and a mobilization strategy. 
By the summer of 1971, the city was approved for a $15 million, five-
year Model Cities project. The MCO had demonstrated its political power 
when the mayor ceded administrative control of the new program in the 
Mission to MCO. The MCO was given the power to appoint 14 of the 21 
members of the new Model Mission Neighborhood Corporation (MMNC), 
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which was charged with giving highest funding priority to producing more 
low-income housing and job opportunities for Mission residents. Among 
many other projects, the MCO-dominated MMNC created a hiring hall to 
compel employers to follow MCO guidelines in the non-discriminatory 
hiring of job candidates from the neighborhood; established a seed-money 
fund to encourage local banks to end red-lining practices and invest more 
in building more affordable housing in the Mission; and offered financial 
incentives to the school board to promote parents’ participation in shaping 
education policy and the curriculum. The MMNC expanded funding of 
existing social service agencies and created new agencies and programs. 
Despite these impressive achievements, however, the MCO began to 
come apart at the seams as early as 1972. A crucial split developed between 
the MCO and the MMNC. As Castells writes: “As a result, the confrontation 
between the MCO, now controlled by the Latino social agencies, and the 
MMNC, now managed by the Alinskyite cadres, replaced the anticipated 
confrontation between Mission residents and city hall.”5 Mayor Alioto, rather 
than facing a unified leadership, common agenda, and grassroots mobiliza-
tion in the Mission, instead played the role of mediator between the rival 
factions while exercising overall control of the Model Cities program. By 
early 1974, most of the MMNC programs were placed under the authority 
of various city bureaucracies with reduced funding. What had once been 
an incipient neighborhood-based social movement was now reduced to 
interest-group politics as usual, leading Castell’s harsh words about the 
opportunities lost: “[H]aving established their legitimacy exclusively on 
the basis of their capacity to deliver immediate rewards, they reproduced 
the social fragmentation of different interest groups fighting for the dimin-
ishing pieces of an unquestioned pie of dubious taste.”6 During MCO’s 
brief life, it did succeed in bolstering neighborhood defenses against the 
ravages of urban renewal. And it did provide federally-funded services that 
benefited thousands of Mission residents. But the price paid for thinking 
so defensively and so small (the Mission only, services only, Latinos only) 
was the continued fragmentation of leadership, the lack of allies outside the 
Mission, and the lack of formal representation or political clout in city hall. 
The Dot-Com Boom and an Awakening Grassroots Resistance
Latino urban agency, to a large extent, lay dormant for a twenty-year 
period from 1975, when George Moscone was elected mayor and the 
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Manhattanization of San Francisco’s skyline took hold, to 1996, when 
Willie Brown took office as a business-friendly pro-growth mayor. But 
it was during this period that certain key trends and events occurred 
leading to the emergence of a Latino resistance in the Mission district. 
For example, Latino immigration accelerated, Republican Governor Pete 
Wilson endorsed the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 as a wedge issue to 
win reelection, and Latino community leaders and their allies successfully 
declared San Francisco an official City of Refuge. Most important, in 1996, 
the city’s voters also approved a highly significant change from at-large to 
district elections of supervisors (SEE FIGURE 1), which became effective 
in the November 2000 elections. 
Figure 1: Map of Districts, San Francisco Board of Supervisors
Starting around 1997, shortly after Mayor Brown took office, the local 
economy turned from cold to hot, the commercial real estate market revived 
after ten years of doldrums, and a rogue wave of capital investment hit the 
city. The economic forces that threatened San Francisco in the late 1990s, 
however, were different from those that had “Manhattanized” the city’s 
skyline in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The political response also was 
different. That earlier investment surge had been driven by high-rise office 
developers funded mainly by commercial banks and tax syndicates. The 
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negative impacts of unregulated growth on transportation and housing 
were confined mainly to the city’s downtown financial district. The political 
response was the emergence of a grassroots slow-growth movement led by 
white, middle-class professionals, environmentalists, and historical pres-
ervationists. In 1986, as a result of their efforts, the city’s voters approved 
Proposition M, which imposed stringent caps and controls on future high-
rise office development.7 
This latest surge of investment, however, was fueled mainly by Silicon 
Valley venture capitalists who poured billions of dollars into hundreds of 
Internet and other high-tech start-up firms.8 This sudden onslaught of 
well-funded, dot-com start-up firms and their voracious demand for space 
quickly bid up the low rents in places like the Mission that had made it 
possible for low-income families, nonprofit workers, artists, and musicians 
to live in an expensive city like San Francisco.9 A swarm of local “place entre-
preneurs,” particularly residential and commercial landlords and developer 
lobbying groups like the Residential Builders Association, took advantage 
of the economic opportunities.10 Between 1997 and 1999, average rent for 
a two-bedroom apartment in the Mission rose 26%, and the median sales 
price for homes jumped 62%.11 
Mayor Brown, his allies on the Board of Supervisors, and his downtown 
business friends all welcomed this latest chaos of capitalism with open 
arms. Brown, the most brazenly pro-business, pro-growth mayor in recent 
memory, was in his element. “Mayors are known for what they build and 
not anything else,” Brown declared, “and I intend to cover every inch of 
ground that isn’t open space.”12 At a city-sponsored “Multimedia Summit” 
in early 1998, Mayor Brown called the burgeoning multimedia industry 
“our modern day gold rush.” He promised the gathered entrepreneurs and 
developers that he would provide tax incentives, streamline the permit-
ting process, and improve transit policies to attract more start-up firms to 
the city.13 Stacked with Mayor Brown’s obliging appointees, the Planning 
Commission and Board of Permit Appeals approved dozens of building 
projects and live-work developments. Many of these decisions violated the 
spirit, if not the letter, of Proposition M, ignored the city’s neighborhood 
preservation priorities, and made mush of other planning codes. 
The sudden gentrification and displacement impacts of this high-tech 
gold rush on the low-income residents, merchants, artists, and nonprofit 
workers living in the Mission, South of Market, and Portrero Hill neighbor-
hoods provoked a new grassroots, slow-growth movement. It began with 
spasms of anarchic revolt in 1998, starting with the Yuppie Eradication 
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Project, whose leaders urged residents of the Mission to engage in acts of 
politically-motivated vandalism, including keying and tire slashing, against 
the “yuppie” sports cars and SUVs that increasingly clogged the streets 
around the new trendy restaurants and office buildings where dot-com 
firms were setting up shop.14 Later, mobilized by new umbrella organiza-
tions, principally the Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition (MAC) and 
the South of Market Anti-Displacement Coalition (SOMAD), growing 
numbers of low-income, working-class renters, and people of color would 
join the movement, many of them in leadership roles. 
In 1999, as the NASDAQ continued to climb along with the skyrock-
eting rents and massive evictions, Mayor Willie Brown launched his reelec-
tion campaign into the first winds of a brewing political storm. Initially, 
his chances looked good to win an outright majority in the November 2 
mayoral election, despite his plummeting popularity. His two declared 
rivals—former mayor Frank Jordan and local political consultant Clinton 
Reilly—posed no real threat. One potential challenger who did scare Brown 
a bit, however, was Tom Ammiano, president of the board of supervisors 
and a nationally known gay rights advocate. Ammiano, who lived in the 
Mission district, strongly opposed Brown’s pro-growth policies and was a 
tough political fighter. But he had announced much earlier that he would 
not run for election as mayor and was all but counted out. Then, six weeks 
before the election, sensing the spread of the anti-Willie Brown backlash 
and the surge of a new slow-growth movement in the making, he changed 
his mind. He and his supporters mobilized an intensive, last-minute, 
grassroots write-in campaign that succeeded in winning enough votes on 
November 2 to place him in the December 14 run-off against Brown. 
Many outside reporters at the time framed the run-off election campaign 
in identity politics terms as a contest between a straight, black, liberal 
incumbent and a gay, white, progressive challenger. Locally, however, the 
discourse of racial and sexual identity politics was rarely heard. The main 
content of the candidate forums and debates focused on issues like afford-
able housing, public transit, schools, and, most prominently, the destruc-
tive impact of the dot-com invasion and what to do about it. 
Mayor Brown had the support of the state and local Democratic Party 
establishment, the downtown business elites, most labor union chiefs, 
nearly all African American voters, most Asian voters, and many gay and 
lesbian voters. Ammiano’s main support came from the Haight-Ashbury 
and Portrero Hill white progressives, gays and lesbians affiliated with the 
progressive Harvey Milk Lesbian and Gay Democratic Club, some sectors 
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of organized labor (especially in the public employee and teachers’ unions), 
and the growing cadres of militant slow-growth organizers in the Mission 
and South of Market. Brown raised a mountain of corporate soft money for 
his campaign through his affiliated PACs, overwhelming Ammiano’s paltry 
sums. Brown also tipped the scales strongly in his favor by appealing to the 
politically conservative white homeowners in the Sunset, Lake Merced, and 
West of Twin Peaks neighborhoods. He won most of their votes, helped by 
an official endorsement from the San Francisco Republican Party.15 
At the end, on December 14, Mayor Brown soundly defeated Supervisor 
Tom Ammiano by a 60-40 vote to win a new term as mayor.16 But the winds 
of a voter revolt were blowing. 
Year 2000: Birth of the MAC 
In April 2000, at the peak of the dot-com feeding frenzy, Stein Kingsley 
Stein Investments (SKS) sought the planning commission’s approval for a 
huge project at Bryant and 20th Streets, the biggest to hit the Mission in 
years. SKS, a major financial contributor to Brown’s reelection campaign, 
proposed to build 160,000 square feet of new high-tech and multi-media 
office space on a site that then housed a garment factory employing twenty 
Mission residents and an artist loft structure used by eighty local artists, 
all of whom would have to be evicted. Other development projects in the 
Mission were on track at the same time, including one backed by Eikon 
Investments that proposed to convert the former National Guard Armory 
into 260,000 square feet of dot-com office space.17 But the Bryant Square 
project, in particular, was the critical tipping point that galvanized neigh-
borhood resistance and gave it political form. Angry and beleaguered, 
neighborhood activists, community organizers, and nonprofit service 
providers formed a partnership called the Mission Anti-Displacement 
Coalition (MAC) to fight the Bryant Square project and others like it that 
threatened the sudden and massive displacement of Mission residents, 
small businesses, artists, and service providers. 
By several accounts, among the dozen or so groups and agen-
cies involved, the key founders of the MAC were the Mission Housing 
Development Corporation (MHDC) and Mission Economic Development 
Association (MEDA), both of which dated back to the old MCO of 
the 1970s; tenant organizers from the Mission Agenda and St. Peters 
Housing Committee, and an important new local environmental justice 
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group, People Organizing to Demand our Economic and Environmental 
Rights (PODER).18 The MAC’s declared mission was to “eliminate the 
displacement of low-income and working-class people from the Mission 
District—who are primarily Latinos and other people of color, tenants, 
artists, and community serving businesses and nonprofits.”19
From the beginning, MAC established itself as a grassroots operation; 
it held weekly meetings open to everyone; forged alliances with displaced 
artists, low-income whites and other groups; and made decisions by 
consensus. One observer reported, however, that there was “a determi-
nation to let the movement be led and defined by working-class Latinos.” 
When asked if the “struggle faced by artists and low-income whites was 
similar to the struggle faced by Latino families,” many of the white artists 
said yes, but Latino activists “overwhelmingly said no.” MAC member Paola 
Zuniga said: “It’s extremely different. A lot of us lack the language skills and 
social skills required in this society to be able to navigate. As for families, 
it’s harder to move.”20 
By assuming leadership of MAC, Latino activists accelerated the process 
of what Ronald Inglehart has called “cognitive mobilization” in the 
Mission’s Latino community.21 As they prepared to do battle with city hall 
politicians and the planning bureaucracy, protest alone was not enough. 
“In their struggle at the Planning Commission,” Gin writes, “MAC activ-
ists realized that they had to learn about and educate their members about 
the technical minutiae of the planning process.”22 To be effective in this 
new arena, they were forced to learn a great deal about urban economics, 
land use policies, zoning regulations, and the local politics of planning. 
“We have been learning and developing an understanding of the planning 
process and have become much more sophisticated in understanding it,” 
said Eric Quezada, a MAC organizer and program director for the Mission 
Economic Development Corporation. “People thought it was just about 
the market forces. As if there was no facilitation process by the city.”23
Orchestrating what June Gin has called a “bricolage of movement 
strategies,” MAC leaders and their followers engaged in a wide range of 
tactics to capture public attention and influence city hall politicians and 
planners: rallies, marches, sit-ins, shut-downs of meetings, mock funerals, 
and other forms of mass mobilization.24 On May 4, in a last-ditch effort 
to persuade planning commissioners to reject the Bryant Square project, 
MAC activists crowded the meeting room and lined up more than twenty 
opponents to speak against it. The commissioners, all mayoral appointees, 
turned a deaf ear and voted six to one in favor of the project, causing 
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widespread anger and disappointment in the Mission. The commission’s 
decision was affirmed by the board of supervisors on appeal in late June. 
Thus, MAC leaders lost this first battle with the dot-com developers and 
their city hall backers. But they also attracted media attention to the 
cause and established MAC’s street credentials as the new champion and 
defender of the barrio.25 
MAC leaders went on to organize a number of protest marches and 
rallies in the Mission; chants of “Aquí estamos y no nos vamos” (we’re 
here and we’re not leaving) became a common refrain, and red signs 
bearing the words “residentes orgullos de la Misión” (proud residents 
of the Mission) were distributed and placed in windows throughout the 
district.26 In early June, after staging another loud protest outside the city’s 
planning department offices on Mission St., MAC leaders scored a major 
victory by compelling the planning director, Gerald Green, and two plan-
ning commissioners to meet with them and hear their demands. On June 
28, more than four hundred people showed up for that meeting at Horace 
Mann Middle School “in a show of solidarity not seen in the Mission in 
decades.”27 Responding to some of MAC’s demands, Green agreed, among 
other things, to support and fund a community planning process. But he 
claimed he lacked authority to impose a temporary moratorium on new 
office buildings, lofts and housing in the Mission, which was MAC’s top 
priority and most urgent demand.28 Ultimately, the mayor and the super-
visors would have to make those kinds of decisions, and it was clear at the 
time that they were not so inclined. Nonetheless, MAC had once again 
flexed its organizing muscle, and angry voices in the Mission were at 
last being heard. Renee Saucedo, a MAC member, boasted that “MAC is 
known not only citywide but nationally . . . . The eyes are on San Francisco 
as to how city officials can be held accountable for the makeup of the 
neighborhood.”29 
“A Perfect Political Storm”
In August 2000, weeks before the November 7 general election, Richard 
Marquez, a leader of the recently formed MAC, spoke to a crowd at 
a MAC-sponsored rally in the Mission: “We have the potential in 
November to build the perfect political storm,” he said. “We’ve got no 
choice, because our backs are up against the wall. We’ve got to come out 
swinging.”30 The “perfect political storm” he envisioned combined three 
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powerful forces that were converging to cause political ruin for Mayor 
Brown on election day. 
The first was the continuing and unabated fury of the anti-Willie Brown back-
lash that had fueled Tom Ammiano’s write-in campaign for mayor in November 
1999. That backlash intensified in late June 2000 when the mayor bolted from a 
compromise slow-growth plan offered by a group of stakeholders and went his 
own way with Proposition K, a pro-growth ballot proposition favored by his 
downtown business allies that did nothing to solve the problem. Meanwhile, the 
cresting dot-com tidal wave was at the peak of its sharpest impacts on commer-
cial real estate, housing prices, and low-income neighborhood communities, 
especially in the Mission and South of Market. Now certain they could expect no 
help from the mayor or board of supervisors, MAC organizers began mobilizing 
direct action and civil disobedience against individual dot-com firms. Illustrative 
of the kinds of battles that took place, fifteen local activists were arrested in late 
September after engaging in a non-violent, sit-in protest at the Bay View Bank 
building in the Mission. The action was aimed at Bigstep.com, a business service 
firm that had moved into two floors of the building months earlier, displacing 
two Spanish-language newspapers, a radio station, and a number of small busi-
nesses and nonprofit organizations serving the local Latino community. MAC 
leaders demanded that the firm obtain a conditional use permit for its operation 
and that it relocate the businesses and nonprofits it displaced. Bigstep’s execu-
tives, fearing a community backlash and the wrath of MAC, offered concessions, 
such as internships to low-income students and discounts on rents charged to 
nonprofits, but these were refused.31 Finally, backed by city hall, Bigstep rejected 
the protesters’ demands and called the police.32 
The second force was set in motion by a citizen-initiated ballot measure, 
Proposition L, placed on the November 2000 ballot by a citywide signa-
ture-gathering campaign led by MAC and other community activists.33 
Proposition L would have banned new development in parts of the Mission 
and South of Market districts; imposed an indefinite moratorium on new 
development in certain other neighborhoods; raised exaction fees to pay 
for growth-induced demands on housing and public transit; halted further 
live-work loft construction; redefined zoning codes to place more dot-com 
firms in a business class requiring higher exaction fees, and allowed only 
a few of the exemptions demanded by high-rise developers and dot-com 
entrepreneurs from the growth caps imposed by Proposition M in 1986.34 
Dubbed the “daughter of Proposition M,” Proposition L would have closed 
all the loopholes and barred all the gates that had allowed the dot-com firms 
to enter the city so suddenly and displace its most vulnerable populations. 
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The third force at work that converged with and magnified the other two 
was the scheduled change to district elections of supervisors. Thanks to voter 
approval of Proposition G in 1996, all eleven seats on the board were now 
up for grabs. The consequence of this institutional reform was that all of the 
mayor’s loyal allies on the board who sought reelection would now have to 
stand trial before angry neighborhood electorates. The timing of this shift 
from at-large to district representation coincided perfectly with the cresting 
of the dot-com wave, the peaking of the grassroots revolt against Mayor 
Brown, and the reemergence of Latino urban agency in San Francisco. 
Mayor Willie Brown versus MAC and the Neighborhoods: 
The 2000 Board of Supervisors Elections
By August 2000, a total of 87 candidates had filed for candidacy in the 11 new 
districts. Eight of the candidates were board incumbents seeking reelection 
in different districts, guaranteeing that at least three new supervisors would 
serve on the board. Of those eight, four (Michael Yaki, Mabel Teng, Alicia 
Becerril, and Amos Brown) were loyal allies of Mayor Willie Brown; two 
(Mark Leno and Gavin Newsom) agreed with Mayor Brown on most issues 
and supported his pro-growth agenda; and only two (Tom Ammiano and 
Leland Yee) consistently opposed the mayor and voted against his devel-
opment plans and land use policies. Two of the incumbents faced little 
opposition and were assured of victory: Newsom, running in District 2, 
and Ammiano, running in District 9, which included the Mission. In the 
remaining nine districts, the mayor pulled out all stops to maintain his 
working majority on the board. Mayor Brown had created that majority by 
appointing six individuals to board vacancies over the 1996–1999 period, 
vacancies which he had arranged through artful shuffling to allow his new 
allies on the board to run as incumbents in later elections. His organized 
network of corporate executives, political action committees, and political 
clubs now spent an unprecedented $1.6 million in soft money to fund the 
campaigns of loyal incumbents and anointed candidates.35 For many voters, 
however, this mayoral orchestration of political careers, funding flows, and 
district campaigns confirmed their suspicions that Mayor Brown really did 
own and operate a political machine in a city renowned for its neighbor-
hood activism and grassroots democracy. 
The issues of land use, displacement, and growth controls defined the 
main agenda for debate in most of the district campaigns. MAC leaders 
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and their allies made sure of that by sending campaign organizers and 
volunteers out from Mission, South of Market, and other growth-impacted 
neighborhoods into other areas of the city to educate the residents and do 
battle. They demanded that candidates in every district address those issues 
and state their positions on Propositions K and L. 
Meanwhile, the city’s long tradition of divisive racial and identity poli-
tics was suspended, at least for this election (there is a very apt saying in 
San Francisco that “truce is stranger than friction”).36 In particular, MAC 
leaders resisted any temptation to endorse Latina incumbent and Brown-
appointee Alicia Becerril in District 3. They also decided not to advance 
Latino candidates for the seats in District 6 (South of Market) and District 
9 (the Mission). Instead, they backed three Anglos in those campaigns: 
Aaron Peskin in District 3, Chris Daly in District 6, and Tom Ammiano in 
District 9. Peskin was a tenant organizer in the city’s North Beach neighbor-
hood. Daly was a community organizer in the South of Market area and a 
member of MAC. Ammiano had stood up to Mayor Brown while serving on 
the board and in his 1999 campaign for mayor. All three strongly endorsed 
Proposition L and spoke out against Proposition K. And all were popular 
in their districts and highly electable. MAC leaders and many Latino voters 
backed Latino candidates in two other districts—Matt Gonzales in the 
predominately white District 5 and Geraldo Sandoval in the racially diverse 
District 11. In their campaigns, however, neither appealed to ethnic identity, 
and both stressed their credentials as slow-growth progressives and sworn 
political enemies of Brown and his political machine. 
Matt Gonzalez, in particular, dramatically signaled the priority he placed 
on ideology over identity by announcing his switch from the Democratic 
Party to the Green Party following the November election and before the 
December run-off in District 5. Upset with the centrist positions taken 
by presidential candidate Al Gore and with the state Democratic Party 
establishment for excluding Green candidates from forums and debates, 
Gonzalez wrote: “I decided I am not going to vote for candidates who 
support the death penalty or oppose gay marriage. I’m not going to vote for 
candidates who oppose campaign-finance reform or value the corporation 
over the individual. Nor will I give the local machine party any legitimacy 
by remaining a part of it.”37 At a time when many local Democrats blamed 
the Green Party for Bush’s likely victory over Gore, Gonzalez’s conversion 
was seen by many observers as a risky political move. Nonetheless, disgrun-
tlement with Brown and the local Democrats was widespread, especially 
among the city’s Latinos in the Mission. MAC spokesman Eric Quezada 
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acknowledged that he would like to see more Latino representation on the 
board. His primary goal, however, was to elect supervisors who could take 
on Brown and protect area residents from eviction. “It’s not enough to be 
Latino right now, to run in the Mission.”38 
Many of the city’s other leading political organizations and clubs 
also put identity politics on hold to maintain coalitional solidarity in 
opposition to Mayor Brown and his pro-growth agenda. The Chinese 
American Democratic Club, for example, endorsed white progressive Jake 
McGoldrick in his race against incumbent Chinese American Michael Yaki 
in the heavily Asian-populated District 1. And the Harvey Milk Lesbian 
and Gay Democratic Club endorsed several progressive straight candidates 
in opposition to a “lavender slate” of pro-growth gay candidates supported 
by Brown and funded by his political machine.39 One could argue that a 
communal sense of place identity was strongly asserted in this campaign. 
Even the conservative columnist Ken Garcia made that point in character-
izing the Mission’s battle against the dot-coms as a struggle for the “soul” 
of the city.40 Overall, however, this election was not fundamentally about 
group interest or ethnic identity narrowly defined but about land use and 
ideology—and Mayor Brown
The November 7 general election (and nine December 14 district run-off 
elections) produced three significant outcomes. First, Propositions K and L 
both lost, the former overwhelmingly (39.2% yes) and the latter just barely 
(49.8% yes). As a result, Proposition M’s tight restrictions on growth would 
continue to apply by default. Second, many Latino voters, expressing the 
same disenchantment with the Democrats later voiced by Matt Gonzalez, 
defected from that party to vote for Green Party candidate Ralph Nader in 
the presidential election. Politicians like Brown, who would be viewed as 
liberal or even radical almost anywhere else, are often labeled as conserva-
tives in the local political discourse. Consistent with this trend, majorities of 
voters in the Mission helped to elect two Green Party members, including 
Latino Mark Sanchez, to the school board in a citywide election. 
Third, and most important, Brown’s carefully crafted slate of well-funded 
candidates was blown to smithereens. Most were eliminated in the November 
election, and nearly all the rest were crushed in the December 14 district 
run-offs. Among Mayor Brown’s allies, only the incumbents Newsom and 
Leno survived the onslaught. Tony Hall, a maverick independent, defeated 
incumbent loyalist Mable Teng in District 7, but could be counted on to 
vote with the mayor on most issues. On the other side, most of the progres-
sive, slow-growth, anti-Willie Brown candidates for supervisor won in 
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their districts. Incumbents Ammiano and Yee were reelected, joined by the 
insurgents McGoldrick, Peskin, Gonzalez, Daly, and Sandoval. These seven 
supervisors, along with Sophie Maxwell, an African American community 
activist elected by voters in District 10, formed a unified and veto-proof 8-3 
progressive supermajority on the board that would thwart Mayor Brown 
and clip his wings over the rest of his term.41
At the end, Mayor Brown’s political machine was in ruins. Its moving 
parts, lubricated by corporate money, worked well enough under the old, 
at-large system. Under district elections, however, the MAC-led neigh-
borhood revolt ultimately brought down the machine.42 The result was a 
ghastly political nightmare for Brown, who now had to look forward to a 
progressive super-majority voting against him on the board of supervisors 
and to demands from the downtown corporate CEOs for an accounting of 
how their huge financial investment in local political control could have 
been so wildly misspent. 
After the Storm: 
Consolidating and Expanding Latino 
Urban Agency in San Francisco
Over the years since the watershed 2000 board elections, a number of 
important developments and events have worked to consolidate and expand 
Latino urban agency in San Francisco. These can be summarized under the 
headings of protecting the barrio; curbing mayoral authority; advancing 
Latino voting power and political incorporation; pioneering new policies 
and democracy reforms; and Matt Gonzalez’s run for mayor. 
In January 2001, the board’s new progressive supermajority immediately 
passed a temporary moratorium on building additional live/work units in 
the Mission.43 Encouraged by that example, and with neighborhood-friendly 
district representatives now in power, activists in the South of Market and 
Portrero Hill districts pushed for similar bans in their communities and got 
them. Although it was true that the NASDAQ bubble had burst by this time 
and that the local dot-coms were dropping like flies, MAC leaders wanted 
to keep pressure on the city “to implement strict development controls 
before the next economic boom,” according to one reporter.44 “It’s espe-
cially obvious that planning cannot be left to the free market,” said Tom 
Ammiano, newly elected president of the board of supervisors and now the 
representative of District 9 and the Mission.45 
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MAC leaders were emboldened by these victories; they also felt empow-
ered by a stronger and more sympathetic board of supervisors standing up 
against a weakened mayor and his planning bureaucracy (see below). In 
2002, they formed the Mission Anti-Displacement Partnership in collabo-
ration with other neighborhood groups and organizations and drafted a 
“People Plan” that would set priorities and regulate land use in the Mission 
(Mission Anti-Displacement Partnership 2005). In September 2003, MAC 
and PODER activists organized yet another sit-in at the city’s planning 
department office, this time to protest the planning director’s sluggish 
response to the People Plan. There were no immediate results, and seven-
teen of the protesters were arrested.46 But under the new regime at city hall, 
this action and others that followed eventually compelled the planning 
department to adopt a more inclusive and responsive “community plan-
ning” process in developing new zoning policies for the Mission district 
and the entire eastern side of the city.47 
As these examples illustrate, MAC did not simply fold its tent and fade 
away after its stunning electoral victories in the 2000 elections. Unlike 
the MCO of the 1970s, the coalition has consolidated its power in the 
Mission, maintained its grassroots base, and sustained its pressure on city 
hall politicians and bureaucrats. MAC also continues to keep a close and 
critical eye on all outside entrepreneurs seeking to build or invest in the 
Mission. Operating as self-appointed gatekeepers and toll-takers, and with 
the backing of key supervisors like Chris Daly and Tom Ammiano, MAC 
leaders have learned to bargain tough to exact the maximum “community 
benefits” from private firms and developers, including affordable housing 
and job opportunities for residents.48
Advancing Latino Voting Power and Political Incorporation
As Browning, Marshall, and Tabb argued long ago, however, “protest is not 
enough” to convert growing numbers and demands for equality into respon-
sive public policies and programs serving the Latino community’s needs.49 
Political incorporation is key and involves a combination of formal represen-
tation and informal inclusion in the power centers that make policy. A group 
has achieved substantial political incorporation, argue Browning, Marshall 
and Tabb, when it “is in a position to articulate its interests, its demands will be 
heard, and through the dominant coalition it can ensure that certain interests 
will be protected, even though it may not win on every issue.”50 By this standard, 
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the political incorporation of San Francisco’s Latino population took a great 
leap forward as a direct result of the 2000 elections. Two Latino politicians, 
Matt Gonzalez and Geraldo Sandoval, were elected to the 11-member board 
of supervisors, and Mark Sanchez was elected to the School Board. In 2002, the 
voters elected progressive Dennis Herrera as city attorney, and reelected him 
in 2006. José Cisneros was elected as treasurer in 2006. Under the new district 
election system, with more Latinos serving as elected officials, the appoint-
ment of Latinos to the city’s various boards and commissions rose from a 
mere 6% of the total in 1993 to 11% in 2002, close to population parity.51 
New Progressive Policies and Democracy Reforms
As members of the new dominant coalition on the board of supervi-
sors, Matt Gonzalez and Geraldo Sandoval exercised considerable influ-
ence on the policy-making process. Gonzalez, elected by his colleagues 
in 2002 as president of the board of supervisors, was particularly effec-
tive in advancing legislation or ballot propositions that benefited the city’s 
Latinos, in particular, and low-income working class renters and their fami-
lies in general. These initiatives included imposing greater board control 
over mayoral appointments to the planning commission and board of 
appeals; establishing a new elections commission along with restrictions 
on mayoral authority over redistricting and appointments to vacancies on 
the board; regulating growth and protecting neighborhoods, particularly 
the Mission; promoting the construction of additional affordable housing; 
strengthening tenant rights while preserving the declining stock of rental 
units under the city’s residential rent control policies; raising the city’s 
minimum wage; mandating feasibility studies of municipal ownership of 
PG&E and alternative energy sources, including solar and tidal power; and 
extending sunshine laws requiring greater transparency and accountability 
in the city’s bureaucracy. Gonzalez also took the lead in persuading voters 
to adopt instant run-off voting (IRV) in 2002, which was implemented for 
the first time with district elections for supervisor in 2004.52 Inspired by 
San Francisco’s success with IRV, voters in the city of Berkeley overwhelm-
ingly adopted it the following year, and the IRV movement has since spread 
to other cities in California, Vermont, Washington, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
North Carolina, and Florida. Gonzalez also pushed for non-citizen voting 
rights in school board elections, an initiative that was barely defeated by the 
voters in 2004 but has good prospects of passage in the near future.53 
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For his part, Sandoval co-sponsored or endorsed most of Gonzalez’s 
legislative agenda, and was the principal author of pioneering legislation 
requiring all city agencies to officially honor “matricula consulare” ID 
cards as legal identification.54 In the wake of September 11, he also took the 
lead in affirming San Francisco’s city of refuge policies, official non-coop-
eration with the Immigration and Naturalization Services in facilitating its 
raids and detentions, particularly in the Mission, and restrictions on local 
police cooperation with federal agents in the practice of racial profiling and 
arresting of foreign persons not suspected of a crime.55 
Going Against the Grain
In November 2003, Matt Gonzalez ran for mayor. He eventually lost to rival 
Gavin Newsom in the December run-off election, but he came close, and 
his electrifying campaign vaulted him into the national spotlight as a rising 
Latino star and a leader of an emerging urban-based progressive reform 
movement. Convinced that Tom Ammiano, icon of the local left, would 
only lose again, this time to Willie Brown’s protégé and heir apparent, 
Supervisor Gavin Newsom, Gonzalez threw his hat in the ring. That move 
angered Ammiano and his followers, and the internecine battle that ensued 
was aptly dubbed by one reporter as a “left coast brawl.”56 He and Newsom 
were the top two voter-getters in November, beating out four other candi-
dates, and both waged furious campaigns in the five weeks leading to the 
December 9 run-off election. 
Although city elections are officially non-partisan, the fact that Gonzalez 
was a Green and Newsom was a Democrat drew national and even interna-
tional media attention. Afraid that Newsom might actually lose to a Green 
in the Democratic Party’s urban stronghold at a time when the Democrats 
were gearing up to challenge President George W. Bush’s reelection bid in 
2004, top state and national Democratic Party leaders raced to the rescue. 
The California Democratic Party paid $153,000 for an anti-Gonzalez mailer, 
a part of the total of $4 million raised for Newsom’s campaign against only 
$400,000 for his rival. Leading a long parade of Democratic Party notables, 
Al Gore, Bill Clinton, and Nancy Pelosi flew to the city to endorse Newsom 
and praise him, prompting a Gonzalez spokesperson to ask: “What’s next? 
The Pope?”57 
Great pressure was placed on the city’s more progressive Democratic 
political clubs to stay in line. Even so, some members of the powerful 
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Democratic County Central Committee (DCCC) abstained from the 
committee’s endorsement of Newsom, and several took the step of endorsing 
Gonzalez as individuals. Among others, the Harvey Milk Democratic Club 
rejected the entreaties and formally endorsed Gonzalez. Later, in 2004, 
angry state party officials demanded that the DCCC require its members 
to take loyalty oaths to the party; the DCCC refused to comply. In 2006, a 
faction of the DCCC attempted to rescind the Harvey Milk Club’s charter; 
the move failed.58 The Latino Democratic Club dutifully endorsed Newsom, 
as did the local chapter of the officially non-partisan Mexican American 
Political Association. But in the barrio, defection was in the air. The city’s 
Latino voters, most of them Democrats, had backed Newsom (30%) over 
Gonzalez (26%) in the November election, according to one poll. Results 
of another poll in late November, however, gave Gonzalez a lead of 68% to 
28% among Latino voters.59
Matt Gonzalez clearly had the momentum going into the last days of the 
campaign. Unfortunately for Gonzalez, thousands of conservative absentee 
voters had already registered their choice between a liberal Democrat and 
a progressive Green, and time simply ran out. On December 9, although 
Gonzalez won a majority of the election-day votes, Newsom’s absentee vote 
was overwhelming and he won the run-off 53% to 47% to become the 
city’s next mayor. 
Figure 2, a scatter plot of precinct data showing the relationship between 
the vote for John Kerry for president in 2004 and the vote for Matt 
Gonzalez in December 2003, helps to visualize some important points 
about San Francisco politics in general and the voting tendencies of the 
city’s Latino voters in particular. First, the plot reveals a strong positive 
correlation between the precinct vote for Kerry, the Democrat, and the vote 
for Gonzales, the Green. In a city owned by Democrats, in which only 3% 
of voters registered Green, that is an odd correlation to find. 
Most Democrats voted for Gonzalez in 2003. The Democrat Newsom, like 
Mayor Brown in 1999, could not have won without significant help from 
Republicans and conservative independents. Second, however, as Figure 
2 shows, the Latino (“H”) and white progressive (“P”) precinct elector-
ates that voted Green in 2003 snapped to the party line in voting for the 
Democrat Kerry in 2004, joining the African American precincts (“B”) that 
voted loyally Democratic in both elections. The white conservative precincts 
(“C”) showed relatively little support for either Gonzalez or Kerry and are 
lumped in the lower left of the plot. The Asian/PI precincts (“A”), illustrating 
a general pattern of moderate/centrist voting in San Francisco, are grouped 
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in the center of the plot. Third, as suggested by the last point, the city’s Latino 
voters as a group are inclined to support the most progressive candidate in 
any given election (as in 2000 and 2003) and will shift to a default party-line 
vote for Democrats only if there are no electable alternatives (as in 2004). No 
doubt some Latinos voted for Gonzalez in 2003 out of ethnic solidarity alone, 
but clearly ideology trumped identity and partisanship in this election. 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of the Vote for Kerry 2004 versus Vote for Gonzalez 
2003 in San Francisco Precincts. Legend: B = Black/African-American 
majority or plurality, H = Hispanic/Latino majority or plurality, A = 
Asian-American 55%+ majority, C = “White Conservative,” and P = 
“White Progressive” precinct electorates.*
* Note: This scatterplot is a purely heuristic graphical tool for roughly sorting out and 
identifying racial/ethnic and ideological voting patterns in the city’s precinct electorates. 
The plotting symbol “B” identifies the precincts in which Blacks/African-Americans were 
a majority or the dominant plurality of the estimated total 2000 precinct population, the 
symbol “H” the precincts in which Hispanics/Latinos were a majority or plurality, and the 
symbol “A” the precincts in which Asian-Americans were at least a 55% majority. The symbol 
“C” identifies the precincts which were at least 60% white and scored in the lowest quartile of 
a 22-item Progressive Voting Index (PVI), and the symbol “P” those precincts which were 
at least 60% white and scored in the highest quartile of the PVI. Precincts that did not meet 
these criteria were not plotted in the graph. For details on methods and data sources, see 
Rich DeLeon and David Latterman, “Updating the New Progressive Voting Index (PVI) 
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Leaders of the national Democratic Party were relieved to have dodged 
a bullet on their home turf in 2003. Still, in September 2006, they did not 
appear to have drawn any lessons from it about the need for their party to 
turn left from the center to recapture and hold its base in the cities . The 
message was not lost on Gavin Newsom, however. 
Starting in 2004, the city’s new mayor went on to challenge his own 
party’s timidity on social issues by famously authorizing marriage licenses 
for same-sex couples. He also demanded that the city’s business elites, who 
had backed his run for mayor, submit to higher taxes to cover a revenue 
shortfall. He later joined the picket lines of Local 2 UNITE-HERE (a third 
of which are Latinos) to protest the lockout of striking hotel workers by the 
same hotel owners and managers who had funded his mayoral campaign. 
In November 2005, addressing a fund-raiser in Iowa for Democrats seeking 
to recapture the Senate, he urged the crowd to face issues like gay marriage 
head on: “I don’t think we have anything to be ashamed of in our party, 
standing up for the foundation of those principles which have been 
historic.”60 And in April 2006, citing San Francisco’s City of Refuge laws, 
Mayor Newsom signed a resolution—sponsored by Geraldo Sandoval and 
passed unanimously by the board of supervisors—that advised the city’s 
law enforcement officers not to comply with the criminal provisions of any 
new immigration bill. The US House of Representatives had passed just 
such a bill, H.R. 4437, making it a crime to be in the United States illegally or 
offer aid to illegal immigrants. “San Francisco stands foursquare in strong 
opposition to the rhetoric coming out of Washington, DC,” Newsom said. 
“If people think we were defiant on the gay marriage issue, they haven’t seen 
defiance.”61 
Newsom saw that the 2000 board elections and the insurgent Gonzalez 
campaign in 2003 had shifted the city to the left, and now he was urging 
his fellow Democrats to do the same. Matt Gonzalez, perhaps because he 
saw no role for a loyal opposition—what was there to oppose? —decided 
not to run for reelection to the board in 2004, focusing instead on starting 
a new law firm and touring the country to build the Green Party in cities 
that seemed ripe for political change. 
Conclusion: Is MAC the Vanguard of a New Urban Progressivism? 
Unlike the MCO, which ultimately failed for lack of ambition, unified leader-
ship, and federal money, the Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition became 
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the organizational core of a still-powerful grassroots social movement that 
seems to have longevity. MAC’s activities and initiatives reach far beyond 
the boundaries of what Paul Peterson has called the “allocational” arena of 
local government decision-making into the arenas of “developmental” and 
“redistributive” policy.62 The city’s development policy should be left to the 
business CEOs, planners, and technocrats, Peterson argues, and redistribu-
tion should be the exclusive responsibility of the federal government, not 
the locals. Writing at a time long before the federal government “devolved” 
its responsibilities for national welfare policy and urban assistance onto 
state and local governments, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb accepted these 
Petersonian “city limits” in defining very modest yardsticks for measuring 
Black and Latino political incorporation and progress toward equality. 
What this case study demonstrates, if nothing else, is that San Francisco’s 
Latinos have adapted to the new political reality. They have learned not to 
depend on the federal government for needed resources, and have strongly 
emphasized the “urban” in their quest for greater Latino urban agency. 
Years ago the MCO fell apart when the federal money disappeared. As a 
result, Latino agency failed to make a claim on local state power or the 
resources of the private sector. In the current era, however, MAC serves as 
a model of how Latinos can wield land use planning tools to secure their 
turf in big cities; mobilize voters and elect Latinos to positions of power in 
local government; and sustain a grassroots movement to force the bureau-
crats and politicians to do the right thing while extracting needed resources 
from the local private sector.63 In the Mission, where ethnic identity and 
place identity intersect, MAC has achieved significant power by combining 
multiple and overlapping forms of Latino urban agency as a grassroots 
movement, as a social service network, and as a disciplined political appa-
ratus with electoral and lobbying clout. 
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Introduction
laTinos in chicago have a long hisTory of successful communiTy 
political action. As Latinos began to move to Chicago during World War 
I, they almost immediately found themselves forming voluntary asso-
ciations in response to the hardships they faced as newcomers. During 
subsequent decades, these groups began to cross neighborhood lines and 
form larger collective organizations.1 As the city’s Latino population has 
grown in recent decades—from 3.1% of the population in 1960 to 26% 
in 2000—so has Latino political representation. In 1983, only one Latino 
served on the city council; twenty years later, eight of fifty aldermen were 
Latino. Some of these seats were won only after divisive legal battles to 
change district lines.2 Other legal and redistricting battles eventually 
also led to the election of Latino state legislators and the creation of 
the “earmuff ” 4th Congressional District (connecting Pilsen and Little 
Village), held by Luis Gutierrez since 1992.3 Latino representation in the 
city has also increased in recognition of the community’s electoral power. 
After being elected in 1983 with strong Latino support, Mayor Harold 
Washington named at least one Latino to every major board and commis-
sion, and put in place an affirmative action plan.4 Mayor Richard M. Daley, 
first elected in 1989 with significant Latino support, gave a large number 
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of city jobs and contracts to Latinos and supported various Latinos for 
city council.5
Notwithstanding this increased political representation, Latino parents 
still felt the need to resort to protests, demonstrations, and most notably 
hunger strikes in order to get city officials to agree to their demands 
regarding public schools. In 1994, Latino students went on strike and 
Latino parents and state legislators staged a hunger strike to demand the 
city promise to build a new local elementary school. On Mother’s Day 2001, 
yet another hunger strike was launched by Latino parents demanding the 
fulfillment of a years-old promise for a new local high school. Given the 
recent increases in Latino political representation in the city, and recogni-
tion by city leaders of the importance of the Latino vote, why were such 
tactics used rather than more conventional political activities? What do 
the hunger strikes tell us about the level of, and nature of, Latino political 
power in Chicago? Were they a sign of weakness, or of strength? 
After recounting the details of these two battles for school equity, this 
chapter discusses their motivations and meaning. I argue that the Latina 
mothers of Pilsen and Little Village staged these protests not only due to 
community traditions, but also because they recognized that their position 
in Chicago society afforded them a unique political opportunity structure 
where unconventional politics were quite likely to succeed. In addition, 
while the presence of many elected and appointed Latino officials did not 
give the community the conventional political power they needed to win 
the new schools, it emboldened them to take action against a city known 
more for machine politics than for responsiveness to citizen demands. 
The School Battles
In early 1994, parents of students at the predominantly Latino Richard 
J. Daley Elementary School repeatedly complained about the presence of 
lead and asbestos, as well as numerous maintenance issues such as a faulty 
heating system, clogged toilets, a leaky roof, and broken water fountains. 
The school was also severely overcrowded. Eventually, the building was 
declared unsafe, and the Board of Education agreed to build a new school 
by 1995. When school started in September 1994, students went to Daley for 
three days before being informed that they would be bused to Washington 
Elementary School, twenty-six blocks away in Englewood, starting the next 
week. Daley parents complained that Washington School was too far away, 
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asserting that their children should have been switched to Chavez School, 
which is only four blocks from Daley. They claimed the Washington neigh-
borhood was unsafe, and that the bus rides were dangerous. Parents of 
about seventy-five of the seven hundred students announced that they were 
on strike, and that they would teach the children themselves. The parents 
set up an outdoor classroom on a vacant lot down the street from Daley, 
complete with portable chalkboards and a cloth banner naming the site the 
“Richard J. Daley Elementary School.”6
At first, school officials resisted any changes to their plans. Some school 
officials warned that the parent-led truancy could lead to charges of neglect 
with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. Daley School 
Assistant Principal Liliana Evers argued that Washington School was safe, 
and that students were finding the bus rides fun and free of accidents. She 
urged parents to “give Washington School a chance.” A few days later, the 
school board offered to let concerned parents join students on the buses, 
but parents rejected the deal. Eight days into the strike, parents offered 
the school board a deal—they would send their children to Washington 
School if they got a promise, in writing, for the long-promised new school, 
including a date for its opening. They wanted the new school to be built 
in the vacant lot in which they were holding their strike, but school board 
officials were reluctant to commit to a specific location.7 Parents wanted a 
new school, and they vowed to wage a hunger strike until they got it. Four 
women began their hunger strike a few days later. Soon afterwards, four 
Latino state legislators pledged to join the hunger strike: State Senators 
Jesus Garcia and Miguel del Valle, and State Representatives Ray Frias and 
Edgar Lopez. These elected officials also began to lobby the Daley School 
administration and the school board on behalf of the parents. Meanwhile, 
the number of students on strike continued to increase, and school board 
officials continued to claim that the strike was unjustified.8
A few days later, after almost eight hours of negotiations, a deal was 
announced between the city and the school board to build a new school, 
including a promise to give parents a role in the design and location plan-
ning. Instead of sending the striking students to Washington School, the 
school board agreed to set up temporary accommodations on the Daley 
School grounds and pledged that students would eventually go to “mobile” 
units at one of the various neighboring schools as soon as possible. At the 
school council meeting the next day, the deal was almost killed. Teachers 
refused to support it, and the council’s first vote on the issue was 5-4 
against. Parents attending the meeting reacted to the vote with shouts 
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and screams; one woman, who was involved in the hunger strike, fainted 
and had to be resuscitated. Finally, after a closed session, another vote to 
reject, and unheard whispering among city council members, the plan was 
approved on a 6-4 vote.9 The new school opened for business in 1995 under 
the temporary name of Whitney-Corkery. Two years later, the school was 
renamed Emiliano Zapata Academy.10
Just a few years later, Latino parents staged another hunger strike, in 
order to bring political pressure on the school board to build a new 
school in their neighborhood. In 1998, the district had promised to build 
three new high schools in the city, including one in Little Village. Land 
was purchased at the corner of 31st and Kostner Avenues, but political 
conflict and budget problems delayed actual construction. Although the 
site was initially intended for a high school, in late 2000 Chicago School 
Board President Gery Chico announced plans to add a grammar school 
to the site to relieve overcrowding at local elementary schools. The plan 
was immediately attacked by United Neighborhood Organization (UNO) 
President Juan Rangel, who charged that high school gang members would 
be a danger to young elementary children if the two buildings shared the 
same site. The criticism from Rangel was notable, as UNO had been one of 
Washington’s staunchest allies in the Latino community. Rangel was joined 
in his criticism of the plan by Ald. Rafael Frias, state Rep. Edward Acevedo, 
and state Rep.-elect Susana Mendoza. Others defended the plan, including 
Ald. Ricardo Muñoz, who noted that the eighteen-acre site was so large 
that the two schools could be as much as two blocks away from each other. 
School Board President Gery Chico noted that high schools and elemen-
tary schools already shared campuses on ten sites in the city, but oppo-
nents countered by noting the high amount of gang activity in the Kostner 
Avenue neighborhood.11
By 2001, while two selective-enrollment high schools had been built 
in wealthier neighborhoods, Little Village was still waiting.12 The Little 
Village Community Development Corporation (CDC) helped lead a 2001 
campaign, including a hunger strike, which forced the Chicago Public 
Schools to begin building the new high school they promised the commu-
nity. The Little Village CDC was formed in 1998 to improve housing and 
support local businesses. However, in the summer of 2000, its volunteers 
kept coming back with a different priority. “Everywhere our block club 
organizers went, people would ask them, ‘Whatever happened to the new 
school we were promised?’” said Jaime de Leon, the corporation’s director 
of community initiatives.13 For a year, the CDC staff and a small group of 
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parents and community members fought for the school. They unearthed 
the history of the school board’s promises for a new school in Little Village. 
They gathered signatures on petitions. They pleaded at school board meet-
ings. They disrupted public events. They met with Chicago Public Schools 
officials. They went to Springfield. However, no real progress was made. 
Chicago Public Schools budgeted $5 million for site preparation in 1999 
and $25 million for construction in fiscal 2000 for the new high school, but 
plans were delayed by budget constraints and opposition from Pilsen Ald. 
Danny Solis (25th), who wanted funding for a new high school in his ward. 
The school was eventually taken off of the schools’ capital improvement 
program as delays and shifting budgets meant the school board no longer 
had the funding available to make good on its 1998 promise.14
Frustrated by more conventional efforts, the Latino community turned 
to the tried-and-true strategy of a citizen hunger strike. The hunger strike 
began small, with just eight parents (mostly women) camped out at the 
vacant lot at 31st and Kostner—the site approved for a high school by the 
Chicago school board in 1998—on Sunday, May 13, 2001 (Mother’s Day). 
Protestors claimed the three-year delay was due to politicians ignoring the 
needs of Little Village residents, although Public Schools Chief Paul Vallas 
insisted that the board’s hands were tied by lack of funds. The tent city 
was called “Camp César Chávez,” and was decorated with an American 
flag between two Mexican flags. Two weeks into the hunger strike, the 
mothers were joined by Juan Andrade, head of Chicago’s United States 
Hispanic Leadership Institute (USHLI). Vallas called the hunger strike 
“blackmail.”15
On May 21, about seventy-five protesters took their demands to City Hall, 
disrupting a press conference being held by then-California Governor Gray 
Davis in front of Mayor Richard M. Daley’s office. The protesters chanted, 
“Daley, Vallas, keep your promise,” until Davis left, then delivered a letter to 
Daley’s office that demanded a new high school at the Kostner site.16
The hunger strike ended on June 1, after participants had gone without 
solid food for nineteen days. Although it ended without a political victory 
on the school issue, organizers called it a success because it had mobilized 
the community. Started by only eight people, other hunger strikers eventu-
ally joined in, bringing the total number of participants to fourteen, not 
including the last-minute addition of Andrade. The hunger strike was 
called off after participants began to suffer health problems, including one 
woman who had to be hospitalized. On June 2, the next day, Little Village 
residents paid tribute to the hunger strikers and launched a second phase 
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of their effort to demand a new public high school: pickets at City Hall and 
weekly rallies in Little Village.17
The second phase seemed to go nowhere for a while, but in August, after 
the mayor replaced Paul Vallas with Michael W. Scott and Arne Duncan, 
the new schools team promised that the new high school would be built. 
New Board President Duncan announced plans to move forward with two 
new high schools for the Latino neighborhoods of the city, one each in 
Pilsen and Little Village. Although only $5 million was allocated to each 
site in the 2001–2002 capital improvement budget, and each school was 
expected to cost at least $30 million to construct, the announcement was 
seen as a victory for the community.18
The Little Village CDC continued involvement after the promise was 
renewed, organizing a committee headed by Jaime de Leon to advise the 
district to ensure that the new high school would meet residents’ needs. 
After the promise for a new school was renewed in August 2001, Latino 
activists continued their involvement, meeting with the CPS staff and archi-
tect to help design the new school. The Little Village CDC conducted meet-
ings, surveys and focus groups to find out what parents, students, and the 
community wanted from the new school.19 Design plans were approved in 
November 2002; in late September, 2003, the Chicago Board of Education 
approved $60 million in construction funds for the 31st Street and Kostner 
Avenue site. Little Village Lawndale High School opened in the fall of 2005, 
with four hundred students.20
Although the hunger strike comprised only a few weeks of the multi-
year battle for the new school, it was crucial to the community’s success. 
“The hunger strike was the pinnacle of the organizing,” according to 
de Leon. The importance of the hunger strike to the school is evident in 
various features of the architecture and landscaping. Honoring the four-
teen hunger strikers are fourteen flowering trees. Symbolizing the nine-
teen days of the strike are the nineteen-degree angles of the entryway, a 
walkway, and six glass partitions. Inside the school’s courtyard is a unique 
solar calendar that shows the sunlight slowly fading from May 13 to June 
1, the days that coordinate to the 2001 action. George Beach, the architect 
who designed the school, said that the hunger strike was a constant theme 
during two years of design meetings with local residents. “They constantly 
talked about their struggle and how to sort of bring that into the school so 
the students know what transpired to make the building—so they would 
not forget.”21 The hunger strike is also noted prominently in the school’s 
current website.22
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Chicago Latino Community Activism
In the early 1970s, Latinos in Chicago (Mexicans and Puerto Ricans) came 
together in a spirit of latinismo and formed larger, stronger organizations to 
fight for better conditions, including the Spanish Coalition for Jobs. In the 
face of job discrimination by Illinois Bell and Jewel supermarkets, unsuc-
cessful meetings and negotiations led to protests and demonstrations until 
Latinos’ demands were finally met. Padilla notes:
[T]he Illinois Bell and Jewel controversies provided both mate-
rial and symbolic benefits to the Spanish Coalition constitu-
ency . . . these successes demonstrated that adoption of a “Latino 
ethnic identity” could alter institutional racist practices.23
Latinos in Chicago have since continued to turn to community organiza-
tions for political power. Traditional routes to equal treatment and repre-
sentation have been supplemented as needed with protests, boycotts, and 
demonstrations. But given the increased number of Latino elected and 
appointed officials in Chicago in recent decades, why did the fight for 
improved educational facilities turn to protest politics? 
The continued need for such unconventional political action is in 
some measure a reflection of the lack of political power of Latinos in 
Chicago. On the other hand, the continued success of such actions reflects 
the power of the community to achieve positive results. Michael Jones-
Correa’s description of Latino politics in Queens, New York, provides 
a good parallel to that of Chicago and insight into how and why the 
women of Pilsen and Little Village acted as they did in these instances.24 
In Queens, Latinos are marginalized by politicians because those who are 
active participants “tend to be Democrats in any case, regardless of the 
way they are spurned by the local party organization.”25 Because Queens 
is overwhelmingly Democratic, there is no effective competition from 
the Republican Party, leaving Latinos little choice but to either abstain 
or vote Democratic despite discontent with Democratic politicians. The 
same could easily be said of Chicago. Explaining the gendered approach to 
politics, Jones-Correa notes that “while mainstream immigrant organiza-
tions, dominated by men, are oriented toward their home country, activist 
women attempt to circumvent the obstacles to local participation placed 
there by the once supposedly helpful political party structure.”26 Elsewhere, 
he clarifies: “While men are likely to keep a sojourner mentality, and 
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organizations dominated by men will focus on the home country, activist 
immigrant women are more likely to turn to the problems of the immi-
grant community in this country.”27 Again, the parallel to Chicago is clear: 
such a gendered approach to politics explains why women took the lead in 
both school equity battles. The legitimacy of Latino parents’ concerns was 
likely heightened by the right of non-citizens to vote in Chicago school 
board elections, a right extended to all community residents and parents 
of children in schools in 1988.28
Another insight from Jones-Correa is that Latin American immigrants 
are creatures of habit in how they engage in politics: 
“The forms of mobilization immigrants choose are almost ritu-
alistic in nature. Like others mobilizing collectively, immigrants 
are not calculating tacticians who seize every available oppor-
tunity to act; instead, they choose the form and timing of their 
collective action from a narrow repertoire.”29
This explains the frequent use of hunger strikes by the Latino community 
of Chicago. It is part of their political repertoire. 
The political opportunity structure surrounding these school battles 
was impacted not only by the ethnicity of the affected communities, 
but also by the gender and family identities of the mothers involved. 
In other words, that this occurred in the Latino community, and that 
the primary actors were Latina mothers, created a unique political 
context which must take into account the various categories of differ-
ence involved. The “multiple marginalizations” of individuals—in this 
case, as non-Anglos, as women, and as members of an economic lower 
class—locked these women in an “interlocking prison from which there 
is little escape.”30 In other words, the political context faced by the Latina 
mothers of Chicago was impacted by their ethnic identities, their gender 
identities, their class identities, and their identities as mothers. But, to 
paraphrase Hancock, it is not just an arithmetic problem. Women as 
mothers can arguably have more power—a different political opportu-
nity structure—than women in general. The traditional commitment 
of Latinos to school policy increased their credibility.31 Their identity 
as mothers increased their power and legitimacy because they were not 
acting self-interestedly, but out of concern for others: their children and 
the community. As noted by Little Village CDC Board President Elena 
Duran:
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We didn’t want an olympic sized swimming pool; we were not 
asking for a shopping mall, we were not asking for extraordinary 
things, frivolous things. We wanted education for our kids.32
Would the hunger strikers have had the same success if they had been 
predominantly men? Arguably not, as starving (and fainting) women cues 
certain social responses that are unique to women. Would the need for a 
hunger strike have existed if the affected community had been Anglo and 
higher income? Again, arguably not. Here, then, is the intersectionality and 
the unique political opportunity structure. In part it was imposed from 
above, but the positive aspects were generated from below by the involved 
women. That the second hunger strike initiated on Mother’s Day suggests 
an understanding of that structure and how it could best be manipulated. 
Traditional (what Hancock refers to as unitary or multiple-strand) 
research would conclude that the political opportunity structure here was 
quite dire. Latinos have less political power than Anglos. Women have less 
political power compared to men. Members of lower socioeconomic classes 
have less political power than those of higher classes. But the unique inter-
sectionality of these categories in this instance created a positive political 
opportunity structure, due to the way in which these poor Latinas were 
able to manipulate and benefit from their position in Chicago society. 
The approach by the Latina mothers of Chicago—protest rather than 
conventional politics—is not only a reflection of their lack of institutional 
power, but also a reflection of the different conception of ethics and rights 
held by men and women. Gilligan argues that while men are taught “to 
respect the rights of others and thus to protect from interference the rights 
to life and self fulfillment,” women instead are taught “to care”—to “alleviate 
the ‘real and recognizable trouble’ of this world.”33 Other feminist theorists 
have expanded on Gilligan’s “ethic of care” theory to argue that women 
do not “treat people as self-interested maximizers of private or existing 
desires.”34 Such “ethic[s] of justice” approaches, while perhaps appropriate 
to the experiences and understandings of men, do not adequately explain 
the behavior of women in the political arena. 
Actions done for the good of the community are often not even consid-
ered political, masking the extent of women’s militancy. Naples notes 
that the low-income, community activist women she interviewed did not 
consider community work political, because “politics, in their view, was 
designed to serve those in power, not the low-income communities.”35 The 
involvement by these women with the PTA and block associations, their 
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participations in public hearings, demonstrations, and local coalitions and 
advocacy programs, was understood by the women as “civic” activities or 
“citizen activism,” but not as political activity. This suggests that women 
seeking improvements in their communities are unlikely to turn to elected 
officials or more traditional political routes, and more likely to seek change 
through “civic” (as opposed to “political”) means. 
This distinction between the motivations, ethics, and understandings 
of politics between men and women is illustrated by the Chicago school 
battles described in this chapter. The Latina mothers were motivated to 
work to improve the educational situation in their community due to a 
concern for their children. While perhaps clearly a political issue to outside 
observers, the women interpreted the situation as a non-political commu-
nity problem, to be solved with local meetings and actions. In fact, their 
willingness to act, and their determination over time, illustrates that they 
not only felt strongly about the issue but also expected to win, an expecta-
tion that likely would not have persisted had the problem been understood 
as a political one requiring action by elected officials. 
In the two school equity battles reviewed here, Chicago Latinos were 
able to achieve their goals not through conventional methods, but through 
protest politics coordinated by community organizations. Of what use, 
then, is increased political representation? Research on Black political repre-
sentation suggests that the symbolism of those Latino officials, perhaps 
combined with the right of non-citizens to vote in school board elections 
in Chicago, provided important psychological support to the activists in 
these struggles. In other words, the existence of a substantial number of 
elected and appointed Latino public officials encouraged members of 
the community to believe that city officials would be responsive to their 
demands, while their right to vote in school board contests gave them an 
additional sense of legitimacy in the arena of school policy. 
Gay notes that “research on minority political leadership at the local 
level suggests that descriptive representation can favorably affect attitudes 
towards public officials and institutions.”36 Building on Fenno’s claim that 
constituents value accessibility and the availability of two-way communi-
cation between themselves and their representatives,37 Gay theorizes that 
descriptive representation improves citizens’ attitudes about such accessi-
bility and communication. She found that both white and Black citizens 
were more likely to contact same-race members of Congress, evidence 
that those attitudes translate into substantive political behavior. Similarly, 
Williams argues that descriptive representation sets in motion a “spiral of 
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trust” which has real implications for political life.38 Abney and Hutcheson 
find that having a same-race mayor increases trust among city constitu-
ents.39 Mansbridge argues that descriptive representation can be neces-
sary to overcome distrust between legislators and constituents and ensure 
adequate communication.40 Swain argues that descriptive representation 
increases minority trust in government.41 Burrell notes: “When citizens 
can identify with their representatives they become less alienated and more 
involved in the political system.”42 What all of these researchers conclude in 
common, albeit about Blacks rather than Latinos, is that descriptive repre-
sentation has substantive effects; increased trust, communication, and 
political behavior increases the political voice of minorities beyond any 
substantive representation elected officials might otherwise be delivering. 
Applying these findings to the local Chicago context suggests that 
members of the Latino community were more likely to approach and 
make demands of school officials because of the presence of Latino leaders. 
While Latinos in Chicago may not have enough traditional political power 
to achieve their goals without going to extremes (e.g. hunger strikes), they 
have enough to be empowered to take such extreme action when they 
believe it to be necessary, and also enough for it to be successful. In Chicago, 
although the Daley administration was not delivering the school policies 
favored by the Latino community, the parents in Pilsen and Little Village 
were empowered to act, first using traditional means and then turning to 
protest politics when those initial efforts were unsuccessful. It is impos-
sible to know whether the same actions would have been undertaken 
given less descriptive representation, but it is consistent with the theories 
reviewed here that the Latinos of Chicago might have been more likely to 
suffer quietly, or to give up more quickly, in an atmosphere of less trust and 
weaker feelings of political efficacy. 
Conclusion
The Latino community in Chicago can point to significant advancements 
and successes in the last few decades. After years of being denied a propor-
tional share of political power, based on population size, they won lawsuits 
and redistricting battles that led to notable increases in the number and 
strength of city and state elected and appointed officials. The resulting pres-
ence of Latino members on the city council and in the state legislature in 
Springfield have led to tangible gains for Latino residents, including more 
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jobs and more city contracts. In the face of unfulfilled promises from city 
officials to do something about overcrowded schools in Pilsen and Little 
Village, community activism and determination led to renewed promises 
and promises kept, resulting not only in the desired outcome (new and 
expanded schools), but also a renewed sense of community power—the 
same lessons learned by those who fought for jobs at Illinois Bell and 
Jewel in the 1970s. While in some ways the continued need for such tactics 
as hunger strikes and pickets is evidence that Latino political power in 
Chicago still lacks sufficient strength, the school equity battles also indi-
cate the power of the community to successfully exploit available political 
opportunity structures. 
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Introduction
in The early To mid-2000s, miami underwenT The largesT real esTaTe 
boom and bust in its history. The frenzy of new construction in Miami’s 
urban core radically transformed the politics and demographics of the 
“Magic City.” Hispanics, especially the city’s powerful Cuban American busi-
ness and political establishment, were the prime agents behind the redevel-
opment of Miami’s historic neighborhoods. However when the city’s real 
estate market collapsed in 2006, the effects of the ensuing recession were 
disproportionately felt by those residents who did not benefit from the 
boom years. In large measure, it was the city’s working-class Hispanics and 
African Americans who bore the burden of 10% of unemployment and had 
one of the nation’s highest foreclosure rates. The major agent responsible 
for the Miami Renaissance and its consequences was then-Mayor Manuel 
(Manny) Diaz (2001–2009) who reasoned that if he provided political 
stability, efficient government services, and development incentives, then 
developers would flock to the city and redevelop its downtown and the 
surrounding, depressed, waterfront neighborhoods. His logic at that time 
was that growth would revitalize the city and bring prosperity to one of the 
nation’s poorest city. 
The real estate boon under Mayor Diaz was different from Miami’s past 
boon in that its main beneficiary was the Latino-owned development and 
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construction companies. These projects were largely financed, planned, 
developed, and constructed by Miami’s Latino bourgeoisie. Latino devel-
opers and bankers were able to negotiate with the Diaz administration’s 
favorable government-private partnership that added fuel to Miami’s 
already hot real estate market. Miami’s Latino-owned businesses, along 
with the Diaz Administration, were the principal agents of the so-called 
Miami Renaissance. While the building boon enriched the mostly Cuban 
business community, it only temporarily improved the lives of working-
class Hispanics and African Americans. Unemployment dropped to 4% 
during the height of the boon, and housing values skyrocketed, increasing 
the assets of many middle- and working-class Hispanics. But when the 
boon ended it was Miami’s Hispanic working- and middle-classes who 
bore the burden. Unemployment climbed to 10%, and many families lost 
their homes due to second mortgages taken out during the height of the 
housing bubble. 
At its height in 2005, the scope, scale, and speed of the Miami real estate 
boom was breathtaking:
More than 114 major projects, most of them high-rise condos, 
were under construction or in the planning stages in the urban 
core along Biscayne Bay. Citywide, developers were propos-
ing more than 61,000 new condominium units, eight times the 
number built during the past decade.1 
This unprecedented growth came under the leadership of Miami’s Cuban 
American Mayor Diaz. 
Elected in 2001, Diaz counted on the boom to reverse Miami’s long 
decline. The 2000 Census found that the City of Miami was the poorest city 
in the nation. Diaz also became Mayor after a period of political instability 
and corruption that tarnished the city’s image. In 1996, City Manager Cesar 
Odio and City Commissioner Miller Dawkins were convicted of accepting 
bribes from city contractors. The following year, the city’s mayoral election 
was tainted by widespread vote fraud that eventually led to the removal 
of Mayor Xavier Suarez in February 1998. During Suarez’s brief, 100-day 
tenure as Mayor, his extraordinary behavior led the city’s major newspaper 
to refer to him as “Mayor Loco.” The crisis in Miami politics exploded on 
national television during Easter week 2000 when Elián González was forc-
ibly removed from his Miami relatives’ home in Little Havana, sparking 
days of civil protest. 
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Diaz was committed to reviving the city’s faltering fortunes; therefore, 
neighborhood issues were very much a part of his election campaign. The 
mayor outlined his version of the Miami Renaissance during his 2005 State 
of the City address when he announced that Miami was becoming a world 
class city. He said, “Now it is the time we stop talking about potential. Now 
is the time to take our rightful place as one of the world’s greatest cities.”2 
The Mayor then tracked the city’s progress from the financial turmoil and 
fraudulent mayoral election of the 1990s to its boom town status as one of 
the hottest real estate markets in the country and the darling of such enter-
tainment events as the MTV Video Music Awards.3
An important dimension of the Miami Renaissance story was Diaz’s 
leadership style. He governed as an Agentic leader—that is he has a “power 
over” orientation towards leadership. Such leaders describe themselves as 
“aggressive, ambitious, dominant, forceful, independent, daring, self-confi-
dent, and competitive.”4 These attributes are reflective of what Burns calls 
great man leadership, in which a heroic figure employs his “will to power” 
to achieve desired results.5 As a result, Diaz’s vision of the city’s transfor-
mation was very much his own; he worked very little with people and/or 
groups in neighborhoods to bring about neighborhood change. Even the 
city commission and the city manager were reduced to rubber stamping 
the vision advocated by the Mayor’s Office. Diaz was able to bulldoze his 
agenda through the city’s commission and bureaucracy because of his 
close ties to the Miami business establishment, combined with his appeal 
to voters as reflected in his surprise come-from-behind victory in the 2001 
mayoral election. 
The 2001 Election: The Neighborhood Candidate 
Diaz’s commitment to the revitalization of Miami’s downtown is ironic 
given that in the 2001 mayoral election he ran as the candidate of Miami’s 
neighborhoods. The frontrunner in the election was former-Mayor 
Maurice Ferre (1970–1985). Ferre based his candidacy on the city’s 
1970s construction boom that saw the development of Miami’s financial 
district along Brickell Avenue. Ferre entered the race as a clear favorite 
leading his nearest rival incumbent, Mayor Joe Carrollo, by 15 points, 
35% to 20%.6 Diaz barely registered at 5%. In fact, in a race that featured 
two former Mayors (Ferre, Suarez), an incumbent Mayor (Carrollo), 
the chairman of the City Commission (Willy Gort), and a former city 
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manager (Jose Garcia Pedrosa), Diaz, who had never held elected office, 
was clearly the underdog. 
Diaz overcame his early underdog status by exploiting his ties to the 
city’s business community and raising more money than all his rivals. In 
the primary election, Diaz raised over $1.1 million. Ferre was only able to 
raise $900,000 while incumbent Mayor Carrollo, who had offended both 
the Anglo and Cuban American business establishments, barely reached 
$300,000. Diaz’s fundraising muscle came from his close relationship with 
then-Insurance Commissioner and former US Senator Bill Nelson, and his 
business relationship with many of the city’s most prominent developers. 
Diaz, a life-long Democrat, also had strong connections with the city’s 
Anglo legal establishment. These connections allowed him to collect monies 
from the state insurance industry, from Hispanic developers, and from 
Miami’s silk stocking law firms. He also was able to organize a campaign 
staff that brought together three of Miami’s most savvy campaign consul-
tants (Armando Gutierrez, Alberto Lorenzo, and Steve Marin). 
Candidate Diaz combined his elite fundraising and campaign organiza-
tion with a populist message and touch. Though Diaz never held public 
office, he was relatively well known in the city’s Cuban community. He 
had been the founding President of the Spanish American League Against 
Discrimination (SALAD) that defended the civil rights of South Florida’s 
Spanish speaking immigrants. More importantly, Diaz gained notoriety as 
Elián González’s lawyer. He was in Elián’s relatives’ Little Havana home the 
morning it was raided by federal agents. Diaz justified his abandonment 
of the Democratic Party by pointing out that Janet Reno, the Democratic 
Attorney General, had ordered federal agents to point a gun to his head. 
Diaz’s reputation gave him entry into the city’s Hispanic neighborhoods, 
and he became a Republican. 
Diaz’s campaign strategy was designed to capitalize on his strong Cuban 
credentials. Early in the campaign, Diaz spent three months walking door-
to-door in the heavily Cuban neighborhoods of The Roads, Shenandoah, 
Little Havana, Coral Gate, and Flagami. He stressed his strong community 
links and the fact that he came from humble origins, having been raised in 
the city’s Hispanic neighborhoods. In the debates, Diaz criticized Suarez, 
Ferre, Carrollo, and Garcia Pedrosa, all of whom had been mayors or city 
managers, for ignoring Miami’s ethnic neighborhoods and concentrating 
their efforts on Downtown and the Biscayne and Brickell corridors. This 
strategy paid off. By October 2001, four weeks from Election Day, Diaz 
was in a close race with Ferre and Carrollo. On Election Day, Ferre was 
85
Manny Diaz and the Rise and Fall of the Miami Renaissance
in first place with 14,310 votes, while Diaz barely edged out incumbent 
Mayor Carrollo by just over 200 votes (10,808 to 10,581) to make it into 
the run-off with Ferre. 
The run-off election for Mayor of the City of Miami was no contest. 
Despite the fact that Ferre had bested Diaz in the primary, Ferre suffered 
from the handicap of being a Puerto Rican in a Cuban city. In the primary, 
Ferre had been the only non-Cuban in the race, now he was head to head 
with a Cuban Republican who had developed a strong base in that commu-
nity. To make matters worse, Ferre, a Democrat, muddled the question 
of whether he would endorse Janet Reno for Governor of Florida. The 
confused answer set off a firestorm in the city’s Cuban American commu-
nity that the Diaz campaign gleefully exploited. Needless to say, Diaz easily 
defeated Ferre 55% to 45% in the run-off. Moreover, Diaz carried the 
Hispanic neighborhoods by nearly 70% of the vote, while Ferre received 
two-thirds of the Anglo vote and nearly 90% of the African American vote. 
Reforming the City
The incoming Diaz Administration faced formidable challenges as they 
took office. First, repairing Miami’s tarnished image in the wake of the Elián 
González affair and the corruption and electoral fraud of the 1990s. Second, 
dealing with the endemic poverty that plagued the city, especially its tradi-
tional ethnic neighborhoods. The new administration was barely in power 
a month when they received the official notification from the US Census 
Bureau that Miami was the United States’ poorest city. Third, the admin-
istration faced a city bureaucracy that was inefficient and unresponsive to 
citizens. Moreover, previous administrations had granted the police and fire 
employee unions generous pensions and benefit packages that threatened 
the city’s financial stability. Finally, the Diaz administration had to deal with 
a shrinking tax base that, along with financial mismanagement, had pushed 
the city to the edge of bankruptcy. From the 1990s to the 2000s the city’s 
population had actually declined and urban development projects were rare. 
Almost immediately, the new administration began a vigorous campaign 
to restore the Magic City’s image. During his first year in office, Mayor 
Diaz, working with the city’s large Latino music industry, began negotia-
tions to host the Latin Grammys. Miami had been scheduled to host the 
2001 award show but a dispute over the appearance of Cuba-based musi-
cians had led to the relocation of the Grammys to Los Angeles. After a year 
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of intense negotiations between the Diaz Administration and the Latin 
Recording Academy, Miami was chosen to host the awards in 2003. The 
success of the show, plus Miami’s knack for hosting extravagant events, led 
the city to host the more popular MTV Video Music Awards in both 2004 
and 2005. The Diaz Administration’s ability to host these events without 
generating protest from radical elements of the city’s Cuban community 
was a major breakthrough. In the past, the city’s reputation had been 
blemished by extremists who had been able to shut down major main-
stream events because they somehow offended local sensibility regarding 
Castro’s Cuba. During the negotiations to bring the Latin Grammys and 
the MTV awards, the Diaz Administration did not allow the unreason-
able demands of right wing groups to determine the city’s official posi-
tion. This was a radical shift from the policies of past city administrations. 
Therefore, in this case the avoidance of conflict, rather than the use of 
conflict, proved effective. 
Diaz also made reforming the Miami Police Department (MPD) a major 
priority of his tenure. Before the new administration, the national image 
of the Miami Police Department had been tainted by numerous deadly 
encounters between police officers and community members. In a 12-year 
period (1991–2003), 33 civilians were killed by Miami police officers under 
questionable circumstances. Miami officers, for example, shot fifteen 
people in the back, killing five. These incidents became very high profile, 
dominated press coverage of the department, and overshadowed the hard 
work of the department in crime reduction. In 2002, the Department of 
Justice published a report which criticized MPD’s policy on the use of 
deadly force. Mayor Diaz began his term as eleven Miami police officers 
were convicted by a federal court of planting guns at the scene of police 
shootings. The large numbers of bullets at various shooting scenes that 
were fired indiscriminately, suggesting that officers often lost control and 
had no line of vision on their intended targets were also disturbing. Six 
times they wounded or killed innocent bystanders. More often than not, 
officers missed their intended targets and sent bullets flying, raising ques-
tions about whether it was proper to resort to firearms. During a 12-year 
period (1991–2003), MPD officers fired nearly 1,300 bullets at suspects and 
missed more than 1,100 times. At least 20 of those bullets ended up inside 
civilian homes, including one found in a microwave oven. 
The Mayor began his reform by hiring one of the most respected law 
enforcement professionals in the nation to head the troubled depart-
ment. John Timoney was appointed as Miami’s eleventh Chief of Police 
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on January 2, 2003. Timoney had worked his way through the ranks of 
the New York Police Department until he was appointed First Deputy 
Commissioner, the second highest rank in the NYPD, in 1995. The new 
Chief began his effort to reform the city’s police by initiating a new “Use 
of Force” guideline. Under the new policy, MPD officers discharged their 
weapons in less than 1% of incidents resulting in arrests in 2004. The 
policy required officers to, under all circumstances, avoid placing them-
selves in a position where the only option is the use of deadly force. The 
new policy also greatly restricted the authority of MPD officers to shoot at 
moving vehicles, a practice that was all too frequent before the implemen-
tation of the 2003 policy. In the past, police officers fired more than 300 
bullets at 33 moving vehicles during the same 12-year period (1991–2003). 
Since the institution of new departmental policies, introduced by Chief 
Timoney and the adoption of new “less-than-lethal” technologies during 
threatening situations, the death of officers and suspects, as well as the 
accidental death of innocent bystanders during these situations decreased 
to zero. 
In addition to restoring the public image of the MPD, the Diaz 
Administration also initiated a major overhaul of the city’s organizational 
structure. At the end of his first year in office, Mayor Diaz appointed Joe 
Arriola, a feisty Cuban American businessman, to begin the process of 
reforming Miami’s bureaucratic processes in order to ensure efficiency and 
economy in the governance of the city. In fewer than six months, every major 
department head had been removed and replaced from the Parks Director 
to the City Attorney. Moreover, the new Manager began the arduous process 
of renegotiating the city’s pension programs with its employee unions in 
order to reduce the city’s financial liability in the future. 
The mayor also made dealing with the city’s high poverty rate one of his 
top priorities. As part of the mayor’s Prosperity Campaign, the city launched 
a public relations campaign to publicize the availability of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) program for Miami’s working poor. Duplicating 
successful campaigns in Denver and Chicago, the city partnered with the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Human Services Coalition, and Florida 
International University to conduct the outreach effort. According to the 
IRS, the number of City of Miami residents receiving EITC increased from 
60,170 to 63,247, an increase of over 3,000 applicants. The increase in 
monies going to low-income workers in the City of Miami increased from 
$110,000,000 to $123,500,000. The City of Miami captured a little over half 
of the $26,000,000 that the IRS estimated, are potential EITC claims.7 
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Miami 21
The legacy of the Diaz Administration, however, is not in these long 
overdue reforms, but the dramatic transformation of the city’s skyline. 
The inauguration of Diaz as mayor ushered in a period of unprecedented 
growth in the city’s real estate market. The level of private investment in 
the city outdid in risk and bravado the 1920 boom that created the city. 
It included a 74-story spire—taller than any residential building south of 
Manhattan—in Midtown Miami, the largest urban development project in 
the nation second only to the freedom towers in New York. All this unprec-
edented growth occurred in a city with fewer than 400,000 inhabitants and 
only 45 square miles. 
The large-scale construction improved the city’s economy. During a 
four-year span (2002–2006), over 11,000 new jobs were added in the City 
of Miami (from 142,632 to 154,377), cutting the city’s unemployment rate 
in half from 9.8% to 4.7%.8 Furthermore, the city’s fiscal situation was 
aided by the real estate boom. The Diaz Administration, due to increased 
tax revenues from the boom, was able to lower property tax rate every year 
of his administration. The city’s bond rating rose from near junk bond to 
triple “A” rating. 
One of the most unique features of the Miami Renaissance is that Latino 
developers are among the principal agents of growth. Jorge Perez, of the 
Related Group, has been one of the cataclysmic forces behind the boom. 
Perez’s Related Group is the largest Hispanic-owned business in the United 
States with a development portfolio with projects valued in excess of $10 
billion, and with reported sales of more than $2.1 billion for 2004. The 
Related Group is responsible for some of the boom’s landmark develop-
ments, including One Miami, Loft Downtown, Loft II, 500 Brickell Avenue, 
Icon Brickell, Park Suites, The Plaza, and The Mark. These projects, with a 
multi-million dollar assessed value, were at the forefront of Diaz’s vision of 
the new Miami. It is important to note that Jorge Perez and other prominent 
Hispanic developers, such as former ambassador Paul Ceijas, are Cuban 
Democrats and were associated with Diaz before the 2001 election. While 
Hispanic developers are the chief beneficiaries of the real estate boom, a 
sizable number of projects are being constructed by national developers 
who were predominantly Anglo. 
The Diaz Administration initially took a laissez-faire approach to the 
transformation of the Miami skyline, their attitude was best expressed by 
commissioner Johnny Winton, who quipped that “the role of government 
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is to simply stay out of the way.”9 By 2005, the mayor decided that the 
unprecedented growth offered the city a unique opportunity to create a 
city-wide Master Plan that would regulate and rationalize the boom. The 
Mayor was determined that the plan be in harmony with his vision of 
Miami as a world-class city. The new plan, Miami 21, was coined for the 
Miami of the twenty-first century and entailed the complete overhaul of 
the city’s outdated and chaotic zoning code. Diaz viewed Miami 21 “as a 
long-term investment in the preservation and improvement to the quality 
of life in [the] city.”10 
The city hired architect Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, the high-priestess of 
new urbanism, as the lead consultant on the project. Plater-Zyberk sought 
to revive the principle of traditional town planning denser, compact devel-
opment and walkable streets as an alternative to auto-dependent urban 
sprawl—this was needed in a Miami where traffic congestion is a major issue 
for residents. Miami 21 was designed to produce a zoning code that dated 
back to the city’s founding in the early 1900s and had not been re-written 
since. New regulations, called overlays, were added on top of the original 
code, making Miami’s zoning one of the most complex in the country. The 
city’s new zoning regulations filled several volumes, forcing developers and 
homeowners to hire lawyers and consultants versed in exploiting loopholes 
in the code. This complexity has resulted in many cases of inconsistent deci-
sions leading to inappropriate zoning. The Diaz Administration hoped that 
Miami 21 would create a Master Plan that compelled rational and consis-
tent zoning, resulting in a more livable and pleasant urban core. 
The adoption of a form-based code, like Miami 21, places the city in a 
proactive position as opposed to a laissez-faire attitude in regards to devel-
opment. Private citizens were encouraged to participate by helping adopt 
community standards for their neighborhoods. This “form” gave the city 
the tool it needed to achieve the highest quality of development with a 
vision that is accepted by citizens at the neighborhood level. 
The Diaz administration hoped that Miami 21 would create a predict-
able and efficient code. Predictability would result from giving residential 
neighborhoods the tools to conserve and enhance their unique character. It 
would also give developers clear guidelines of the areas that are available for 
high-density growth, thus allowing them to concentrate their resources on 
projects that will succeed. In contrast to conventional zoning codes, form-
based codes are highly illustrated and involve a significant level of public 
participation by engaging citizens in the development process, so that they 
have ownership over it. These new regulations would actually reduce the 
90
The Roots of Latino Urban Agency
time and cost for development in the City of Miami. Developers are no 
longer forced to hire land-use lawyers and lobbyists to obtain city approval 
for their projects as long as they adhere to the form-based code. 
Gentrification
The real estate boom has not only changed the Miami skyline but also 
affected the city’s demographics. After nearly two decades of static 
growth, the City of Miami witnessed a significant increase in population. 
Between 2000 and 2003, the City’s population grew by over 20,000 people, 
from 362,470 to 382,959. This compares with a very modest population 
increase of 3,685 between 1990 and 2000. Significantly, the dramatic 
increase in the city’s population has come before 61,000 new units have 
come online. Given the planned growth in the city’s residential units, it 
was expected that the City of Miami would have a population of half a 
million by the 2010 decennial census; in fact Miami’s population in 2010 
approximated 400,000. 
However, at the same time that Miami’s population was increasing, the 
number of African Americans continued to decline. During the same 
three year period, 2000–2003, the African American population of the 
city declined from 80,858 to 68,817. According to estimates from the 
US Census Bureau, African Americans comprised only 18% of the city’s 
population in 2003, compared to 22.3% in 2000 and 25% in 1990. This 
decline of African Americans reflects the growing gentrification of Miami’s 
urban core. This gentrification began before the inauguration of the Diaz 
administration; between 1990 and 2000, the African American popula-
tion of the city declined by 11,000. The process began when middle- and 
upper-middle class Anglos and Hispanics, fleeing the high cost of housing 
on Miami Beach, began settling in Miami’s northeast neighborhoods, such 
as Morningside and Belle Meade. These new homeowners replaced African 
American renters in those neighborhoods. By the late 1990s, the process of 
gentrification had moved to the west side of the Biscayne corridor including 
the eastern areas of Lemon City and Little Haiti. 
The Diaz administration, especially Commissioner Winton, encour-
aged and promoted this process in the areas adjacent to Miami’s declining 
downtown. An economic development study of Miami’s Florida East 
Coast (FEC) Railroad Corridor demonstrated the economic potential 
of developing a series of poor neighborhoods north of downtown. The 
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report recommended the residential development of Edgewater, Wynwood, 
and the areas south of the city’s vibrant design district. The centerpiece 
of this development strategy was the 55 acres of the Buena Vista site. An 
abandoned railroad switching yard, the Buena Vista site, was the hole in 
the donut between the design district and the Wynwood and Edgewater 
neighborhoods. The development of the Buena Vista site into Midtown 
Miami accelerated the gentrification process in the city. Midtown Miami, 
an 18-block stretch dubbed “SoHo South,” is a place residents and visi-
tors gravitate to, much like its sister neighborhood up north. Designed 
as a pedestrian-friendly neighborhood, it was to be comprised of 3,000 
condominium residences interspersed with street-level retail and commer-
cial space. The pricing of the units were geared toward upper-middle class 
and wealthy buyers; condominiums are priced between $400,000 and 
$2,000,000. 
The pricing of the Midtown project was in line with the rest of the devel-
opments occurring in the city at the time. Most of the new condominium 
residences under construction and planned, were priced in the mid-six-
figure range, pricing out most of the current residents of the city. Many 
critics of the Miami boom argued that by pricing-out middle- and work-
ing-class people, the city will not become a vibrant 24-hour metropolis, but 
instead, Miami will be nothing more than a seasonal playground for the 
rich. Joel Kotkin, an urban historian, hypothesizes that Miami is in danger 
of becoming an “ephemeral city, like San Francisco and [Manhattan].”11 
The danger is that Miami will become a place that caters to the rich, the 
childless young, and tourists. 
In addition to the high cost of the units, many critics of the Miami 
building boom argued that the real estate market in the city is, in reality, a 
speculative bubble. They point out that in some projects, nearly 80% of the 
buyers are investors. The luxury condo market in the city has been domi-
nated by European and Latin American buyers, attracted by the weak dollar 
and the relatively inexpensive properties in comparison to other coastal US 
cities. These critics suggest that many of the spectacular new buildings will 
stand empty and will not create the busy street life the Diaz administration 
is hoping for. 
In 2005, construction began on the “Midtown Miami” development 
which was planned with eight high-rise residential buildings, a hotel, two 
parks, and a major urban shopping area—“The Shops at Midtown.” Due 
to the collapse of the real estate bubble in 2007, only two residential build-
ings, and about two-thirds of the “The Shops at Midtown” were built. In 
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July 2011, plans were announced to begin construction on a new entertain-
ment center at Midtown, including a hotel, movie theater, and shops on 
the site of the current temporary park in the center of Midtown. Critics of 
Midtown state the lack of parks continues to be a major issue. Midtown has 
grown quickly, despite the development slow down. 
Nowhere have the battlegrounds over gentrification been so clearly 
drawn as in Miami’s Overtown neighborhood. Overtown is the city’s 
historic African American neighborhood, adjacent to downtown. The area, 
in the 1940s–1960s, was a working and viable neighborhood. Within the 
boundaries of Overtown, there were many black-owned businesses and 
homes. Moreover, Overtown was nationally famous as a venue for black 
entertainment. Since black entertainers were prohibited from staying 
in Miami Beach, Overtown became the place where they lodged. After 
performing for whites on the beach, the entertainers would then play for 
African Americans in Overtown clubs like Sir John’s and the Lyric. The 
neighborhood’s cohesion was destroyed by the building of I-95 that cut 
through Overtown, dividing the community. From 1980–2010, Overtown 
experienced steep decline as businesses and middle- and working-class 
blacks have moved out. However, Overtown remains a powerful symbol of 
past injustices for Miami’s African American community and remains an 
important center for traditional black churches. 
After years of neglect and broken promises, The City of Miami redirected 
efforts toward Overtown. The first step in the redevelopment of Overtown 
was a four-block parcel of parking and vacant lots in the southeast corner 
of the historic neighborhood. The city awarded the contract to Crosswinds 
Communities to develop over 1,000 residential units to be sold to medium-
income buyers. The city-run Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) 
would donate the land to the project in exchange for moderately priced 
units and 65 units to be given to low-income Overtown residents. The 
Crosswinds deal, supported by the Mayor, divided the Overtown commu-
nity. Community leaders embraced the development as the best possible 
deal available while others in the community viewed it as a gentrification 
project in disguise. Power U, a group of dissatisfied residents, became the 
project’s main critic, suing both the City and the developer. 
Since 2011, the city’s redevelopment agency has had to settle two lawsuits 
tied to claims from both the public and private sector about who should 
control the land. One, between the county and the city, is about whether 
the city and its CRA should continue to control three county-owned parcels 
located between Sixth and Ninth streets. These parcels have reverted to 
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county control. The second has to do with land tied to the stalled Sawyer’s 
Walk/Crosswinds residential project, which has 3.5 blocks that overlap with 
some of the parcels in question in the county/city lawsuit. 
Gentrification was also occurring in the city’s Hispanic neighborhoods. 
However, in sharp contrast to the process in the city’s historic black areas, 
gentrification in Latino areas had not decreased the city’s Hispanic popula-
tion. In fact, contrarily, the city’s Hispanics population continues to grow 
and diversify. In these neighborhoods, young, professional Latinos are 
buying property from retired, elderly Hispanics. The elderly are replacing 
single-family homes for mid-priced condominiums along Coral Way 
and Southwest 8th Street in Miami’s Little Havana neighborhood. Young, 
professional Latinos are remodeling the single-family homes and rein-
vigorating Miami’s decaying historic neighborhoods. Thus, gentrification 
did not become the hot-button issue among the city’s Hispanics, as it did 
among African Americans. The major issue that the Miami boom created 
for some elderly and working class Hispanics is that higher property values 
resulted in higher rents. This has disproportionately affected poor and 
working-class Hispanics, especially the elderly. 
The Failure of the Miami Renaissance
Mayor Diaz was an agent of change for the Miami urban landscape during 
his tenure, but an agentic leader. This leadership and decision-making style 
brought both positive and negative results to Miamians. He almost single-
handedly rehabilitated the image of the city’s Cuban American majority. 
In the aftermath of the fraud and corruption of the 1990s and the Elián 
González affair, he demonstrated that Miami’s Cuban American commu-
nity was capable of tolerance and community building. The Mayor broke 
many of the traditional taboos that had constrained Cuban American poli-
ticians in the past. He did not kowtow to the city’s right-wing extremists or 
allow them to veto events and public policy. For example, he was the only 
prominent Cuban American politician that met with Oswaldo Paya, the 
founder of the Varela Project that calls for reconciliation between the Cuban 
American community, Cuban dissidents, and the Castro government. 
It was under Diaz’s leadership that the city underwent the most 
profound economic and real estate boom in its history. Moreover, this 
boom was spearheaded by local Latino developers. Similar to Stone’s anal-
ysis of Atlanta’s black leadership, in Miami it was minority developers who 
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designed, constructed, and profited from the redevelopment of Miami’s 
urban core.12 Jorge Perez, Pedro Martin, Paul Ceijas, Sergio Roc, Walter 
Defortuna, and Alan Ojeda directed the boom. Anglo and outside devel-
opers also profited, but it was the Hispanic developers, especially the Related 
Group, that paved the way and determined the rapid pace of the boom. By 
encouraging speculators and marketing his products in Europe and Latin 
America, Perez’s firm discovered the formula for Miami’s successful real 
estate development. 
However, it was this very formula that overheated the real estate market. 
For example, in a four-year period (2002–2006), 21,616 units were built in 
the downtown area, but buyers were only absorbing 2,000 a year. By 2006, 
there were over 13,000 unsold units just in the city’s urban core—a five-
year surplus—and over 10,000 more units in construction. Speculators 
began backing away from their contracts, and the contraction of the 
market began in earnest. Real estate prices fell over a third in the City 
of Miami in 2007. The cranes and construction sites, which were a ubiq-
uitous part of the Miami landscape for most of the decade, disappeared. 
Despair set in. 
By mid-2009 all the economic indicators were worse than when Mayor 
Diaz took office in 2001. Unemployment was in the double-digits, foreclo-
sures at record levels, and the reduction in real estate values had reduced city 
revenues; in 2012 the unemployment rates hovered around 9.5%. Moreover, 
the reduction in revenues combined with generous union contracts 
has again put the long-term fiscal viability of the city in jeopardy. More 
disturbing is that while the rank-and-file people of Miami did not benefit 
from the boom, they are surely suffering from the consequences of Diaz’s 
growth-at-all-costs strategy. The failure of the Miami Renaissance does not 
only reflect the limits of growth-machine strategies of urban development 
but also reflects the limits of agentic leaders. Diaz’s leadership style not only 
disempowered the working people of the city who elected him but, at the 
end of the day, made them pay the price for his failed policy. 
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“Ladies and Gentlemen: I have always abided by the axiom that one 
should never discuss politics or religion with anyone but your imme-
diate family. To do otherwise is a formula for creating a long list of 
former friends and associates. . . . That said, I feel so strongly about 
the Mayor’s race that I am compelled to break my own rule. . . . Mr. 
Castro is a smarter version of Ed Garza, making him potentially far 
more dangerous. . . . Don’t blow it. Vote for Phil Hardberger.”
–Memo widely circulated by San Antonio 
business executive, Ken Wolf, May 2005
Introduction
The already conTenTious poliTical environmenT of The 2005 san 
Antonio mayoral race was heightened when a private memo authored by a 
local business executive became public. The media were quick to report that 
many in the city found the sentiment in the document—which was sent to 
thousands of voters via email—racist.1 Interestingly this was the first time 
in the election cycle that television and newspaper directed their atten-
tion to the role of race. The memo made public what many had suspected: 
Julian Castro’s candidacy made ethnicity a factor in the minds of voters, 
5
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whether or not the local media, or candidates themselves, were interested 
in addressing the issue. San Antonio’s demographics and electoral environ-
ment are unique. In 2000, it was America’s eighth largest city, where 58% of 
the population is Latino, and roughly 34% of registered voters are Spanish-
surnamed. Unlike many other urban centers, San Antonio is not character-
ized by a significant proportion of immigrants or other minority groups.2 
Castro was attempting to become only the city’s third Latino mayor. Phil 
Hardberger, the white candidate, eventually emerged the victor, winning 
52% of the vote. 
Urban America is characterized by its diversity. Candidates for office are 
increasingly reflective of the diversity found in their cities. The growing 
number of minority candidates for citywide offices offers an opportunity 
to explore how political behavior is shaped and influenced by race and 
ethnicity. The purpose of this research is to further examine the relation-
ship between ethnicity and politics. Research illustrates that given the choice, 
voters will generally prefer co-ethnic candidates.3 This essay looks not only 
at the persistence of ethnic bloc voting, but also considers which ethnic 
group sare more likely to support non-co-ethnics. Plainly: who is more 
inclined to vote for “the other” and cast a cross-over vote? We test the threat 
hypothesis and project that Anglo voters will be more inclined than Latinos 
to support a co-ethnic candidate. The 2004 San Antonio, Texas mayoral 
race between Phil Hardberger and Julian Castro presents unique histor-
ical, electoral, and demographic conditions to test this hypothesis. Using 
precinct level data from San Antonio elections, individual level data from 
pre-election polls, and in-depth interviews with candidates, we examine 
the relationship between candidate ethnicity, election context, turnout, and 
vote choice.
Electoral Context: Party and Ethnicity
Like many American cities, San Antonio mayoral and city council races 
are nonpartisan elections. True as this may be, their partisan leanings are 
certainly not a secret matter. Traditionally, San Antonio’s mayoral candi-
dates have been linked with the Republicans or Democrats and campaigns 
have incorporated these party ties. Based on the number of San Antonians 
who participate in the Democratic primary and the number of Democrats 
elected to represent the city in other avenues of government, it is clear that-
Democrats have the electoral advantage in the city. In both the 1991 and 
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2005 elections, the final two candidates that emerged in the run-off were 
Democrats with public and formalized associations with the party. Thus, 
party should not function as an electoral cue to voters in either of these 
races. 
Another important similarity in the 1991 and the 2005 elections is the 
fact that a Mexican American was vacating the office of mayor. The city 
has had only two Latinos serve as mayor in its history. Henry Cisneros had 
been mayor for eight years and decided against running for re-election.4 In 
2005 Ed Garza was term-limited after four years in office. These conditions 
have only emerged twice in the city: a Mexican American candidate sought 
to succeed a Mexican American mayor. In both elections, a white candidate 
emerged victorious. 
Given the absence of party cues in these elections and the racial compo-
sition of the candidates and city, we surmise that voters relied on ethnic 
cues to establish their candidate preferences. There is some debate in the 
literature however that merits our attention as we formulate our hypoth-
eses and put the San Antonio case into a more theoretical context. 
Urban Elections and Racialized Voting
Ethnic and racial voting literature consists of three principal strands: 
1) The persistence and impacts of racial and ethnic bloc voting and its 
complementary racial threat frameworks;5 2) Deracialized campaigns and 
multiracial/ethnic electoral coalitions;6 and 3) Spatial voting models,which 
emphasize ideology and issues over race/ethnicity.7 Central to these strands 
are the varying degrees of racial and ethnic bloc voting and their relative 
influence on voter turnout and election results. 
The focus on racial/ethnic bloc voting, for example, suggests that race 
and ethnicity are primary determinants of vote choice in elections where 
a racial or ethnic minority candidate runs against a non-racial and non-
ethnic candidate. Hero succinctly puts it as “a tendency (for racial and 
ethnic minorities) to vote ‘for their own.’”8 Kaufmann tests an empow-
erment hypothesis for the persistence of racial and ethnic bloc voting by 
demonstrating that among Denver area Latinos ethnicity was a salient and 
powerful voting cue.9 All of these findings are consistent with Uhlaner’s 1989 
relational goods theory, which argues that certain benefits and incentives 
exist only for members of the in-group—in this case co-ethnics. Applied 
to our study then, voters perceive specific benefits and incentives from 
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electing a co-ethnic. Indeed, a central idea driving the creation of single-
member and racially gerrymandered districts is rooted in the assumption 
and evidence that minority voters prefer co-ethnic candidates.10
Others’ recent work has concentrated on city politics in Texas, Florida, 
and California.11 Brischetto, for example, concludes: 
After examining the results of literally hundreds of bipartisan and 
non-bipartisan contests in state and local jurisdictions through-
out the southwest over the past decade, one must conclude that 
racially polarized voting is a fact of political life which simply 
reflects different perceived self interests on the part of Anglo and 
Chicano voters.12
Hill et al., as another example, in their investigation of the 1996 Dade 
County executive mayoral election added, “Is there anyway that one can 
avoid the conclusion that the . . . election was about anything but ethnicity? 
In a word: no. Absolutely not.”13
The literature diverges on the persistence of racial and ethnic bloc 
voting. Dahl, for example, argued that ethnic voting is a product of 
social status; thus, as the ethnic group increased in social status, ethnic 
voting would decrease.14 Dahl also asserted that the social and economic 
concerns “bind” the self-consciousness of ethnic members. Wolfinger, in 
contrast, argued that the effects of ethnicity were not easily diminished by 
changes in economic characteristics and that economic mobility (into the 
middle class) heightens ethnic consciousness and, “by implication,” ethnic 
bloc voting. Wolfinger also noted that education, geographic dispersion 
(suburbia), intermarriage, and inter-group contacts, would likely reduce 
ethnic consciousness and ethnic bloc political behavior. 
Dahl and Wolfinger point to the size, shared class identification, and 
geographic location and density of the ethnic communities as contributing 
factors to cohesive social and political behaviors. Huckfeldt also recog-
nized the weight of class and status on political behavior but argued for 
the recognition that ethnicity, class, and social status also interact and vary. 
Seemingly, at times, class and social status carry more weight; in others, 
race and ethnicity may prevail.15
One variant of this aspect of the racial bloc politics literature is the racial threat 
framework.16 Giles and Evans (1986, 470), for example, conceptualize racial 
and ethnic groups as vehicles pursuing interests and competing over control of 
economic, political, and social structures. Here, the competition among ethnic 
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and racial groups defines behaviors. In a metropolitan area, for example, that is 
changing from minority to majority and vice-versa, persistent racial and ethnic 
bloc voting behavior may be viewed as a threat to traditional political hegemo-
nies and result in “blacklash” against racial and ethnic candidacies.17
On the other side of racial and ethnic bloc voting are examinations of 
deracialized electoral campaigns. Here, candidates and campaign strat-
egies “de-emphasize racially divisive issues to garner crossover support 
from voters of other races” and mobilize “support from voters of the 
candidates racial group.”18 Several Latino mayoral elections are frequently 
cited as examples of successful deracialization campaigns, including Pena 
in Denver,19 Cisneros and Garza in San Antonio,20 and Villariogosa in Los 
Angeles.21 De la Garza, perhaps unknowingly, cited the campaign’s success 
in El Paso, when he wrote “Anglo Americans do not support Mexican 
Americans candidates who identify with the Mexican American people, but 
they will vote for Spanish-surnamed candidates who identify with ‘all El 
Paso,’ (i.e., with the Anglo sectors).”22 The literature on the subject generally 
agrees that these elements are key to a successful, non-ethnic campaign:
Consistent, non-threatening images•	
Avoiding racially divisive issues•	
Aggressive grassroots mobilization efforts•	
Strategic targeting of white votes•	
High-profile business and political elite endorsements•	
Middle age•	
Moderate political ideology•	
De-emphasis of ethnicity•	 23
Liu adds that deracialized campaigns assist in strategic voting decisions for 
non-ethnic minority voters.24
Many studies on racial and ethnic bloc voting offer qualified assessments 
of race and ethnicity as cues to voting behavior. Wolfinger, for example, 
writes, “In the absence of other cues, ethnicity guides voter decisions . . . and 
ethnic voting also seems to be less important when some greater issue domi-
nates political perspectives” (emphasis added).25 Hero adds that “in the 
absence of compelling reasons—such as strong issue agreement [and] candi-
date image—voters generally support candidates of their own racial-ethnic 
background (emphasis added).26 These conditions have become points of 
departure for the final strand in this literature: spatial models of voting. 
These models typically suggest that voters consider the issue positions, 
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party loyalty, and candidate evaluations and choose the candidate closest 
to their own issue positions, loyalty, and values.27 This model indicates that 
Mexican American voters condition their vote on available information and 
on their evaluation of the candidate, Mexican American or not.28 Abranjano 
et al. offer crossover voting among Anglo and Latino voters in the 2001 Los 
Angeles mayoral election as evidence of the strength of the model.29
Perhaps the mixed results and emphases suggest that standards for 
evidence of racial and ethnic bloc voting are too high. Abranjano et al. also 
look at crossover voting as evidence that race and ethnicity are not the 
principal vote cues; they actually find a greater degree of crossover voting 
among higher income, better educated, and more liberal white voters.30 
On the one hand, they also verify polarized voting but only predominantly 
among Latinos. On the other hand, the use of simple bivariate analyses may 
overstate the impact.31
Is race and ethnicity simply a surrogate for difference in interests? 
And is racial and ethnic bloc voting simply symptomatic of a conflict of 
different interests? Perhaps so. Yet, it still matters. For the courts and the 
1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights, “all that mattered was 
that the level of bloc voting had the effects of denying minorities an equal 
opportunity to elect candidates of choice.”32 If context varies and matters, 
then we might expect and, in fact, see varying degrees and impacts of racial 
and ethnic bloc voting. Vanderleeuw et al. suggest that “the fact that elec-
tion campaigns are strategically deracialized may be a sign of the continued 
importance of race in urban elections.”33
Dahl argues that the social and economic class concerns of ethnic group 
members are the “ties that bind” the self-consciousness of ethnic groups. 
Wolfinger, on the other hand, contends that the effects of ethnicity are not 
easily diminished by changes in economic characteristics. Wolfinger also 
notes that education, geographic dispersion (into the suburbs), intermar-
riage, and inter-group contacts would likely reduce ethnic consciousness 
and ethnic bloc political behavior. He argues, in essence, that the racial-
threat is diminished with these demographic and contextual variables. 
Hypotheses: Ethnically Polarized Voting
Given the persistence of racial bloc voting, the continued use of deracialzied 
campaigns, and the impact of other contextual variables, we test competing 
approaches with three specific hypotheses. 
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In an election with a co-ethnic candidate, as the percentage H1. 
of Latinos in a precinct increases, so will the vote share for 
the co-ethnic candidate. 
As the percentage of Latinos in a precinct increases, turnout H2. 
should also increase. 
Given the option, voters will prefer the co-ethnic candidate. H3. 
Whites will have a stronger preference for the co-ethnic 
than Latinos. 
These hypotheses test the persistence of ethnic bloc voting at the neigh-
borhood or community level and the political empowerment framework. 
We expect that in Latino-heavy precincts individuals will vote in a cohesive 
fashion and turn out in large numbers to support their co-ethnic candidate. 
The converse should also hold true: in neighborhoods that are predomi-
nantly white, voters will be more inclined than Latinos to support the white 
candidate. 
There are several reasons we should expect Latinos to be more inclined 
to engage in crossover voting. In the first place, it is common practice for 
Latino voters, of any partisan position, to cast a ballot for white candidates. 
Crossover voting is the norm for Latinos, as they do not typically have the 
option of voting for a co-ethnic. The fact of the matter is that more elections 
than not, from national to local offices, are between several white candidates. 
Whites are also accustomed to ethnically homogenous ballot choices, but in 
this case the choices are co-ethnics. The presence of a candidate who is not 
of shared ethnicity is rare and threatens to weaken the group’s descriptive 
representation and political power. Therefore, we hypothesize that Latino 
voters will be more likely to cast a crossover vote than white voters. 
Because the mayoral election was non-partisan in nature and featured 
two Democratic candidates in the run-off, it is possible to sidestep the 
notion that the effect of ethnicity is mediated by partisanship. If ethnicity 
only influenced partisanship, rather than directly influencing candidate 
preference, there would be no difference between Latino votes for Castro 
and Latino votes for Hardberger. 
Data and Methods34
We use both precinct and individual level data to proceed with our 
analysis of racially polarized voting. Precinct level data were obtained 
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from the Bexar County Elections Office for several elections to conduct 
our analysis. The 1991 San Antonio mayoral race between former city 
council Democrats Maria Berriozabal and Nelson Wolff is tested to estab-
lish a benchmark of the pattern of racially polarized voting and turnout 
in the city. The 2005 mayoral elections—both general and run-off—are 
subsequently tested in more detail for 1) the incidence and persistence of 
ethnically polarized voting, 2) the variation of turnout and 3) the effects 
of deracialized campaigns. First, at the precinct level, we explore the 1991 
and 2005 election data. Here, the dependent variable is the percent of votes 
cast for the Latino candidate (Berriozabal in 1991 and Castro in 2005). The 
Bexar County Election datasets also include data that allows the measure-
ment of percent Spanish-surnamed voters for 1991 and election results 
for both years. The Texas Secretary of State, Elections Division, maintains 
county data at the precinct level. From these data, the percent Spanish-
surnamed registered and the percent voters age 65 and over by precinct in 
the November 2004 election are derived. We then match these data to the 
2005 municipal election precincts. Data from the 2000 Census are used 
to create measures for the percent residents in a precinct that are Anglo, 
Latino and African American. The same data are used to estimate median 
income per precinct. The 2004 presidential election results are employed 
as indicators of partisanship. The precinct percentage vote cast for Kerry 
matched with city precincts is a proxy for party identification and strength. 
Collectively, these measures allow test for the effects of race, ethnicity, age, 
income and partisanship as control variables. Individual level data were 
obtained from Survey USA telephone polls that were conducted in May 
2005 (3320 respondents, 4.5% margin of error) and June 2005 (4981 
respondents and 4% margin of error). The June 2005 data is used in the 
analysis presented here for several reasons. The June sample size is larger 
and has more valid responses than the May dataset. The campaigns were 
nearing their end at the time the poll was conducted. Like many other elec-
tions, both candidates advertised heavily and directly against each other 
in the final weeks leading up to the run-off. In addition there was heavy, 
consistent radio, television, and print media attention to the election—
including the Wolf Memo—as the campaign wrapped up. Obviously, any 
of the campaign or media effects on preferences that presented themselves 
after the May survey would not be reflected in those responses. For these 
reasons, the June sample is used in this study. The dependent variable is 
a dichotomous variable (0 = vote for Hardberger, 1 = vote for Castro) 
tested against independent variable measures for ethnicity, age, party 
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identification, ideology, and education. The survey data are recoded to 
reflect our research interests. Because our study focuses on Latino and 
white candidates and their co-ethnic group voter behavior, ethnicity is 
coded as a dichotomous variable where 0 =White, 1 = Latino. Black voters 
accounted for a total of only 73 valid responses and are not included in 
the individual level analysis presented here. Ideology and party are three 
point scales, 0 = liberal, 1 = moderate, 2 = conservative and 0 = Democrat, 
1 = independent, 2 = Republican. Education is also constructed into a 
three point scale: Completed high school or less = 0, some college = 1, 
and completed undergraduate school and/or more = 2. Respondent age is 
coded into 11 groups ranging in value from 0 to 10: 0 = 18–25, 1 = 26–30, 2 
= 31–35, 3 = 36–40, 4 = 41–45, 5 = 46–50, 6 = 51–55, 7 = 56–60, 8 = 61–65, 
9 = 66–70, 10 = 71+. These detailed differentiations are made because age 
was such a big factor in this race. On election day, Castro was 30 years 
old and Hardberger was 70, making them the youngest and oldest candi-
dates ever to vie for the office. Bivariate contingency tables, ordinary least 
squares, and logistic regression analyses are performed to test our data and 
hypotheses. 
Analyses and Findings: 
Precinct Level Analysis 1991 and 2005
In San Antonio’s 1991 mayoral election, ethnic bloc voting was a domi-
nant characteristic. Councilperson Berriozabal, a 10-year veteran on the 
city council, squared off against an equally experienced Anglo male coun-
terpart from the council. Both candidates were well-known Democrats. 
Berriozabal represented a blue-collar, inner city district that included the 
downtown business district and portions of the predominantly Latino 
westside. Ideologically, she was left of center.35 Candidate Wolff had four 
years on the council and represented a sprawling, wealthy, and largely white 
district reaching the northwest portion of the city. Ideologically, he was the 
conservative chamber of commerce candidate.36
In a large field of 11 candidates, with 5 of them considered viable, 
Berriozabal emerged with a plurality of 30.5% of the votes in the general 
mayoral election, surprising many political pundits. Wolff emerged 
from the field with 26.2% of the votes. In the run-off election, however, 
Berriozabal’s election fortunes would turn and she would come up short 
3% of the votes relative to Wolff ’s 51.5% majority. Examining the 1991 
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run-off election returns by precinct contextualizes the persistent of ethnic 
bloc voting in San Antonio. In election precincts with 66% Spanish-
surnamed registrants or greater (n = 103), for example, 78% returned 
election margins of 66% or higher for Berriozabal. On the other hand, 
in election precincts where Spanish-surnamed registered voters were 
one-third or less (largely non-Latino precincts) of the registered voters 
in the precinct, 69.5% of the precincts returned votes for Berriozabal at 
one-third or less. Overall, the measure of association between precinct 
votes for the Latina candidate and Spanish-surnamed registration levels 
is strong and statistically significant (Tau-c = .78; prob = .000). The 
correlation between percent votes for the Latina candidate and percent 
Spanish-surnamed registrants at the precinct level was strong (.87). 
Moreover, the correlation between percent votes for the Latina candi-
date and voter turnout at the precinct level was moderate and negative 
(-.38). This correlation suggests that as turnout across the precincts 
increased, votes for the Latina candidate across the precincts decreased. 
Similarly, the correlation between voter turnout by precinct and percent 
Spanish-surnamed registrants is also negative and weaker (-.27). Here, 
as the percent Spanish-surnamed registrants in a precinct increased, the 
turnout across precincts declined. Table 1 reports the results of an OLS 
regression of the 1991 mayoral run-off election, again, using precinct 
level data. Percent votes for the Latina candidate is the dependent vari-
able and percent turnout and Spanish-surnamed registrants are indepen-
dent variables. Overall, 77% of the variance in the percent Berriozabal 
vote at the precinct level is explained in this model. Here, the influence 
of percent Spanish-surnamed registrants in the precincts is positive and 
strong (beta = .82) and percent turnout is negative and much less influ-
ential (-.16). 
Others have demonstrated the presence of a Latino candidate increased 
turnout in Latino-heavy precincts in various cities.37 We do not find this 
to be the case in San Antonio. While Berriozabal did win Latino-heavy 
precincts, turnout was not particularly high in these areas compared to 
the rest of the city. Two-thirds of Latino-heavy precincts (60% and above) 
had turnout rates that peaked at 26%. On the other hand, 60% of all Anglo 
dominant precincts had turnout rates of 32% and above. It is important to 
note that San Antonio has notoriously low voter turnout rates in municipal 
elections. In fact, this overall turnout of 30% is relatively high by this city’s 
standards.38
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Table 1: Regression of 1991 San Antonio Mayoral Run-off Election
B Std. Error Beta T Sig.
(Constant) .311 .023 13.742 .000
Percent 
turnout 2




.594 .020 .825 29.236 .000
Dependent Variable: PctBerzbl; Adjusted R Square = .77
Similar to the 1991 mayoral run-off, the 2005 mayoral run-off race 
reveals a consistent and persistent ethnic bloc voting at the precinct level 
(tau-c = .72). Here, in precincts with a high percent of Spanish-surnamed 
registrants (.66 or higher; n = 142), candidate Castro won nearly nine 
in ten (89.4%) with 66% or higher of the precinct votes. The opposite is 
also true. In lower Latino-registered precincts (.33 or less), 7 in 10 of the 
precincts returned Castro votes at one-third or less. Examining the corre-
lations among various measures reveals interesting associations. Here, for 
example, percent Castro votes in the run-off at the precinct level is strongly 
associated with total Spanish-surnamed registrants in the precinct (.80) but 
nonexistent with percent African-Americans in the precinct (.02). Income 
(median income in the precinct) is negatively correlated (-.55) with percent 
Castro votes, while percent votes cast for Democratic presidential candi-
date Kerry in November 2004 election at the precinct level is strong and 
positively associated (.70) with percent votes cast for Castro at the precinct 
level. Finally, the correlation between percent Castro in the run-off and 
percent voter turnout is moderate and negatively associated (-.30); for 
every increase in percent turnout at the precinct level, the percent Castro 
vote decreased. 
Table 2 reports results from a multiple regression using percent votes cast 
for Castro in the run-off election at the precinct level as a dependent vari-
able and percent registered voters 65 years of age or older, percent Spanish-
surnamed, percent African American and percent voter turnout all at the 
precinct level. Again, percent Spanish-surnamed registrants had the most 
influential effect (beta = .90). Percent African Americans in the precinct is 
weak but positive (.25), while percent registrants 65 and older in a precinct 
is small and negative (beta = -.07). In this model, increasing voter turnout 
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in the run-off as a percent of total registered in the precinct had no impact 
on the percent of votes Castro received in the run-off at the precinct level. 
Table 2: Regression of 2005 San Antonio Mayoral Run-off Election
B Std. Error Beta T Sig.
















.003 .067 .001 .052 .959
Dependent Variable: Pct Castro Run-off; Adjusted R Square=. 75
Substituting an interaction variable (DSPANSURN) for Democrat 
precinct (measured by percent of votes Democrat Kerry received in the 
November 2004) and percent Spanish-surnamed registration for only 
Spanish-surnamed registered in the precinct did not alter the strength of 
the model or change the direction or contribution of the independent vari-
ables in the model.39 Here, the overlap between Spanish-surnamed regis-
tered voters and Democrats at the precinct are virtually indistinguishable. 
Adding an interaction term for median income and percent Spanish-
surnamed registered in the precinct (ISPANSURN), on the one hand, while 
decreasing the explanatory strength of the model (adjusted R-square = .40), 
the relative influences of percent African American, and percent registered 
voters 65 and over increased (see Table 3). In addition, percent turnout in 
the run-off is significant and negative (-.25). While the interaction term was 
still the most influential, its relative weight decreased compared to the model 
where percent Spanish-surnamed registration was used alone. Interestingly, 
however, the interaction variable for median income and percent Spanish-
surnamed remained strong overall and positive. So, at precinct level, as 
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the median income and number of Spanish-surnamed registered voters 
increased, the percent Castro votes increased by .61 standard units. We inter-
pret this to mean that the influence of ethnicity declines but is not neutral-
ized or decreased by increased median income at the precinct level.40 These 
results address the issue of class or ethnicity and its interactive effects. 
Table 3: Regression of 2005 San Antonio Mayoral Run-off Election
B Std. Error Beta T Sig.
(Constant) .068 .021 3.03 .000
Percent 
registered age 65 
plus





.007 .001 .245 6.291 .000
Percent African 
Americans
.447 .093 .185 4.817 .000
Percent turnout 
run-offs
-.612 .099 -.248 -6.206 .000
Dependent Variable: Pct Castro Run-off; Adjusted R Square = .40
2005: Individual Level Analysis
The 2005 election began as a three-man race between Julian Castro, Phil 
Hardberger, and Carroll Schubert. Castro and Hardberger moved on to the 
run-off, winning 42% and 30% of the vote. Schubert, a four-year council 
veteran and active Republican, was eliminated from the race. Winning only 
26% of the total vote, he finished in third place. It is important to note, 
however, that a mere 17.7% of eligible voters cast ballots in the May race. 
Shortly after the general election, Schubert endorsed Hardberger; his busi-
ness community supporters and their dollars followed. All of the Schubert 
supporters surveyed—exactly 100%—indicated they would turn out to 
vote again in the June run-off. An overwhelming 90% of Schubert voters 
indicated they would support Hardberger; 77% of Schubert supporters are 
white. Recall that turnout in this election was highest in precincts where 
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Latinos comprise less than one third of the population and lowest in 
precincts where Latinos are a majority of registered voters. 
Table 4: General Election
Castro Hardberger Schubert
Total 42% 30% 26%
Ethnicity
Latino 72% 16% 9%




The initial May race produced the ethnically polarized outcomes we 
expected. Among whites, 79% cast their ballot for a co-ethnic; 35% voted 
Schubert; and 44% voted Hardberger. Castro won only 20% of the white 
vote. In the initial May race, 72% of Latinos voted for Castro; 16% voted 
Hardberger; and 9% Schubert. Typically run-off elections have a lower 
turnout than the general election. The opposite is true here. Turnout 
increased by 15,760 votes, an overall total of 1%, but a 14% increase of the 
voting population in the previous race. The increase in turnout is signifi-
cant in several ways. Schubert voters, who are overwhelmingly Republican 
and conservative, did indeed return to the polls to support a candidate with 
a well established association with liberal causes and Democratic party 
politics.41 Not only did the Schubert voters come back to vote, but also an 
additional 15,000 voters who had not participated in the election just one 
month before bringing the total turnout to 18.8%. All of that said, turnout 
in the run off was still quite low. In terms of ethnicity and turnout, over 
half of Latino supermajority precincts (66% above) turned out to vote at a 
rate of 16% or less. In two-thirds of the precincts where Latinos comprised 
less than 25% of the registered voters, turnout was at 17% and above. 
An important question to consider is where turnout increased. Turnout 
increased in Latino majority precincts, but they did not match the increase 
in white voter turnout that also occurred. 
With respect to candidate preferences, the pattern again is clear: voters 
continue to prefer candidates who share their ethnicity. As hypothesized, 
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this preference is more pronounced for white voters. In the two-man race, 
73% of Latino voters supported Castro, and 79% of whites supported 
Hardberger. What is particularly striking is the overwhelming conservative 
and Republican levels of support for Hardberger given his clear patterns of 
solidly Democrat and liberal identification.42 Many liberal establishment 
voices endorsed and contributed to Hardberger; among them were high 
profile Democrats including former Congressman Ciro Rodriguez, union 
advocates Jaime Martinez and Rosa Rosales, State Senator Leticia Van de 
Putte and Congressman Charles Gonzalez. 














Up to HS 62% 39%
Some College 45% 55%
BA and + 38% 62%
p = .000
In terms of crossover votes, Latinos are more likely to engage in cross-
over voting than Anglos in several contexts. Latino moderates, conserva-
tives, independents, Republicans, college attendees and graduates all have 
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significantly higher rates of voting for the candidate who is not of shared 
ethnicity. While it is true that high percentages of white liberals and white 
Democrats report voting for Castro, it is important to recall that their actual 
numbers are quite small in the local electorate. Despite Castro’s efforts 
to avoid running an ethnic campaign, and directing focus instead on his 
council experience, educational credentials and ideas, voters still picked up 
on ethnic cues. 
















Some College 20% 31%
College Grad/+ 20% 30%
p = .000
Two final tables illustrate the degree to which ethnicity predicted candi-
date choice in the 2005 race. We include partisanship, ideology, age, and 
education as control variables. The outcomes are significant, consistent, 
and clear. This model improves the baseline 55% cases correctly predicted 
to 76% of cases correctly predicted. Latino ethnicity is a positive and signif-
icant predictor of a vote for Castro. Those who identify as conservative and 
Republican are significantly less likely to support Castro. Older voters and 
more educated voters also preferred Hardberger, but not significantly in 
this model. This is a noteworthy outcome given the attention to candidate 
age in this race. 
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% Correctly Predicted 76.4%
N. 1800
To further test the extent to which ethnicity is driving vote choice, we bifurcate 
the logit model by ethnic group. Table 8 presents very interesting findings. Among 
white voters, Republicans, conservatives, and older voters are all more likely to cast a 
vote for Hardberger. However, the model’s overall prediction hardly improves from 
79.4% to 79.7%. This tells us that while those variables are significant, race is driving 
voter preferences, so much so that 79% of the white votes were predicted along this 
variable alone. Among Latino voters, only Republican partisanship is negatively 
and significantly associated with lesser support of Castro. Again, age was a non-
issue among these voters. Yet again we find that ethnicity alone correctly predicted 
73% of the cases, our contextual variables only improved prediction by .4%. 
Table 8: Logit Estimates: Probability of Castro Support
White Voters Latino Voters
Variable B. S.E. B. S.E.
Constant 1.4** .43 1.33** 30
Conservative -.49** .18 -0.20 .17
Republican -.76**       .15 -0.49** .13
Education -.22 .15 -0.16 .13
Age -.14 .04 .08 .04
Baseline 79.4% 73%
% Correctly Predicted 79.7% 73.4%
N. 611 477
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Campaign observers expected a degree of ethnic polarization at the polls. 
Some estimated that Castro would need about 20% of the white vote in 
order to win. Our data illustrate that he carried 21% of the white vote and 
73% of the Latino vote. Turnout in white precincts was significantly higher 
than in Latino precincts, thus Hardberger wins. 
Conclusions
Our findings present strong evidence that racial cues are significant deter-
minants of vote choice for both Anglos and Latinos. In the city of San 
Antonio, there is a degree of turnout mobilization present for both ethnic 
groups as well. We are interested in a longitudinal approach to studying 
the effects of ethnicity on vote choices in urban elections. To this point, 
the literature our paper included has focused on cross-section analysis of 
particular elections. To this end, we are interested in examining the elec-
toral dynamics of several San Antonio mayoral races, in the presence and 
absence of minority candidates, in more detail. 
It is worthwhile to contrast the findings in San Antonio with those in 
other cities with large Latino populations. In the cases of Los Angeles, 
Denver, and Miami the presence of a Latino candidate increased turnout 
in Latino majority precincts such that they exceeded many white majority 
areas. Additionally, the Latino population in these cities was far more cohe-
sive than the white population in their support for a co-ethnic candidate. 
Turnout in both the 1991 and 2005 elections examined here remained quite 
low across groups in the city: 30% in 1991, and 18% in 2005. We also find 
that Latino voters were not as cohesive as white voters or Latino voters in 
other cities. In terms of partisan identification, ideology, and vote choices, 
Latinos are less cohesive than whites. 
Despite significant ideological and partisan differences among white 
voters, they are a larger and more cohesive voting bloc than Latinos. In the 
elections we evaluate we find wide variance among white voters in terms of 
their ideology and partisanship. Yet, their votes in this race are overwhelm-
ingly in support of the same candidate with strong ties to the Democratic 
party. San Antonio voters of any ethnicity have not demonstrated a strong 
interest in local politics regardless of the presence or absence of a minority 
candidate. San Antonio voters illustrate that Latino political behavior 
cannot be generalized from the city politics of Los Angeles, Denver, or 
Miami. Unique political and demographic dynamics shape local politics. 
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We have made the case that voter behavior in 1991 and 2005 San Antonio 
mayoral races is very different from that examined recently in Los Angeles, 
Miami, Houston, and Denver. That said, there is one consistency among 
these cities that merits at least an acknowledgement here: turnout in 
Latino precincts spiked in all of these cities, San Antonio included, when 
the first Latino mayoral candidate in serious contention for the seat ran 
for office. It could be that the sense of a drought in terms of descriptive 
representation pushes Latinos to the polls. Therefore, we do not observe 
the same enthusiasm for co-ethnic voting and turnout among Latinos 
after the “first one” has been elected. This simple observation is ripe for 
further study. 
San Antonio is of particular interest for several reasons. The Latino 
population possesses particular demographics that mirror Latino voters 
in several pockets of the United States: largely Mexican American, many 
US born and a large presence in the population. The racial politics of San 
Antonio and Texas are also of importance to those examining cities directly 
affected by the Voting Rights Act. Our findings indicate that racially polar-
ized voting is not only significant and but also a steady pattern in one of 
America’s largest Latino cities. 
Appendix A: 2005










Up to HS 43% 23%
Some College 30% 30%
BA and + 28% 48%
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The focus of This volume has been on ciTies where laTinos have, 
throughout the twentieth century, busied themselves in establishing their 
cultural, social, economic, and political roots. Indeed, Latinos have, espe-
cially after WWII, engaged in politics in their respective urban spaces, strug-
gling to shape those spaces to their needs. Continuing into the twenty-first 
century, this process is now occurring in innumerable smaller urban areas 
as the Latino diaspora spreads across the United States. 
This particularly local and provincial process made these communities 
both invisible and diverse. Ironically, because of their different historical 
legacy, as opposed to European immigrants, Latinos have remained insu-
lated and invisible to mainstream America, which continues to see Latinos 
as migrant workers or simply as immigrants.1 The diversity springs from 
the varied and diverse circumstances they found themselves in from East 
Los Angeles to the Mission District in San Francisco, to Chicago, to Miami, 
to the West side of San Antonio and many other urban realities. Added to 
these multiple circumstances, the multiple national origins that make up 
the Latino community creates one of the most diverse and yet identifiable 
communities in America. Moreover, it has been difficult to generalize about 
Latino politics because Latinos, as pointed out above, may arguably be the 
most heterogeneous, or diverse, of all other cognizable ethnic or racial 
groups in the United States. Today, Latinos come from about two dozen 
different nations, each of which has its own history, economy, and social 
Conclusion: 
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and political systems. Each group has had different patterns of migration 
and encountered different experiences in the United States. Furthermore, 
national origins and generations are major lines of diversity among the 
Latino community. As the global economy engulfs the hemisphere, this 
diaspora of Latinos across North America has not only continued but 
intensified in its diversity. 
While there is considerable disagreement as to whether there is a single 
Latino “community” in the United States, the reality of a Latino commu-
nity is constantly validated as the government, the economic sector, and 
the media continue to refer to and take action with regard to a group called 
Latino or Hispanic. Also contributing to the unity of these groups are the 
combined efforts and activities in politics, as well as generally increasing 
levels of interaction among them and a heightened awareness of each other. 
Stated one way, it seems that politics is shaping the contours of what one 
identifies as Latino. 
However, this volume began with the premise that one cannot begin to 
understand Latino politics without going to its urban roots. The aim of 
this book, then, has been to explain the multiple and overlapping forms of 
Latino urban agency in five major cities in the United States: Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, Chicago, Miami, and San Antonio. Stated another way, the 
essays in this volume explore the struggle of Latinos to overcome barriers 
to full participation and political incorporation. Indeed, through this 
discussion of struggle, we can see how the Latino community has had to 
improvise in order to gain inclusion. While not all of the case studies have 
a happy ending, they tell a story of process, a process that ultimately goes 
beyond this volume. 
Our goal in this anthology is to begin the first steps towards a more 
systematic approach to understanding what we consider the roots of 
Latino community in the current state of the global economy. Utilizing 
the various manifestations of urban agency, the volume focuses on the 
political activities that have occurred in the local communities where 
the most significant numbers of Latinos reside; this is where much of 
the action has taken place and will continue to do so. Certainly this can 
be seen in the large metropolitan areas, which have large populations of 
Latinos. As Latinos increasingly disperse throughout the United States in 
significant numbers, more political activity will occur at the local level 
as Latinos press for increased representation and responsiveness to their 
policy needs. Latinos will be even more involved as influential players 
in the debates over these policies, and their inclusion will mean that the 
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policies that do emerge will be more representative of the population of 
this country. 
It would be difficult for Latinos to change the American political system 
(the basis of most xenophobic fears), including its entire apparatus—its 
philosophies, its institutions, its operating principles, its organizations, and 
its processes—and there is little evidence that this is desired by Latinos. 
Indeed, there is also little evidence that radical changes of any sort will 
occur in US politics simply due to the increase in participation by Latinos, 
women, or any other group. Moreover, the incorporation of people who are 
often distinctive in their appearance (and perhaps also in various aspects 
of their behavior) could lay the basis for an open system, making it more 
accessible to a wider spectrum of citizens of the United States. Regardless 
of outcome, we are witnessing a more culturally inclusive process where 
different cultural groups, as well as a greater range of other demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, economic class, and occupation are having 
an impact on the system. As this process becomes more evident, the public 
agenda will reflect additional policy issues related to Latino culture and to 
immigration from Latin America. The most significant question that this 
volume does not, could not, address but is of profound significance is that 
of class. If class, as Rodolfo Rosales points in his study of San Antonio, is 
the door to political inclusion, will it limit the potential of Latino urban 
agency as defined in this volume? 2
What we have suggested is that Latino influence can best be measured at 
the local level through what we call Latino urban agency; that is, the power 
of community to develop and achieve creative goals, including social and 
political change, within their social environment. We begin our examina-
tion with Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval’s study of Latinos in Los Angeles. 
Armbruster-Sandoval examines the past history of the multi-racial coali-
tions of the Left, a tradition that continues in the 1990s and beyond. He 
suggests that Latino agency can manifest itself in four different forms: 
community leadership; a grassroots movement manifesting itself in cultural 
production; the intersection of labor organizing with Latino politics; and 
building coalitions with members of other racial and ethnic groups. 
Richard DeLeon’s “The Rebirth of Latino Urban Agency in San Francisco,” 
Chapter Three, examined the Latinos of Mission District in San Francisco. 
In the Mission District the Latino community finds itself not as an isolated 
community but as a community immersed in reality with other commu-
nities who find themselves facing the same destruction of community by 
“progress.” As DeLeon has pointed out in his book, Left Coast City,3 San 
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Francisco in general, including the Mission District has been a story of 
communities that have successfully put development under siege. The story 
of the Mission District is a more detailed analysis of this conflict between 
development and community. While not ignoring or omitting the Latino 
community from his analysis, DeLeon has placed the Latino community’s 
politics in the broader context of geography and urban history. His story 
is of the most successful process of political incorporation of the Latino 
community into the larger urban picture. 
Melissa R. Michelson’s “The Fight for School Equity in Chicago’s Latino 
Neighborhoods,” Chapter Four, examines Latino urban agency through 
leadership and in the electoral context, specifically redistricting. She finds 
that Latino urban agency in Chicago hinges on the ability of Mexican 
Americans and Puerto Ricans to answer the ethnic cue mentioned in 
Manzano and Vega’s chapter by looking to certain leaders for guidance 
and mobilizing for inclusion through redistricting and supporting specific 
candidates. Because of Chicago’s industrial base it has been a major “port of 
entry” for Mexican immigrants throughout the twentieth century. Hence, 
it seems culture is carried directly from the small towns in Mexico to 
Chicago’s neighborhoods while in San Antonio; there is more of an integra-
tion of cultures, Tejano and Mexicano. Thus, culture drives the politics in a 
much more profound manner in Chicago than in San Antonio, resulting in 
increased importance of ethnic cues in Chicago. 
Montforti, Flores, and Moreno’s chapter on “Manny Diaz and the Rise 
and Fall of the Miami Renaissance,” discusses Mayor Diaz’s leadership and 
his ability to craft a political machine made up of minority developers to 
change the face of Miami’s urban landscape. Similar to DeLeon’s chapter, 
we see how Latino people construct their “political agency” in the process 
of engaging a city in the midst of change. 
In “I Don’t See Color, I Just Vote for the Best Candidate,” Manzano and 
Vega examine the way in which Latinos and whites negotiated political 
power in the electoral arena. The authors argue that ethnic group identity 
is salient in the electoral process. Manzano and Vega’s particular argument 
is that electoral contexts, specifically campaign mobilization, are the trigger 
for calling forth ethnic group identity. They conclude that Latino candi-
dates, despite living in an urban city where minority presence does not 
directly translate into political empowerment of the group, face barriers 
with ethnic groups who display dissimilar backgrounds from them. An 
ethnic electoral cue is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an appli-
cation of an ethnic group identity to a political choice. An underlying 
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dynamic in their study is that ethnic bloc voting seems to work against the 
Latino community in San Antonio because of their dominance in numbers 
and concomitant lack of political and economic resources. 
In this anthology we have suggested that Latino political influence can 
best be measured in urban cities (i.e. in cities where Latinos have mobi-
lized to gain political incorporation in different ways). As each of the case 
studies suggest, regardless of the urban regime, Latino urban agency mani-
fests itself in many forms; that is, through leadership, grassroots (collective) 
organizing, through coalition building, legal challenges, networks, lobbying, 
appointments, and in mobilizing the electorate. Further, with the demo-
graphic changes that are occurring in dramatic fashion and a presidential 
election where Latinos are playing an important role, a national presence 
is inevitable. The question then is in what form national political presence 
will manifest itself. It is a major premise in this anthology that the roots of 
the emerging presence are to be found in the urban areas. 
The objective, then, in this volume has been to show how Latinos have 
mobilized to gain political incorporation in their respective communi-
ties. One of the major outcomes has been that the diversity of political 
and cultural experiences found in the contributions to this volume would 
seem to undermine any clear path to a national political agenda (i.e., a 
Latino Agenda). While there are some similarities to the experiences of the 
European immigrant groups in the nineteenth century, the major differ-
ences are the pervasive role of race and the profound proximity of Mexico 
and the rest of Latin America. Perhaps, Samuel Huntington in a perverse 
sense is correct about the “Mexican Problem.”4 While assimilation and 
acculturation certainly has occurred and is occurring, today, it is a two 
way street. 
First, there is the common language tie of most Latino communities that 
is indeed impacting schools and their curriculums and as Michelson shows, 
is impacting politics. Second, there is the collective behavior born out of 
the indigenous cultures that however much subjugated have provided a 
cultural base in the experience of most Latinas and Latinos. Certainly this 
is borne out in the various studies presented here. While, the historical 
status of Latinos, in particular Mexicans in the Southwest, as incorporated 
citizens of a territory taken in the war with Mexico, has complicated the 
definition of Latinos in general, in the twenty-first century, this historical 
factor is lost on most. Indeed, even the concept of immigrant is blurred 
as Latino communities continue to grow in the urban areas and as they 
continue to gain political incorporation. 
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In conclusion, what we have found in the various essays in this volume 
is that the national political status of the Latino community, which seems 
inevitable today, will certainly be defined in ways that are different from 
most other groups that have gained a national presence, including the 
African American community and the various ethnic groups in this nation’s 
political history. These essays provide a window to the incredible change 
occurring on the ground. What does this say about Latino politics? What 
can we project about Latinos in American politics? At worst, it forebodes 
a hopelessly fragmented political base, unmanageable in political terms. At 
best, it represents the best of the American ideal of diversity and democ-
racy. This view would follow the Alexis de Tocqueville view that democracy 
works best through associational activity at the local level.5 What we do 
know is the diversity found on the ground combined with some lasting 
common characteristics, historical, cultural, and linguistic, complicates any 
effort to predict the future of Latino politics. 
What we set out to do, however, and feel we have successfully done, is 
analyze the roots of the Latino political presence (agency) in the United 
States. To that objective we invited and received five diverse, but excellent 
pictures of that agency in five major US cities. This by no means captures 
the very complex and tumultuous entry of Latinos into US politics, but the 
different contributions do present excellent analyses of how the various 
Latino communities have mobilized and impacted their political environ-
ment. How will this translate into a national politics for the Latino commu-
nity? Some questions that we can raise are what kinds of issues will serve as 
mobilizing issues for the Latino community? Will it be immigration? Will 
it be education? Or will this translate via the social issues confronting the 
various Latino communities into a broader agenda reflecting other groups 
in society with a common concern for a social agenda, (e.g., the African 
American community, the various white, working-class communities, the 
very diverse Asian communities, etc). Certainly social issues will be para-
mount in mobilizing the various communities. 
Finally, given the election of the first African American President of the 
United States, the economic conditions that the United States is currently 
facing, and the social conditions that it will most certainly leave in its wake, 
the social agenda that will most certainly emerge from this process may be 
the historical juncture where a broader politics brings together the various 
ethnic, racial, and working class communities in changing the old political 
equation in electoral politics of white, then black, and sometimes “other.” 
But while there is an emerging successful Latino Middle Class intensely 
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involved in its own individualistic success, a social agenda will most certainly 
emerge as the various Latino urban communities continue to struggle for 
incorporation which is based on social issues. What we can project is that 
because of the profound roots of Latino politics in community, and to the 
dismay of many xenophobes, Latino politics is changing and will change 
the political expectations that we have of government from the local to the 
state to the national. There is an old joke that if you put ten Latinos in a 
room you will come out with ten organizations. The hidden truth in that 
joke is that the collective approach by Latinos that is implied by political 
incorporation is that Latinos will certainly play a major role in the twenty-
first century global environment in addressing the disastrous impact that 
global forces have had on all communities. 
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Indeed, the invisibility goes back to the 1960s when Octavio Romano V, 1. 
among other pioneering Chicano intellectuals, challenged the Social Science 
treatment of Chicanos in the following manner: “Suppose that you are a 
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